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INTRODUCTION 
Standardization creates enormous benefits for all those it 
affects, and in doing so it creates enormous economic value. The 
value is enjoyed in varying shares by the public, standards-
implementing device manufacturers, service providers, and the 
owners of patents on the technology implemented in standards. 
How should this value be allocated among these stakeholders? 
Some suggest that the free market should make this 
determination in a reign of laissez-faire—in what Hobbes 
describes as the “war of all against all.”1 But that is too simple. 
The free market may well be unable to resolve this conundrum. 
                                                          
 1.  THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 101 (Bernard Gert ed., Doubleday 1972) 
(1642). 
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Any resolution requires all sorts of state intervention and 
coercion—contract enforcement in courts, patent infringement 
litigation remedies, and government and private antitrust 
litigation backed up by judicial enforcement. Moreover, as US 
courts have recognized, market failure is inevitable and may 
therefore lead to unjustified wealth transfers. For 
standardization necessarily creates potentially harmful 
monopoly power unless some private or public means modulate 
the monopoly power to some degree. 
In the last several years, this issue has become the focus of 
increasing controversy, and therefore of increasing public policy 
concern. This controversy has been marked by: patent 
infringement litigation,2 largely over the determination of 
reasonable royalties for standard-essential patents (SEPs);3 a 
2015 update of the Patent Policy4 of the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a major US standard-setting 
organization (SSO); a business review of that Patent Policy 
update at the Antitrust Division,5 concluding with a 
                                                          
 2. See, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. 
(CSIRO), 809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 
F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014); VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 3. A standard-essential patent (SEP) is a patent that is necessarily 
infringed when a standard-compliant device is manufactured or a standard-
compliant service is performed. A SEP covers technology embodied in a 
standard or that the standard implements. Standards typically incorporate 
patented technology of many SEPs. Since each SEP is essential to making a 
standard-compliant product, at least in principle, each is a sine qua non for 
compliance. There are patents designated as SEPs, however, that cover only 
optional features or certain types of implementations of standards. Therefore, 
some standard-compliant products implement the technology of only some of 
the designated SEPs for a given standard. See, e.g., Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232 
(referring to IEEE 802.11 standard); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-
1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *160 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) 
(“[D]espite the fact that Motorola argues that these 13 patents are ‘essential’ to 
the 802.11 Standard. . . . Microsoft [standard-compliant] products do not use 
these patents in any way . . . .”), aff’d on other grounds, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 4. The update is part of Article 6.2 of the Standards Board Bylaws of the 
IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA). INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, IEEE-
SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.2 (2016), https://standards.ieee.org/develop 
/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf. 
 5. Renata B. Hesse, Response to Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, Incorporated, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter DOJ 
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determination that the policy did not appear to violate the 
antitrust laws; opposition and resistance to the 2015 policy 
update from major US and European owners of SEPs covering 
technology used in standards that cell phones implement;6 
national regulatory agencies’ trade regulation enforcement 
actions in Korea,7 China,8 Japan,9 and Taiwan10 against a 
dominant US cell phone SEP owner and cell phone 
telecommunications chip seller (Qualcomm, Incorporated) for 
allegedly abusive exploitation of its SEP ownership; and 
January 2017 lawsuits that the US Federal Trade Commission 
                                                          
Response to IEEE], https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-
and-electronics-engineers-incorporated. 
 6. See text infra at notes 327–62. 
 7. See Press Release, Korean Fair Trade Comm’n, KFTC Imposes 
Sanctions Against Qualcomm’s Abuse of SEPs of Mobile Communications (Dec. 
28, 2016) [hereinafter KFTC Press Release], http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/solution 
/skin/doc.html?fn=0575fbdccbed8ced77b565db3dc7d32ffc7051e67ef109afad6d4 
f1cd780d6e8&rs=/eng/files/data/result/files/bbs/2017/. 
 8. See Noel Randewich & Matthew Miller, Qualcomm to Pay $975 Million 
to Resolve China Antitrust Dispute, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2015, 3:19 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-qualcomm/qualcomm-to-pay-975-
million-to-resolve-china-antitrust-dispute-idUSKBN0LD2EL20150209. 
 9. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Cease and Desist Order 
Against Qualcomm Incorporated (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en 
/pressreleases/yearly-2009/sep/individual-000038.html. 
 10. See Taiwan Fines Qualcomm $774 Million for Antitrust Violations, 
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2017, 8:31 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
qualcomm-taiwan-fine/taiwan-fines-qualcomm-774-million-for-antitrust-
violations-idUSKBN1CG1RF; see also Trefis Team, EU Charges on Qualcomm 
Less Serious Than the Charges in Taiwan, South Korea and China, FORBES 
(Dec. 11, 2015, 8:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015 
/12/11/eu-charges-on-qualcomm-less-serious-than-the-charges-in-taiwan-
south-korea-and-china/#5e5dd80f75b0 (explaining that the EU charges are less 
serious because they might not affect Qualcomm’s licensing business); Lisa 
Wang, Qualcomm Defends Licensing Fees, TAIPEI TIMES (June 24, 2016), http:// 
www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2016/06/24/2003649305. 
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(FTC)11 and then Apple, Incorporated,12 brought against 
Qualcomm, again for alleged SEP abuse. 
A principal issue in this cascade of controversy has been how 
an obligation to exact only fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) royalties13 for the use of a SEP 
                                                          
 11. FTC’s Complaint for Equitable Relief, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 5:17-
cv-00220 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter FTC Complaint], 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170117qualcomm_redacted_complai
nt.pdf. The FTC’s case has been set for a bench trial in January 2019. Case 
Management Order, FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/345670815/17-04-19-FTC-v-
Qualcomm-Case-Schedule#download. The district court has denied a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., No.17-CV-
00220-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98632 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017). 
 12. Redacted Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Judgment and 
Injunctive Relief & Demand for Jury Trial, Apple, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 
3:17-cv-00108-GPC-NLS (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Apple 
Complaint], https://courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Apple-
Qualcomm.pdf. On June 20, 2017, Apple filed an amended complaint. Redacted 
First Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive 
Relief & Demand for Jury Trial, Apple, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
00108-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2017) [hereinafter Amended Apple 
Complaint], https://www.scribd.com/embeds/351792817/content?start_page=1 
&view_mode=scroll&access_key=key-di0rvYKoCOQuLijm0DzM&show 
_recommendations=true. In July, Qualcomm filed a patent infringement suit 
against Apple on non-SEPs that Qualcomm asserted Apple was infringing. 
Complaint for Patent Infringement & Demand for a Jury Trial, Qualcomm, Inc. 
v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01375-JAH-AGS (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2017), https:// 
www.qualcomm.com/documents/qualcomm-apple-complaint-us-district-court. 
Qualcomm also filed a complaint with the United States International Trade 
Commission (ITC) alleging that Apple has engaged in the unlawful importation 
and sale of iPhones that infringe six Qualcomm patents. Press Release, 
Qualcomm, Qualcomm Files Patent Infringement Complaints Against Apple 
with International Trade Commission and Federal Court (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2017/07/06/qualcomm-files-patent-
infringement-complaints-against-apple-international (including both of 
Qualcomm’s complaints). 
 13. The term RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) was widely used 
in the United States for many years to describe reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms in patent licenses—particularly in antitrust decrees. See, 
e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 94 (1950) (requiring 
compulsory licensing of patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms); 
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 857 (D.N.J. 1953) (“[G]rant 
upon request similar licenses and rights, and perform such undertaking and 
grant, all upon reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, to any 
applicant in the United States . . . .”). In United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 
U.S. 52, 64 (1973), the Supreme Court stated that “compulsory patent licensing 
at reasonable charges” is a recognized remedy in antitrust cases, citing Besser 
Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); International Salt Co. 
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should be understood—in particular, whether the proper royalty 
base for a percentage-of-sales royalty should be the price of the 
smallest saleable patent-practicing unit of a standard-compliant 
product (such as a chip or chipset used to encode and decode 
signals for cell phone use), or should be the price of the standard-
compliant downstream device (such as a cell phone incorporating 
                                                          
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); and Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 
323 U.S. 386 (1945). In recent years, the term FRAND, favored in Europe, has 
tended to supersede RAND. The term F/RAND has been used to refer to RAND 
and FRAND collectively. Judge Posner has observed that “the word ‘fair’ adds 
nothing to ‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory.’” See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 912 (N.D. Ill. 2012), modified on other grounds, 757 
F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
The ICC used similar terminology first, perhaps, in regulating railroad 
rates. See S. Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U.S. 537, 547 (1913) (“[C]ertain freight 
rates maintained by the Southern Pacific Company between Portland and other 
places on its lines in Oregon were unreasonable, excessive, and discriminatory, 
and the commission required the company, in lieu of the rates thus disapproved, 
to put into effect the ‘just and reasonable and non-discriminatory charges’ set 
forth in the order.”). Contemporaneously, in United States v. Terminal R.R. 
Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912), in which a combination of railroads 
monopolized access to all means of crossing the Mississippi River at St. Louis, 
the Court ordered that other railroads should be allowed access to the essential 
facility on “such just and reasonable terms as shall place such applying 
company upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and burdens with the 
present proprietary companies.” Still earlier, the term “reasonable royalty” was 
used in several patent cases (without reference to non-discrimination) to 
provide an appropriate measure of compensation for the unauthorized 
governmental use of the patent. See, e.g., McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 
396, 425, 430–31 (Ct. Cl. 1878) (finding that “25 cents a box was a fair and 
reasonable royalty for the right to manufacture and use the article in question,” 
but because another patentee’s invention contributed 5 cents per box to its 
manufacture and use, the court apportioned 20 cents per box to the plaintiff as 
monetary relief); Hubbell v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 1, 31 (Ct. Cl. 1869). 
Finally, regulation of utilities generally operates under a standard that 
the regulatory agency is to set rates that are “just, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory.” See, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 
487 U.S. 354, 363, 360 n.6 (1988); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 474 
(1936) (explaining that 7 U.S.C. § 211 directs Secretary of Agriculture to 
prescribe “just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” rates for stockyard 
services); Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 689 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that 
FCC properly held that regulatory requirements remained necessary for 
continued assurance of “just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” terms of 
service); District of Columbia v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 402 A.2d 430, 436 
(D.C. 1979) (citing D.C. CODE §§ 43-301 through 43-401 (1973)) (explaining that 
the D.C. Public Service Commission has “unqualified authority to fix and 
maintain ‘reasonable, just and non-discriminatory’ rates for electric service.”); 
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 107 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Mass. 1952) 
(“‘[A]dequate, just, reasonable and non-discriminatory . . . charges’ . . . .”). 
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such a chip or chipset); and to what extent an individual SEP 
royalty should be limited to a share of a sum of SEP royalties 
that in total add up to only a reasonable royalty, where the 
individual royalty shares are apportioned relatively to their 
respective technology contributions to the standard. The 
resolution of these issues ultimately depends on how it is 
properly decided who “owns” or should capture the economic 
values that standardization creates. Or, since it is inevitable 
that different stakeholders will capture varying shares of these 
economic values, the question becomes whether and how the 
relative shares (or the otherwise unseized, contestable part of 
the total) should be allocated under our legal system. 
Part I of this Article describes the benefits and value that 
standardization creates for the public, industry, and SEP 
owners. Standardization enables product interoperability, which 
causes network effects that result in increased benefits as more 
persons use the standardized products that interoperate with 
one another in a network. But standardization can also create 
monopoly power that, if unchecked by appropriate private or 
public mechanisms, may have harmful effects. Standardization 
has led to contests over who should capture the added economic 
value that standardization creates—owners of patents on 
technology embodied in standards, implementers of standards, 
or the general consumer public. The smartphone litigation 
described above paradigmatically illustrates such contests. 
Part II of the Article describes the technological background 
of smartphone standardization. Part III describes cell phone 
industry structure and Qualcomm’s position as a dominant 
patent owner and telecommunications chip seller. Part IV 
describes the marketing practices that the FTC and Apple 
complain of in their suits against Qualcomm. These largely 
involve allegedly abusive royalty terms in the licensing and sale 
of telecommunications chips essential for the manufacture of 
standard-compliant smartphones. 
Part V addresses the current case law governing FRAND 
patent royalties, particularly as to patents essential to standard-
compliance. In large part, the cases have involved cellular 
technology, and were decided in the last few years by the Federal 
Circuit. Part VI describes the IEEE’s efforts to establish for its 
standardization programs a patent licensing regime (the 2015 
Patent Policy update) that reflects the case law discussed in Part 
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V, and the massive resistance that the IEEE’s efforts met from 
some major cell phone technology patent owners. Part VI of the 
Article also discusses, in light of the case law that Part V 
describes, two current disputes unsettling the implementation 
of the IEEE’s policy. 
Part VII addresses in further detail patent owners’ policy 
arguments that, contrary to the recent Federal Circuit decisions, 
they are entitled to capture the monetary value standardization 
creates. Part VII then addresses the difficulties that trying to 
decide who is so entitled raises, and possible assumptions that 
must be made (or rejected) in carrying out any such 
determination. Finally, this part explores a utilitarian theory 
that suggests that the general public—for example, the 
smartphone buyer public (80 to 95 percent of Americans, in 
various age groups)—is the most entitled candidate for 
ownership of the value of standardization. 
The Article concludes that it is problematic that the general 
consumer public could succeed in capturing that monetary 
value. The fallout from the current Qualcomm litigation, 
however, might trigger events that would bring about such a 
result. 
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I. THE BENEFITS, VALUE, AND RISKS OF 
STANDARDIZATION 
A. PUBLIC AND USER BENEFITS 
Standardization14 has enormous direct benefits for the 
public because it enables interoperability,15 which contributes to 
network effects16 that benefit users of standard-implementing 
products.17 Interoperability promotes demand for products and 
                                                          
 14. Standardization is the development and adoption of uniform criteria or 
specifications for manufacturing, processing, or using products or services. The 
criteria or specifications may be functional, permitting those implementing the 
standard to do so with whatever equipment or process they choose in order to 
satisfy the standard’s functional requirements; or they may be design or 
prescriptive standards, which require implementers to use particular 
equipment or processes. See generally Statement of Daniel D. Castro, Senior 
Analyst, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, The Importance 
of Functional Standards to Promote Innovation in Voting System Technology, 
U.S. Election Assistance Commission Roundtable Discussion (Austin, TX, Dec. 
11, 2007), http://www.itif.org/files/VVSGstatement.pdf; WIKIPEDIA, Technical 
standard, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technical_standard (last updated Aug. 
24, 2017). Standards may be de facto or de jure. A de facto standard is one 
established by an individual firm or private organization, such as the Betamax 
videotape standard or the Adobe pdf standard. Such a standard may clear the 
market of alternative standards and their technology, because of widespread 
adoption of the first standard. A de jure standard is one adopted by a standard-
setting organization (SSO) through a consensus process, such as the IEEE 
802.11 wireless standard, which much of the case law and material in this 
Article concerns. 
 15. An illustrative example of interoperability that bears directly on the 
issues addressed in this Article is provided in J. Gregory Sidak, The Value of a 
Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68 BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 61 (2016). 
A cell phone compliant to the IEEE 802.11 standard,  
made by Foxconn, sold by Apple, and operating on AT&T’s network can 
connect to a base station, made by Ericsson and operated by Verizon, 
and send a text message to a phone sold by Samsung operating on 
Sprint’s network, through a base station made by Alcatel-Lucent and 
operated by T-Mobile.  
The point is that these products from many different manufacturers can 
interoperate in one huge network, rather than being isolated in small, separate 
networks. 
 16. See generally Arun Sundararajan, Network Effects, @DIGITALARUN, 
http://oz.stern.nyu.edu/io/network.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (explaining 
that a network effect is the effect that additional users of a good or service have 
on the value of that product to other users, and that the value to each user 
increases as the number of users increases). 
 17. The benefits users get from the interoperability of such a network is 
proportional to the number of possible interactions among users. The number of 
possible interconnections that the interoperability of the network makes possible—for 
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services that the standard concerns, because of network effects. 
The increased demand benefits implementing manufacturers, 
resulting in increased sales and creating economies of scale that 
lower manufacturing costs, to the benefit of the manufacturers 
and (to the extent they are passed on) to the benefit of consumers 
as well. Product interoperability ensures that products from a 
variety of suppliers will work together efficiently, thus reducing 
costs for consumers and producers, making products more 
valuable, and promoting innovation both in and around the 
standard; in addition, standardization can increase competition 
among technologies for inclusion in standards, indirectly 
benefiting consumers through increased functionality or lower 
prices (and sometimes both).18 It also benefits the public by 
increasing the number of alternative sellers available to 
consumers of standardized products.19 These benefits often 
interrelate and promote one another synergistically. 
B. SEP HOLDER BENEFITS 
SEP holders also benefit from standardization in several 
ways. Increased sales resulting from standardization correlate 
with increased royalty payments on the relevant patents. The 
benefit is not limited to the patent royalties that SEP owners 
gain from the incorporation of their technology into a particular 
standard. If they make and sell a product (for example, a chipset) 
that implementers of the standard need, they gain from 
increased sales volume and, more important, they gain from the 
first-mover and head-start advantages they derive from the 
adoption of their technology, with which they are already 
                                                          
example, the number of persons that a telephone system subscriber can call or be called 
by—is a measure of the value of subscribing to the network. The aggregate number 
of possible interactions, say possible telephone calls between two people in a 
network of n nodes, say n telephones, is approximately proportional to n2. See 
infra Appendix A. 
 18. DOJ Response to IEEE, supra note 5, at 3. 
 19. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 
2015) (explaining that standardization “increases competition by lowering 
barriers to entry and adds value to manufacturers’ products by encouraging 
production by other manufacturers of devices compatible with them.”); Apple, 
Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2011 WL 7324582, at *1 (W.D. 
Wis. June 7, 2011) (“Standards lower costs by increasing product 
manufacturing volume and they increase price competition by eliminating 
‘switching costs’ for consumers who desire to switch from products 
manufactured by one firm to those manufactured by another.”). 
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familiar.20 No wonder then that patent owners vie to have their 
technology anointed by standardization,21 engaging in 
competitive bidding even to the point of offering free use of 
patented technology to implementers to win selection.22 
                                                          
 20. See Fernando Suarez & Gianvito Lanzolla, The Half-Truth of First-
Mover Advantage, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2005), https://hbr.org/2005/04/the-
half-truth-of-first-mover-advantage (“Business executives from every kind of 
company maintain, almost without exception, that early entry into a new 
industry or product category gives any firm an almost insuperable head start.”); 
see also W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and 
Lock-in by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 116 (1989), http://www.economia 
.ufpr.br/Eventos/Downloads/Minicurso2b.pdf (“[A] technology that by chance 
gains an early lead in adoption may eventually ‘corner the market’ of potential 
adopters, with the other technologies becoming locked out.”); Sundararajan, 
supra note 16, at 2 (“Theories of competition in network industries emphasize 
the path dependence of outcomes, and suggest that early leads are important, 
intrinsically inferior products will frequently dominate superior products, and 
influencing customer expectations plays a crucial role in ‘winning’ in a network 
market.”). A further advantage to a patent owner that has its patented 
technology incorporated into a standard may be obtaining “external” benefits 
from its participation. For example, Microsoft may have gained collateral 
benefits beyond any negligible royalties it received from its H.264 SEPs, 
because making more video content available to computer users because of 
computer manufacturers’ adoption of the standard fostered “the success of its 
Windows operating system, which is more valuable as more video content is 
available.” Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined 
FRAND Royalties, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW 378–79 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017). 
 21. See J.S. Greenfield, Comment to IEEE Patent Policy Change Would 
Undermine Property Rights and Innovation, TRUTH ON MKT. (Feb. 5, 2015, 
10:11 AM), https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/02/04/ieee-patent-policy-change 
-would-undermine-property-rights-and-innovation/ (“Participants in standards 
efforts routinely lobby to have their particular approach adopted into a 
standard. If their approach is adopted, they potentially stand to profit 
immensely from royalties on any patents they hold or are pursuing. If a 
competing approach is adopted, they don’t stand to profit, and will likely instead 
face paying significant royalties to others, including direct competitors. That is, 
these participants frequently participate in large degree to try to influence the 
design choices made, for their own benefit.”). 
 22. One illuminative example is an early 2000s contest between Intersil, 
the proprietor of Complementary Code Keying-Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (CCK-OFDM) technology, and Texas Instruments (TI), the 
proprietor of Packet Binary Convolutional Code (PBCC) technology, over having 
IEEE Standard 802.11g based on their mutually incompatible respective 
technologies. The IEEE working group was divided 60–40 over which 
technology it preferred to adopt for the standard, since each had different 
advantages. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, What Is PBCC Anyway?, WI-FI 
PLANET.COM (Oct. 8, 2002), http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/columns/Article.php 
/1478441/What-is-PBCC-Anyway.htm. The 60–40 split was in Intersil’s favor, 
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Consider, for example, the once-heated rivalry between two cell 
phone technologies—WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) championed by 
Intel, and LTE championed by Qualcomm—and the similar 
rivalry over videotape standardization between VHS 
championed by Matsushita-JVC and Betamax championed by 
Sony.23 Such “standards wars” can result in the winning 
technology clearing the market of rival technologies. 
Standardization thus also has exclusionary potential,24 for 
technologies defeated in standards wars may vanish from the 
                                                          
but TI then offered its technology on a royalty-free basis, if it was made “the 
sole mandatory implementation for the IEEE 802.11g standard.” Chris 
Heegard, Texas Instruments IEEE 802.11g Royalty-Free Intellectual Property 
Statement, TEX. INSTRUMENTS (Jan. 2001), https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn 
/01/11-01-0023-01-0000-texas-instruments-ip-statement-for-802-11-tgg.ppt. 
Intersil then made a similar royalty-free offer, without the requirement of being 
the sole mandatory implementation. Letter from Larry Ciaccia, Vice-President, 
Intersil Corp., to IEEE (July 1, 2002), http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb 
/patcom/loa-802_11g-intersil-01Jul2002.pdf. After both contestants had 
competitively bid themselves down to zero, the 802.11g working group allowed 
both technologies to be used as alternative optional implementations, as a 
compromise to allow both firms to market their respective devices—which was 
the firms’ main concern. See Jim Zyren, IEEE 802.11g to Benefit WLANs, EE 
TIMES (June 28, 2002, 10:17 AM), http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc 
_id=1200918. 
 23. See generally Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, The Art of Standards Wars, 
41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8 (1999), http://sjbae.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/46841661 
/the%20art%20of%20standard%20wars.pdf (discussing standards wars and 
related strategy). The January 2017 Apple Complaint alleges that “Qualcomm 
forced Apple to renounce WiMAX just as WiMAX was gaining traction in the 
marketplace.” Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 27; see also Elizabeth 
Corcoran, Intel’s WiMax Bet, FORBES (July 5, 2008, 7:05 PM), https://www 
.forbes.com/2008/05/07/intel-clearwire-wimax-tech-enter-cx_ec_0507intel.html 
(discussing Intel’s investment in WiMAX). 
 24. See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 
570–71 (1982); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 364 
U.S. 656, 658–60 (1961). 
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market,25 and so may firms relying on commercially exploiting 
that technology.26 
C. EFFECT OF STANDARDIZATION ON SEP VALUE 
Courts have recognized that a great economic value of 
standardization—to the owner of a SEP for a technology 
“anointed” as standard—is that the SEP owner acquires 
monopoly power as a result of the adoption of the standard. 
Those who seek to make and sell products implementing the 
standard have no choice but to use the anointed technology and 
thus to practice (and infringe) the relevant SEP.27 Owning a SEP 
is like owning a toll booth on the only bridge across the 
Mississippi River.28 Others have implied that this practice 
makes the SEP owner a potential equivalent to a holdup artist.29 
                                                          
 25. For example, if LTE is predominantly adopted for 4G (as it was) then 
WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) fades into obscurity. The spread of VHS videotape 
format excluded Betamax from the market. In high-definition DVD, Blu-ray 
excluded HD DVD. Alternating current excluded direct current in power 
distribution. See generally Shapiro & Varian, supra note 23. “Competitions 
between incompatible standards have a ‘winner-take-all’ quality . . . .” Mark A. 
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 515 (1998). 
 26. In one case, a firm’s patented cellular technology was the core of its 
business, so that when other firms allegedly successfully conspired to exclude it 
from a standard (4G LTE), the effect on its business was disastrous because 
inclusion of the technology in the standard was “vital to . . . commercial 
success.” See TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 
3584626, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss) (“Inclusion 
in the 3GPP 4G LTE standard is vital to the commercial success of 
TruePosition’s UTDOA positioning technology.”); TruePosition, Inc. v. LM 
Ericsson Tel. Co., 844 F. Supp. 2d 571, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“TruePosition 
further alleges that ‘inclusion in the 3GPP standard is vital to commercial 
success. Exclusion from the standard guarantees commercial failure and, in 
most cases, absolute foreclosure from the market.’”). Similar exclusionary 
impacts injured the plaintiffs in the Hydrolevel and Radiant Burners cases. 
Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 562; Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 658. 
 27. As Judge Posner explained: “once a patent becomes essential to a 
standard, the patentee’s bargaining power surges because a prospective 
licensee has no alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the patentee’s 
mercy.” Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012), 
modified on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 28. Cf. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
 29. Judge Posner continued: “The purpose of the FRAND requirements . . . 
is to confine the patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent 
itself as distinct from the additional value—the hold-up value—conferred by the 
patent’s being designated as standard-essential.” Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 
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Consequently, “the development of standards creates an 
opportunity for companies to engage in anti-competitive 
behavior”30 since “SEP holders obtain substantial leverage over 
. . . product developers, who have little choice but to incorporate 
SEP technologies into their products.”31 They are a captive 
market. That standard-development leverage permits SEP 
holders “to demand more for a license than the patented 
technology, had it not been adopted by the SSO, would be worth,” 
unless a FRAND obligation prevents that.32 
In other words, the value of a patent before it is incorporated 
into a standard (its ex-ante value) reflects only the merits of the 
patented technology. The ex-ante value of a patent is not as great 
a value as the patent acquires upon its anointment as a SEP (its 
ex-post value). This increase in value occurs regardless of 
                                                          
at 913; see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change 
Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 
ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 760 (1998) (“The general danger of allowing a private 
party to own intellectual property rights in an open standard is that the private 
party may at some point . . . set[] an unreasonable price . . . . If the standard 
has been widely adopted in a network market, this form of ‘intellectual property 
ambush’ can impose a significant cost on users of the standard.”). 
 30. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 31. Id. at 1031. 
 32. Id.; see also Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (“Patent hold-up exists when the holder of a SEP demands excessive 
royalties after companies are locked into using a standard.”); Broadcom Corp. 
v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A SEP’s] value becomes 
significantly enhanced, however, after the patent is incorporated in a standard. 
Firms may become locked in to a standard requiring the use of a competitor’s 
patented technology. The patent holder’s [patent rights], if unconstrained, may 
permit it to demand supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that 
measures such as FRAND commitments become important safeguards against 
monopoly power.”); Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 
788, 795–96 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“This court finds the reasoning in Broadcom 
persuasive and joins the Third Circuit in concluding that these FRAND 
commitments are intended as a ‘bulwark’ against the unlawful accumulation of 
monopoly power that antitrust laws are designed to prevent. Thus, Motorola’s 
efforts to side-step this bulwark, as alleged in this case, are harmful not only to 
RIM but to competition in general. . . . Both the Third Circuit, in Broadcom, and 
the Supreme Court, in Allied Tube, have stated that standards, without the 
proper safeguards, are inherently anticompetitive. It follows that when an 
entity side-steps these safeguards in an effort to return the standard to its 
natural anti-competitive state, anti-competitive effects are inevitable. 
Motorola’s breach of the [FRAND] commitments to IEEE and ETSI, as a result, 
is harmful to competition.”). 
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whether a patented technology is incorporated into the standard 
because it is superior to all other patented or unpatented 
technologies and thus providing a unique functionality or, 
instead, because its selection and incorporation is merely an 
arbitrary design choice among several approximately equally 
satisfactory technologies providing the same functionality.33 The 
difference between ex-ante and ex-post values is sometimes 
referred to as the surplus value that standardization creates by 
its anointment of a patent as a SEP.34 The surplus is an increase 
in value resulting, primarily, from the combined action of 
network effect (interoperability) and exclusionary effect. 
D. SUNK-COST HOLDUP 
Standardization creates another value in the sense that it is 
something that can be monetized (cashed in on). As will be 
apparent, it is not a legitimate value, and it has no overt 
defenders—this is sunk-cost holdup value.35 A user of technology 
may become subject to sunk-cost holdup if the user has incurred 
sunk costs in implementing the relevant technology, thereby 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., J.S. Greenfield, supra note 21 (“There are two classes of 
standard essential patents: those that would be essential to any possible 
standard, regardless of design choices, and those that are essential to a 
particular standard, on the basis of design choices made in creating the 
standard. Most SEPs fall into the latter category.”); see also supra note 22 
(discussing the TI–Intersil contest over 802.11g, in which IEEE working group 
found each technology approximately equally satisfactory). 
 34. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931 (2013), https://www.criterioneconomics.com 
/meaning-of-frand-royalties-for-standard-essential-patents.html, which 
extensively discusses the appropriate division of the surplus created by a 
standard; see also J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and 
Comparable Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1809, 1832 
(2016), quoted infra text preceding note 500. 
 35. For extensive discussions of sunk-cost holdup, see Norman V. Siebrasse 
& Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1159 (2017); 
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 20. As they point out, sunk-cost holdup should 
be distinguished from appropriation of the value of network effects, with which 
the present Article is largely concerned. The Value of the Standard, supra, at 
1168, specifically points out that “network value appropriation is not a concern 
that should be addressed in assessing FRAND royalties, and it is a mistake to 
conflate this phenomenon with sunk costs holdup.” Siebrasse and Cotter do 
argue, however, that SEP owners should be allowed to capture a portion of the 
value of network effects, in order to provide adequate incentives to SEP owners. 
This Article is concerned largely with network value appropriation, and 
addresses their argument in Part VII, text infra notes 439–86. 
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becoming vulnerable to substantial switching expenses if it must 
change the technology it uses. The company may then be 
“ambushed” by a SEP holder demanding high royalties.36 This 
ambush may be the result of deceptive practices during the 
standardization process (i.e., the ambusher withholds the 
existence of a patent, so that the SSO unwittingly incorporates 
patented technology into the standard) or a patent application 
covering relevant technology may issue (as a so-called 
submarine patent) only after the standard has been adopted—or 
both.37 It might occur also as the result of reneging on a FRAND 
commitment,38 or a SEP owner might change its mind as to 
                                                          
 36. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE 
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARDS–SETTING 16, 24 n.2, 60–64 (2004) 
(collecting cases on ambush and discussing them). 
 37. In Rambus Inc. v. FTC both occurred. Rambus participated in a 
memory chip standardization process of the Joint Electron Device Engineering 
Council (JEDEC). Rambus did not disclose its pending patent applications 
involving the technology incorporated into the standard, and amended the 
coverage of the patent applications on the basis of the working group’s closed-
door deliberations during the standard-setting process. After the patents 
issued, Rambus extracted high royalties from users of the standard. The FTC 
found a violation of FTC Act § 5, but the D.C. Circuit reversed because “there 
was insufficient evidence that JEDEC would have standardized other 
technologies had it known the full scope of Rambus’s intellectual property.” 
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
Earlier ambush cases were Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitsubishi 
Electronics America, Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and Dell Computer 
Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). In Wang, the patent owner Wang deceived an 
implementer and an SSO into believing that it had no patents and had no 
intentions to assert patents, but it had patent applications that became patents, 
and it subsequently asserted them. Wang, 103 F.3d at 1575–76. This entire 
course of conduct was found to establish an implied license under which Wang 
consented to the use of the inventions, royalty free. Id. at 1581–82. In Dell, Dell 
told the SSO that it had no patent rights but, after the SSO included the 
patented technology in the standard, Dell asserted the patent. Dell, 121 F.T.C. 
at 627–28. Dell settled with the FTC on the basis that the undisclosed patents 
would not be enforced against implementers. Id. at 620. Since then, litigation 
has focused less on ambush of this type than on attempts to charge high 
royalties despite a RAND commitment. 
 38. See discussion of the N-Data case, text infra notes 225–39, in which the 
patent owner reneged on a RAND commitment in an effort to hold up users of 
what had become a major computer industry standard. In another case, 
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007), the SEP owner 
allegedly deceived the SSO by fraudulently inducing it to incorporate its 
WCDMA technology into the UMTS standard, by making a FRAND 
commitment that it never intended to honor, and then using its SEPs to hold 
up implementers. The Third Circuit held that such conduct “is actionable 
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appropriate royalties upon later events or upon its acquisition of 
additional patents that come within the scope of a RAND 
commitment.39 This type of conduct no longer appears to be 
sufficiently prevalent to be a significant problem, because SSOs 
have become more conscious of the risk of ambush, and therefore 
have become more vigilant, as is illustrated by the IEEE 2015 
Patent Policy update and several years of comment by federal 
agencies, discussed subsequently in Part VI of this Article.40 
This Article is not concerned with sunk-cost holdup issues, 
but rather primarily with patents, the technology of which SSOs 
knowingly incorporate into standards as SEPs, without SEP 
owner deceit, and that the SSOs and SEP owners make subject 
to RAND commitments. The controverted issue is who, when 
determining RAND compensation, is entitled to the surplus 
value that standardization creates, and to what extent that 
surplus should be reckoned an element to be included in a 
reasonable royalty. In that context, sunk-cost holdup is not a 
significant issue, because there is a RAND commitment and 
                                                          
anticompetitive conduct.” Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 314; accord Funai Elec. Co. v. 
LSI Corp., 16-cv-01210-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44866, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 27, 2017); Microsoft Mobile Inc. v. InterDigital, Inc., No. 15-723-RGA, 2016 
WL 1464545, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss § 2 claim 
based on allegations that defendant made intentionally false FRAND 
commitments to induce SSO to adopt defendant’s technology and then refused 
to comply with FRAND licensing obligations); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
11–CV–01846–LHK, 2011 WL 4948567, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (“Courts 
have recognized that fraudulent FRAND declarations that are used to induce 
SSOs to adopt standards essential patents can be monopoly conduct for the 
purposes of establishing a Section 2 claim.”). 
 39. Something of this sort may have occurred in the CSIRO case, 
Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v. Cisco Systems, 
Inc. (CSIRO), 809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015), in which the SEP holder was 
initially willing to make a RAND commitment but changed its position with 
later iterations of the standard, after the SEP holder reorganized its licensing 
arrangements, and then started demanding higher royalties. 
 40. Moreover, the IEEE added a provision to its by-laws providing that 
RAND commitments pass with patent assignments and firms must so notify 
assignees. See IEEE-SA Bylaws § 6.2, http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies 
/bylaws/sect6-7.html (“An Accepted Letter of Assurance is intended to be 
binding upon any and all assignees and transferees of any Essential Patent 
Claim covered by such LOA. The Submitter agrees (a) to provide notice of an 
Accepted Letter of Assurance either through a Statement of Encumbrance or by 
binding its assignee or transferee to the terms of such Letter of Assurance; and 
(b) to require its assignee or transferee to (i) agree to similarly provide such 
notice and (ii) to bind its assignees or transferees to agree to provide such 
notice . . . .”). 
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there is no ambush, for such openly declared SEPs, unless the 
term “ambush” is to be used, as this Article does not do, to 
characterize any royalty demand deemed excessive by those 
called upon to pay it. Furthermore, in the standard-setting 
context, often no sunk costs occur before a standard is adopted 
that uses one or another alternative technology. While a 
standard is being developed, many potential implementers 
adopt a “wait and see” attitude, in order not to become 
unfortunate “early Betamax adopters.” For example, it is well 
known that this occurred with the IEEE 802.11g standard, 
hampering equipment sales while potential implementers 
waited to see which contending technology would prevail.41 
Thus, not all holdup is sunk-cost holdup, based on ambush 
and exploitation of sunk costs and lock-in, followed by a threat 
to impose switching costs unless implementers pay ransom. The 
practices in the Qualcomm cases,42 for example, have been 
continuing for years. The CDMA technology involved in those 
cases has been in use since the 1990s.43 Some of the practices 
now challenged in the present litigation were aired publicly over 
a decade ago in the Broadcom-Qualcomm litigation.44 Any 
smartphone industry investments made in the last decade or 
more were made with knowledge of these practices, so there 
were no ambushes; any sunk costs were sunk knowingly. 
                                                          
 41. See Joe McGarvey, 802.11g: Ready or Not?, EETIMES (July 3, 2002) 
(“Carney says that at least one wireless LAN equipment company had been 
burned in the past for using chipsets that were based on a pre-final version of 
the standard. Last-minute changes to the specification, he says, instantly 
rendered supposed standard-based equipment incompatible with the final 
specification. ‘It’s irresponsible for companies at such an early stage in the 
process to announce the development of chipsets so that OEMs can develop 
products in advance of the standards,’ adds Carney.”); see also supra note 22. 
 42. Supra notes 7–12. 
 43. See KAVEH PAHLAVAN & PRASHANT KRISHNAMURTHY, PRINCIPLES OF 
WIRELESS NETWORKS: A UNIFIED APPROACH 350–51 (2002). 
 44. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 05-3350 (MLC), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 62090, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2006) (citation omitted) (“Broadcom asserts 
that (1) Qualcomm used its power over CDMA technology to obtain and protect 
monopoly power in the CDMA chipset markets, and (2) this monopoly is due to 
exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct, and not business acumen. For 
example, Broadcom alleges that Qualcomm (1) has threatened cell phone 
manufacturers with the loss of certain benefits if they purchase chipsets from a 
Qualcomm competitor, (2) reduces royalty rates when a company obtaining a 
patent license from Qualcomm agrees to purchase Qualcomm chipsets 
exclusively . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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That fact does not, of course, immunize monopolistic 
conduct, if any. Monopolistic conduct is not benign or legitimated 
simply because those affected by it knew that the monopolist was 
engaging in the conduct. There is no doctrine of volenti not fit 
injuria or voluntary assumption of the risk defense to antitrust 
charges. Moreover, the non-sunk-cost holdup that this Article 
concerns is not necessarily the product of any specific intent to 
monopolize. The controversies between SEP holders and SEP 
users discussed here may be the result of honest differences of 
opinion—what is RAND is often something in the eye of the 
beholder. Nonetheless, in recent litigation SEP owners and SEP 
implementers have respectively entertained concepts of RAND 
that were orders of magnitude apart.45 The royalty differences 
in most of these cases are not related to sunk-cost holdup; they 
could just as well occur in the absence of sunk costs, for example, 
in the case of a new entrant without any sunk costs. They may 
simply reflect very different ideas of how to determine a proper 
reasonable royalty—in particular, which values, such as 
network effect value and other values that standardization 
creates that raise the ex-ante value of a SEP to its ex-post value, 
should be included in determining a reasonable royalty. 
———   
All of this has important policy implications and raises 
controversial questions. One fundamental, and currently highly 
disputed, question may be phrased: Who should “own” (or 
capture) the benefits of standardization (particularly of 
interoperability)? Should standardization be considered a quasi-
public good like the use of streets, and streetlights? Does calling 
it property further the analysis? To what extent should limits be 
placed on the conduct of actors who seek to make individual 
profits from standardization? Who should get the financial 
benefit from standardization, or if it is to be divided among 
actors, how should the value of standardization be shared among 
the actors? 
                                                          
 45. For a tabulation of vastly different plaintiff’s and defendant’s respective 
conceptions of RAND royalties in recent patent infringement litigation, see 
Richard H. Stern, Justice Department Agrees IEEE’ s New RAND Policy Isn’t 
Price Fixing, 35 IEEE MICRO 80 (Mar. 2015), http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org 
/10.1109/MM.2015.34. 
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More specifically, to focus on a hotly disputed current 
example46 in the important US cell phone industry,47 who should 
(or who is “entitled” to) capture the benefit from the adoption of 
standards implemented in cell phones, such as the IEEE 802.11 
Wi-Fi standard? Device manufacturers—cell phone and chipset 
802.11 implementers? Cellular network service companies? SEP 
owners? The general consumer public? That issue underlies the 
remainder of this Article. 
II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CELL 
PHONE WARS 
A. THE SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS OF STANDARDIZATION 
Cell phone networks, such as those of Verizon, AT&T, T-
Mobile, and Sprint, rely on standard technological protocols that 
permit signals from one company’s network to travel over 
another company’s network. The establishment of these 
standards also permits equipment manufacturers to develop 
phones that can operate over the various different networks by 
using the same standard protocol. This facilitates development 
of and investment in infrastructure and technology. 
There have been four “generations” (with “families” within 
them) of standardization in the cell phone industry, so far:48 
a. First-generation (“1G”) standards, introduced in the early 
1980s, supported analog transmission of voice calls.49 This 
                                                          
 46. See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text. 
 47. A cell phone or cellular phone is a small, battery-operated, portable 
telephone that sends and receives wireless radio signals via a network. The 
network uses so-called cellular network technology—a system of radio 
transmitters, in which each transmitter covers a small geographical area (cell) 
and switches the calls from one area to another to reach the call destination. A 
smartphone is a cell phone that also has many computer functions, such as the 
capability to take and display photos, play videos, receive, view, and send e-
mail, and surf the Internet. By the end of 2016, 95% of Americans owned cell 
phones, and 77% owned smartphones. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 
12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. Among Americans 
aged 18 to 44, smartphone ownership runs from 96% to 98%. Millennials Are 
Top Smartphone Users, NIELSEN (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en 
/insights/news/2016/millennials-are-top-smartphone-users.html. 
 48. See FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 6. 
 49. Id. 
2018] WHO SHOULD OWN THE BENEFITS 127 
 
technology was “characterized by significant capacity 
limitations, poor data transfer, and low security.”50 
b. Second-generation (“2G”) standards, “first deployed in the 
early 1990s, supported digital transmission of voice calls.”51 The 
leading 2G standards families are the Global System for Mobile 
communications (“GSM”) and second-generation Code Division 
Multiple Access (“2G-CDMA”).52 “In the United States, AT&T 
and T-Mobile still operate legacy GSM networks, while Verizon 
and Sprint still operate legacy 2G-CDMA networks.”53 2G 
technology provided improved voice and data capacity, 
supported limited additional functions such as text and 
multimedia messages, and offered greater privacy and security 
at lower prices.54 Most cellular telephones today use (at a 
minimum) 2G technology and standards, with GSM being the 
most widely used 2G technology55, but both 2G technology and 
standards are used almost only for legacy purposes.56 2G 
technology and standards are being phased out.57 
c. Third-generation (“3G”) standards, first deployed in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, supported higher data-transmission 
speeds.58 The leading 3G standards families are the Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (“UMTS”) and third-
generation CDMA (“3G-CDMA”).59 UMTS allowed GSM-
network operators to transition economically to a 3G standard. 
3G-CDMA did the same for 2G-CDMA-network operators.60 
UMTS used “Wideband Code Division Multiple Access” 
(“WCDMA”) technology, allowing increased data speed and 
capacity.61 3G technology continues in use today, usually 
                                                          
 50. Apple Complaint, supra note 12. 
 51. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 6. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 14. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See FTC Complaint supra note 11, at 6 (“In the United States, AT&T 
and T-Mobile operate legacy GSM networks, while Verizon and Sprint operate 
legacy 2G-CDMA networks.”). 
 57. See, e.g., id. (“UMTS allowed GSM-network operators to transition 
economically to a 3G standard.”). 
 58. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 14. 
 59. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 644. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 15. 
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combined for purposes of backward compatibility, in more 
advanced later-technology devices.62 
d. “Fourth-generation (‘4G’) standards, first deployed in late 
2009 and the early 2010s, support substantially higher data-
transmission speeds than 3G standards can support.”63 4G is an 
upgrade to 3G/UTMS/WCDMA. The leading 4G standard is 
Long-Term Evolution (“LTE”).64 “Most major network operators 
worldwide have deployed LTE.”65 There have been successive 
categories of LTE standards; a recent advanced LTE release, 
designated Category 12, supports data download speeds of 600 
Mbps.66 An even more advanced form of LTE is Gigabit LTE 
(LTE Category 16), which promises peak speeds of 1 gigabit per 
second (1000 Mbps).67 A Samsung Galaxy S8 smartphone claims 
to deliver Gigabit LTE, but the actual delivered speed is 
significantly less.68 
A fifth generation (“5G”) of cell phone technology, proposed 
to be deployed in the early 2020s, will, initially, support peak 
download speeds of up to 20 gigabits per second (20,000 Mbps).69 
There is no 5G standard at this time,70 no 5G network, and no 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 14–15. 
 63. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Tim Schiesser, Explainer: What Is Gigabit LTE?, TECHSPOT (Feb. 9, 
2017), https://www.techspot.com/guides/1328-gigabit-lte-explained/. 1 Mbps is 
1,000,000 bits of data per second. A bit of data is a 1 or 0 in a string of 1s and 
0s in a binary-coded number. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 66–67 
(1972). 
 67. See Schiesser, supra note 66 (describing “updates to LTE technologies 
and specifications, aimed at improving peak speeds among other things.”). One 
gigabit is 1000 Megabits. 
 68. See Mike Wuerthele, It Doesn’t Matter that Apple’s ‘iPhone 8’ May Not 
Support 4G Gigabit LTE or 5G, APPLEINSIDER (June 12, 2017), http:// 
appleinsider.com/articles/17/06/12/it-doesnt-matter-that-apples-iphone-8-may-
not-support-4g-gigabit-lte-or-5g (discussing the pressure from 
telecommunications carriers to implement 5G technology, even though there 
are no standards for the technology yet); Schiesser, supra notes 66–67 (showing 
that rated downlink speed is less than 1 Gbps). 
 69. See generally What Is 5G? Everything You Need to Know – A Definition, 
SDXCENTRAL, https://www.sdxcentral.com/5g/definitions/what-is-5g/ (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
 70. See id. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has, since 
2012, sponsored development of a 5G International Mobile Telecommunication 
system by 2020 (“IMT-2020”). See ITU Towards “IMT for 2020 and Beyond,” 
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commercial 5G cell phone. Qualcomm has announced a 5G 
chipset, the Snapdragon X50, claimed to operate at up to 5 
gigabits per second (5000 Mbps) download speed, and intended 
to launch for sampling late in 2017 for design of cell phones that 
will appear in 2019.71 Intel then announced that it too will 
launch a 5G modem chipset (baseband processor chip and 
transceiver chip), designated Goldridge, to compete with 
Snapdragon. Goldridge is to launch for sampling in late 2017 
shortly followed by production, and to support speeds of over 5 
gigabits per second.72 Verizon has announced that it will conduct 
field tests of a consumer 5G network covering several thousand 
customer fixed-wireless (non-mobile) locations, during the first 
half of 2017,73 using Samsung equipment, including “Samsung’s 
pre-commercial 5G solution” including a 5G chipset.74 
                                                          
ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/study-groups/rsg5/rwp5d/imt-2020/Pages 
/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). 
 71. See Sascha Segan, Qualcomm Announces Its First 5G Modem, PC 
MAGAZINE (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.pcmag.com/news/348755/qualcomm-
announces-its-first-5g-modem. See generally Press Release, Qualcomm, 
Qualcomm Expands Industry’s First Announced 5G Modem Family to Support 
5G NR with Integrated Gigabit LTE Multimode for Premium Mobile Devices 
(Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2017/02/25 
/qualcomm-expands-industrys-first-announced-5g-modem-family-support-5g-
nr (“Commercial products integrating 5G NR modems from the Snapdragon X50 
family are expected to be available to support the first large-scale 5G NR trials 
and commercial network launches starting in 2019.”). A later Qualcomm 
statement said 5G smartphones were now expected in mid-2019. Dan Jones, 
Qualcomm: First 5G Smartphones Coming Mid-2019, LIGHT READING 5G (Apr. 
6, 2017), http://www.lightreading.com/mobile/5g/qualcomm-first-5g-
smartphones-coming-mid-2019/d/d-id/731910?. 
 72. Peter Clarke, Intel 5G Modem Coming in 2H17, EENEWS EUROPE (Jan. 
5, 2017), http://www.eenewseurope.com/news/intel-5g-modem-coming-2h17; 
Corinne Reichert, Intel Announces 5G Modem at CES, ZDNET (Jan. 5, 2017, 
4:24 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/Article/intel-announces-5g-modem-at-ces/. 
 73. See Press Release, Verizon, Verizon to Deliver 5G Service to Pilot 
Customers in 11 Markets Across U.S. by Mid 2017 (Feb. 22, 2017) http://www 
.verizon.com/about/news/verizon-deliver-5g-service-pilot-customers-11-
markets-across-us-mid-2017. 
 74. Press Release, Samsung, Samsung and Verizon Announce First 5G 
Customer Trials Set to Begin in Q2 2017 (Feb. 22, 2017) http://www.samsung 
.com/global/business/networks/insights/news/samsung-and-verizon-announce-
first-5g-customer-trials-set-to-begin-in-q2-2017. The “pre-commercial” chipset 
is apparently an ASIC modem chip and a 28 GHz RFIC chip. Diana Goovaerts, 
Samsung’s New Commercial 5G Lineup Is a Direct Pipe to Consumers from Core 
to Router, WIRELESS WEEK (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.wirelessweek.com 
/news/2017/02/samsungs-new-commercial-5g-lineup-direct-pipe-consumers-
core-router. 
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Several SSOs have developed telecommunication standards 
implemented in cell phones.75 The most significant of these SSOs 
are the IEEE in the US,76 the European Telecommunication 
Standards Institute (“ETSI”),77 the Telecommunications 
Industry Association (“TIA”)78 in the US, and the Alliance for 
Telecommunications Industry Solutions (“ATIS”) in the US. 
Each of them has required each party that participates in the 
standards development process to commit to license its SEPs on 
FRAND terms to firms that implement the standard.79 Their 
practice is to permit firms simply to declare which of their 
patents are SEPs, and they do not have a mechanism for 
verifying the essentiality of any patent to the technology 
embodied in a standard.80 
                                                          
 75. Some of these standards, such as UMTS and LTE, are implemented 
only in cell phones. Others, such as IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), are implemented in 
cell phones and also many other devices, such as set-top boxes, laptop 
computers, healthcare monitors, credit card machines, and burglar alarms. 
Much of the litigation and case law concerning cellular technology has involved 
IEEE 802.11, which “is the most widely used and universally accepted wireless 
communications standard for ordinary consumer and business use.” Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at 
*144–45 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
 76. The IEEE was responsible for the Wi-Fi 802.11 and Ethernet 803.3 
standards. See BOB O’HARA & AL PETRICK, THE IEEE 802.11 HANDBOOK 5 
(1999); see also IEE Std 802.3-2015 (Revision of IEEE Std 802.3-2012) - IEEE 
Standard for Ethernet, IEEE STANDARDS ASSOC., https://standards.ieee.org 
/findstds/standard/802.3-2015.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 77. ETSI was responsible for GSM, and (in cooperation with ATIS) for 
UMTS and LTE. See Mobile Communications, EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS 
INST., http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/mobile (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 78. TIA was responsible for CDMA. See Karissa Todd, The Titans of 
Wireless, WIRELESS REV. (June 1, 1999) (explaining that John Marinho was 
instrumental in the development of CDMA through his work on the TIA 
Standards Committee). 
 79. IEEE in principle allows patent owners to decline to offer reasonable 
royalty licenses, but “considers” that in determining whether to approve a draft 
standard. DOJ Response to IEEE, supra note 5, at 4 nn.13–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. This practice is common among SSOs, but is not universal. The MPEG 
standards patent pool uses technical experts to determine whether patents that 
their owners declare essential are in fact essential to MPEG-compliance. See 
MPEG-2 FAQ, MPEGLA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages 
/FAQ.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2017); see also Dan Rayburn, HEVC Advance 
Patent Pool Creates Confusion, Lacks Transparency, STREAMING MEDIA 
(July/Aug. 2015), http://www.streamingmedia.com/Articles/Editorial/Featured-
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B. BASEBAND PROCESSORS 
Baseband processors (also not wholly accurately called 
modems) are chipsets built into cell phones to permit the phones 
to communicate with a cellular network. The baseband 
processors accomplish this by performing such electronic signal-
processing functions as signal generation, modulation, and 
decoding.81 For interoperability purposes, a cell phone may need 
to contain a baseband processor that complies with multiple 
standards. For example, a baseband processor that complies 
only with UMTS and LTE standards cannot communicate with 
a legacy 2G-CDMA network, such as Verizon’s or Sprint’s. To be 
used on a network deploying LTE, a cell phone must ordinarily 
contain a multi-mode baseband processor that complies with 
                                                          
Articles/HEVC-Advance-Patent-Pool-Creates-Confusion-Lacks-Transparency-
105235.aspx (“Essential patent evaluation generally works by having an 
evaluator compare claims in a patent with the applicable standard specification 
(in this case, HEVC), and if one claim or more is necessarily infringed upon in 
connection with use or implementation of/reads on the standard, then that 
patent claim is determined to be essential.”). 
The practice of not questioning declarations of essentialness has led to a 
perceived over-designation of SEPs. A 2010 study of a sample of 210 patents 
declared as SEPs for 4G LTE found only 50% of them actually essential, 
according to a panel of experts. See ROBERT A. MYERS, FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, 
INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL TO LTE AND SAE (4G 
WIRELESS STANDARDS) THROUGH JUNE 30, 2009, 1–2 (2010), http://www 
.frlicense.com/LTE%20Final%20Report.pdf. A 2005 study took a sample of 
about 1250 patents out of nearly 8000 patents and patent applications declared 
as SEPs for 3G WCDMA and CDMA2000. The study found that about 21% were 
actually essential. See David J. Goodman & Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular 
Standards and Patents, in 1 2005 INT’L CONF. ON WIRELESS NETWORKS, COMM. 
& MOBILE COMPUTING 417–20 (2005), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp 
.jsp?arnumber=1549445.SSS. 
 81. More specifically, the chipset typically comprises two semiconductor 
chips. One is a signal-processing chip (modem or baseband processor chip), for 
imposing information on, or extracting information from, a radio-frequency (RF) 
signal. The other chip is a transceiver with antenna, for sending and receiving 
RF signals. The Intersil PRISM 3 chipset is illustrative. See R. SZWEDA, SILICON 
GERMANIUM MATERIALS & DEVICES: A MARKET & TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW TO 
2006 217 (2002). 
There also are single-chip devices providing both functionalities in a 
single chip. See, e.g., CYW43438 Single-Chip IEEE 802.11ac b/g/n 
MAC/Baseband/Radio with Integrated Bluetooth 4.1 and FM Receiver, 
CYPRESS (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.cypress.com/file/298076/download; 
802.11bgn, REALTEK, http://www.realtek.com.tw/products/productsView.aspx 
?Langid=1&PFid=48&Level=5&Conn=4 (listing Realtek chips combining both 
functions). There are other chipsets with other numbers of chips. Intersil’s 
PRISM 2.5 used four chips. SZWEDA, supra. 
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both LTE and the older 2G and 3G standards.82 There are two 
principal reasons for this: 
● “First, LTE network infrastructure generally supports 
data, rather than voice, traffic. Therefore, to transmit voice calls, 
a baseband processor must comply with 2G and 3G standards.”83 
● “Second, because the process of upgrading and replacing 
network infrastructure takes years, a baseband processor must 
comply with 2G and 3G standards [as well as LTE] to 
communicate with the network in those areas where [network] 
operator has not yet replaced or upgraded infrastructure 
equipment.”84 
The cell phone market has become segmented into several 
tiers or submarkets,85 which tend to use different standards and 
baseband processors. Smartphones, which offer such additional 
functionality besides telephone service as cameras, high-
resolution touch-screen displays, powerful applications and 
graphics processors, and enhanced memory and storage, are 
premium-tier devices using premium baseband processors. The 
premium-tier Apple iPhones and Samsung Galaxy-S 
smartphone lines incorporate processors compliant with the 
CDMA and LTE standards. Non-premium cell phones may use 
baseband processors that comply with CDMA standards but not 
                                                          
 82. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 7. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. However, a standard for high-speed wireless communication for cell 
phones, designated Voice over Long-Term Evolution (VoLTE), is under 
development and deployment. In 2015, Verizon and AT&T began making 
VoLTE available cooperatively. See Colin Gibbs, Verizon, AT&T Offering 
Interoperable VoLTE to Some Customers, FIERCEWIRELESS (July 5, 2016), 
http://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/verizon-at-t-offering-interoperable-
volte-to-some-customers. Moreover, AT&T terminated its US 2G GPS wireless 
systems in January 2017. Juli Clover, AT&T Shuts Down 2G Network and Ends 
Cellular Connectivity for Original iPhone, MACRUMORS (Jan. 17, 2017), https:// 
www.macrumors.com/2017/01/17/att-shuts-down-2g-network/. Verizon has 
announced that it will shut down its 2G CDMA network by 2019 and plans to 
terminate 3G CDMA service by 2021. Kyle Wiggers, Verizon Will Shut Down Its 
2G CDMA Network by 2019, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 14, 2016), https://www 
.digitaltrends.com/mobile/verizon-cdma-2g-shutdown/. T-Mobile, however, 
plans to continue serving this market segment, at least until 2020. Rebecca 
Kates, What You Need to Know About the 2G Network Shutdown, GEOTAB (Apr. 
5, 2017), https://www.geotab.com/blog/2g-network-shutdown/. 
 85. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) 
(describing submarket). 
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LTE, or if they use LTE they may use less expensive, lower speed 
LTE baseband processors.86 
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of cell phones 
(also termed handset manufacturers) “typically require 
baseband processors with advanced LTE functionality for 
premium-tier [cell phones].”87 The most recent premium-tier 
smartphones, such as iPhones and Galaxy-S models, permit very 
high-speed data transmission and download, as provided by LTE 
Category 12 (600 Mbps). “For an OEM designing and 
manufacturing a premium-tier [device], a baseband processor 
that only supports earlier LTE features is not a reasonable 
substitute for a baseband processor that supports advanced LTE 
standards and features.”88 
III. QUALCOMM AND CELL PHONE INDUSTRY MARKET 
STRUCTURE 
Qualcomm has participated extensively in cellular 
standard-setting processes through IEEE, ETSI, TIA, and 
ATIS.89 These SSOs required FRAND commitments from those 
participating in the process, and Qualcomm committed to these 
and other SSOs that it would license its SEPs covering 2G, 3G, 
and 4G technologies on FRAND terms.90 The US courts have 
held that FRAND commitments are legally binding third-party 
beneficiary contracts enforceable in favor of firms that 
implement the standard to which the commitment relates.91 
Qualcomm was a leading developer and proponent of 2G-
CDMA standards and held a correspondingly high share of all 
patents declared essential to compliance with 2G-CDMA 
standards.92 Qualcomm also participated in 3G-standard 
                                                          
 86. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 8. 
 87. Id. at 10. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
 89. Id. at 13. 
 90. Id. at 14; Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 13. 
 91. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884–85 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1006 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Defendants’ [sic] are contractually obligated under their 
Letters of Assurance to the IEEE to license the . . . patents on RAND terms and 
Realtek is a third-party beneficiary to that contract . . . .”). 
 92. According to the KFTC, Qualcomm holds approximately 95% of the 
SEPs on 2G CDMA technology. See KFTC Press Release, supra note 7, at 4. 
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setting, though its share of all patents declared essential to 3G-
UMTS and 3G-CDMA standards is smaller than its share of 2G-
CDMA SEPs. Qualcomm participated in 4G standardization, but 
its share of patents declared essential to LTE standards is 
relatively low—about the same as the other major 4G 
participants, such as Nokia, Ericsson, and Samsung.93 
In its press release accompanying its December 2016 anti-
monopoly action against Qualcomm, the KFTC provided a chart 
showing Qualcomm’s and other SEP owners’ individual shares 
of the 3G and 4G patents.94 
 
 
In addition, Qualcomm has long been the dominant supplier 
of CDMA baseband processor chipsets, with an approximately 
80% or more market share.95 OEMs seeking to sell devices for 
use on CDMA networks, such as Verizon’s and Sprint’s, must use 
CDMA chipsets, which means that these OEMs depend on access 
to Qualcomm’s chipsets. For backward compatibility, CDMA 
chipsets are required also in devices supporting LTE. Today, 
Intel is Qualcomm’s only competitor in the market for premium 
LTE chipsets, and Qualcomm has no competition at all in the 
market for premium LTE chipsets with CDMA functionality. 
Qualcomm has consistently been the dominant supplier of 
premium LTE baseband processors, with an approximately 80% 
                                                          
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. at 4. 
 95. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 16. According to the KFTC, between 
2013 and 2015, Qualcomm’s market share of LTE chipsets ranged from about 
69% to 96%, and its market share of CDMA chipsets ranged from about 83% to 
93%. KFTC Press Release, supra note 7, at 4. 
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or more market share, and OEMs have had limited practical 
alternatives to Qualcomm for the supply of premium LTE 
processors.96 
IV. QUALCOMM’S CHALLENGED MARKETING 
PRACTICES 
The KFTC, US FTC, and Apple complaints against 
Qualcomm challenge a number of Qualcomm’s patent 
exploitation and chipset marketing practices. The practices are 
interrelated and are said to reinforce one another’s alleged 
exclusionary and anticompetitive effects.97 Although these 
lawsuits challenge a number of different practices, this Article 
primarily concerns those involving the determination of FRAND 
royalties for SEPs and the relation of that determination to the 
question of who should capture the benefits and values of 
standardization. A key issue is whether FRAND royalties should 
be calculated using as a royalty base the selling price of the 
smallest saleable patent-practicing unit (such as a baseband 
processor chipset) or instead the price of the downstream 
finished product (such as a smartphone). 
A. “NO LICENSE, NO CHIPS” 
A core element of the charges in all these cases is 
Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” policy, which allegedly 
interacts with other restrictive practices to maintain 
Qualcomm’s monopoly power and harm competition.98 The “no 
license, no chips” policy is that Qualcomm will sell its baseband 
processors to cell phone original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) only if the OEMs also accept a patent license to 
Qualcomm’s cellular SEPs on Qualcomm’s terms.99 
                                                          
 96. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 17. Arguably, Qualcomm controls a 
so-called essential facility in these markets or submarkets, since it is not 
possible to make premium-tier smartphones without Qualcomm baseband 
processor chipsets (or infringing Qualcomm SEPs). See text supra notes 82–86. 
For a discussion of the essential-facilities doctrine and summary of the 
authorities, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en 
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otter_Tail_Power_Co._v._United_States (last updated Dec. 
4, 2017). 
 97. See, e.g., FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 2–3; Apple Complaint, supra 
note 12, at 3. 
 98. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 2–3. 
 99. Id. 
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Furthermore, OEMs must agree to pay substantial royalties to 
Qualcomm on their sales of any cell phones using a baseband 
processor purchased from any of Qualcomm’s competitors.100 
The “no license, no chips” policy operates to require SEP 
royalties to be determined on the price of the cell phones 
containing baseband processors rather than the price of the 
baseband processors themselves, which aids Qualcomm to 
capture more of the value of standardization dependent on use 
of Qualcomm chipsets and SEPs in the manufacture of standard-
compliant products. A less neutral characterization of the 
practice is that it enables Qualcomm to charge royalties far in 
excess of (and in violation of) its FRAND obligations. 
The FTC insists that the “no license, no chips” policy is 
“anomalous” among chip makers and other suppliers of 
components of semiconductor and cellular-equipment.101 Other 
component suppliers simply rely on component sales, rather 
than requiring separate royalty-bearing patent licenses. “When 
a supplier sells a component, such as a baseband processor, to 
an OEM, that sale, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, 
ordinarily terminates any right of the supplier under patent law 
to control any further use or sale of the component.”102 OEMs 
buy cell phone components from hundreds of suppliers. Among 
these suppliers, “Qualcomm is unique in requiring an OEM, as 
a condition of sale, to secure a separate patent license requiring 
royalty payments,” the FTC says, for cell phones “that use a 
competitor’s components.”103 
                                                          
 100. Id. 
 101. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
 102. Id. at 15; see also Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. 
Ct. 1523, 1531 (2017) (internal quotations omitted) (“When a patentee chooses 
to sell an item, that product is no longer within the limits of the monopoly and 
instead becomes the private, individual property of the purchaser, with the 
rights and benefits that come along with ownership.”); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. 
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding doctrine of patent 
exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item 
terminates all patent rights to that item.”). The practice is not only 
“anomalous,” but it is contrary to patent policy. See Impression, 137 S. Ct. at 
1532 (internal quotations omitted) (“Congress enacted and has repeatedly 
revised the Patent Act against the backdrop of the hostility toward restraints 
on alienation. That enmity is reflected in the exhaustion doctrine. . . . [These 
restrictive] conditions have been ‘hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to 
ours’ and are ‘obnoxious to the public interest.’”). 
 103. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 15. 
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This practice is also anomalous among licensors of SEPs, the 
FTC maintains.104  
Ordinarily, if a SEP holder and a potential licensee can neither agree 
on license terms nor agree to submit those terms to binding arbitration, 
the SEP holder initiates a patent-infringement suit in which a court 
resolves issues of patent validity and infringement and, if the court 
deems a patent valid and infringed, determines and awards reasonable 
royalties.105  
These court-determined royalties are typically far less than SEP 
holders demand. The FTC points, as an example, to a 2013 case 
in which a SEP holder demanded royalties for its SEPs of 
between $6 and $8 per product, and the court ultimately 
determined that the FRAND rate for the SEPs was $0.04 per 
product.106 But the cost of patent litigation is so high that OEMs 
will often find it uneconomical to challenge Qualcomm’s 
unFRANDly royalty demands in litigation.107 
The OEMs’ willingness to submit to Qualcomm’s demands 
is also affected by the fact that they pass their royalties on to 
customers. The FTC maintains that Qualcomm’s royalties do not 
comply with the firm’s FRAND obligations. Rather, they are 
“disproportionately high relative to the value contributed by its 
patented inventions, and often are several times higher than the 
royalties of other SEP licensors that have made similar technical 
contributions.”108 But because of the “no license, no chips” policy, 
OEMs lack “the ability and incentive to challenge Qualcomm’s 
royalty demands in court,”109 for this policy has the effect of 
“dramatically increasing OEMs’ costs of going to court.”110 
Qualcomm will cut off litigating OEMs’ access to Qualcomm’s 
baseband processor chipsets. “Given the dominant position that 
Qualcomm has had in the supply of CDMA and premium LTE 
processors, an OEM unable to purchase such processors from 
Qualcomm would be severely hampered in efforts to design and 
sell critically important premium-tier phones and phones for use 
                                                          
 104. Id. at 16. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (referring to Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 
WL 2111217, at *99–101 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013)). Qualcomm’s royalty 
demands might be called “unFRANDly.” 
 107. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 16–17. 
 108. Id. at 17. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 18. 
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on CDMA networks.”111 To the extent that backward 
compatibility with CDMA equipment is commercially necessary, 
as it appears to be at present, Qualcomm’s SEPs create a near-
absolute roadblock.112 
The FTC explains that two factors combine to cause this 
result. First, because of Qualcomm’s dominance, few alternative 
sources of such baseband processors exist.113 Second, once an 
OEM designs a cell phone with a Qualcomm baseband processor, 
“the OEM is effectively ‘locked in’ to that processor, and remains 
so over the commercial life” of the cell phone.114 To use another 
baseband processor with equivalent functionality, even if 
another manufacturer made one, the OEM would need to design 
a different cell phone, at great cost.115 
Therefore, OEMs have acceded to Qualcomm’s unFRANDly 
demands. They have done so even though Qualcomm sets 
royalties that are disproportionately high relative to the value 
contributed by its patented inventions, and several times higher 
than the royalties of other SEP licensors that have made similar 
technical contributions to the standards. Moreover, Qualcomm 
bases its royalties on the total cost of the cell phone, including 
cameras, high-resolution touch-screen displays, memory, and 
other elements besides cellular connectivity—all of these being 
elements not contributed by Qualcomm’s technology.116 In effect, 
OEMs must pay Qualcomm a premium “to avoid disruption of 
processor supply.”117 
The FTC describes this conduct as Qualcomm’s imposition 
of a “tax” on cell phone manufacturers that is necessarily passed 
on to consumers, whether the OEMs use baseband processors 
from Qualcomm or its competitors.118 Moreover, by increasing to 
OEMs the cost of using competitive baseband processors, 
Qualcomm “weakens the competitive constraint on Qualcomm’s 
own all-in baseband processor price,” and the tax bolsters and 
                                                          
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra notes 82–83, 85–86 and accompanying text. But see supra 
note 84. 
 113. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 10. 
 114. Id. at 18. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 17–19. 
 117. Id. at 19. 
 118. Id. 
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entrenches Qualcomm’s monopoly position because “the tax 
diminishes OEMs’ demand for [competitors’] processors and 
reduces competitors’ sales and margins.”119 This is said also to 
harm technological innovation because the tax “diminish[es] 
competitors’ abilities and incentives to invest and innovate.”120 
Apple makes similar allegations. According to Apple, 
Qualcomm has established a “business model” for itself under 
which it mulcts chipmakers and cell phone manufacturers with 
exorbitant patent royalties based on the innovations of others, 
such as the mulcted chipmakers, cell phone manufacturers 
(OEMs), and Apple: 
Qualcomm is not entitled to collect royalties based on the contribution 
of others to the cell phone standard, or unrelated innovation by 
companies that utilize the standard—but this is precisely the business 
model that Qualcomm has established and that it protects through 
monopoly power and unlawful licenses. In order to purchase 
Qualcomm chips or obtain access to patents pledged to a cellular 
standard, Qualcomm demands that third parties pay Qualcomm a 
royalty much greater than the value of Qualcomm’s contribution to 
the standard—a value based on the entire price of the innovative 
products that only incidentally incorporate the standard.121 
For example, Apple says it invented “a revolutionary new 
security feature . . . touch ID, which enables breakthrough 
technologies like Apple Pay,” but Qualcomm insists on royalties 
for these and other Apple innovations that Qualcomm had 
nothing to do with, and the royalty payments to Qualcomm then 
go up with each additional Apple smartphone innovation.122 
“When Apple spends billions redefining the concept of a 
smartphone camera, Qualcomm’s royalty payments go up. Even 
when Apple sells an iPhone with added memory—256GB123 
instead of 128GB—Qualcomm collects a larger royalty just 
because of that added memory.”124 Apple accuses Qualcomm of a 
nasty, greedy, and unreasonable attitude: “Because of its 
monopoly power . . . and an abusive licensing model, Qualcomm 
believes it is entitled to collect its ‘tribute’ on every such 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 20. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 1. 
 122. Id. at 1–2. 
 123. 1 GB (gigabyte) equals 1000 MB (megabytes). Information storage is 
measured in bytes. A byte is 8 bits (a bit is a 1 or 0, i.e., “on” or “off”). 1 MB = 
1,000,000 bytes. See text supra note 66. 
 124. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 2. 
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improvement” in cellular technology and product 
functionality.125 That is to say, Qualcomm is misappropriating a 
large part of the value of standardization and innovation that 
Apple says or implies should belong to Apple. 
Apple provides an illustrative example of the operation of 
Qualcomm’s business model. Baseband processors (chipsets) sell 
for $10 to $20.126 Contract manufacturers pay Qualcomm an 
“exorbitant” royalty, which is allegedly passed on in full to 
Apple.127 On top of that Apple must pay Qualcomm another, 
much larger patent royalty on the selling price of the 
smartphone. Because the smartphone includes, besides the 
Qualcomm chipsets, memory chips, touchscreen, power supply, 
apps, and other features or components that have nothing to do 
with Qualcomm’s SEPs, the royalty is greatly magnified. A 16 
GB iPhone sells for approximately $400 (20 to 40 times the price 
of a chipset) and a 256 GB iPhone sells for approximately $970 
(about 50 to 100 times the chipset price), while even a Walmart 
16GB Kyocera device sells for almost $100 (5 to 10 times the 
chipset price).128 Apple states that the non-FRAND percentage 
royalty that Qualcomm demands on the selling price of products 
incorporating chipsets (i.e., for smartphones) is only slightly 
lower than the percentage royalty that Qualcomm demands for 
chipsets.129 Yet because the downstream selling price of a 
smartphone is much greater than the price of a SEP-
implementing chipset, an x%-of-sales royalty on a downstream 
smartphone is a large multiple (in dollars and cents) of the same 
x% royalty on the sales price of the chipset contained in that 
smartphone.130 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 2. 
 126. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 22. In October 2017, one seller 
(DHgate.com) offered Qualcomm MDM9625M OBA baseband CPU ICs for 
iPhone 6/6-Plus 4G LTE chip modems for $15 to $17 per unit, at 
https://m.dhgate.com/search.do?key=%22iphone+6%22+baseband+ic&cid=&ta
g=&scht=. The same seller offered Qualcomm MDM9615M OVV Baseband CPU 
ICs for iPhone 5/5G chips for $9 to $10 per unit, at https://m.dhgate.com/hot-
product /hot-iphone-baseband-ic.html. A high-volume purchaser such as 
Samsung or Foxconn might purchase at a lower unit price. 
 127. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 19. 
 128. Id. at 37. 
 129. Id. at 22. 
 130. Id. at 37–38. Financial information is redacted from the Apple 
Complaint, but one industry commentator estimates that Apple paid Qualcomm 
$20 in patent royalties and $20 for the baseband processor chipset, or $40 per 
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Apple asserts that Qualcomm uses its monopoly power to 
impose its “no license, no chips” policy. Because Qualcomm has 
monopoly power over CDMA-compliant chipsets (over 95% of the 
SEPs and over 80% of product sales), it is the only seller of 
premium-tier (top line) LTE chipsets (which contain both LTE 
and CDMA technology).131 Apple is therefore obliged to use 
Qualcomm chipsets for its premium-tier smartphones. 
Qualcomm then uses the monopoly power, Apple insists, to 
engage in “double dipping.”132 By this, Apple means that 
Qualcomm, first, charges a monopoly patent royalty on the 
chipsets it sells the OEM contract manufacturers of Apple 
smartphones and then charges Apple a second patent royalty on 
the sales price of Apple’s smartphones that contain the 
chipsets,133 contrary to the US legal doctrine of patent 
exhaustion.134 
After Apple filed its complaint in January 2017, the 
Supreme Court handed down its May 30, 2017, opinion in the 
Impression Products case,135 reaffirming the “well-settled line of 
precedent” against post-sale restrictions on patented 
                                                          
iPhone. Florian Mueller, Apple May Have Paid Qualcomm Approx. $40 per 
iPhone, Accounted for Third of Qualcomm’s Revenues, FOSS PATENTS (Feb. 10, 
2017), http://www.fosspatents.com/2017/02/apple-may-have-paid-qualcomm-
approx-40.html. The average sales price for iPhones in 2016 Q4 was $695. Alex 
Webb, Apple Sales Beat Estimates on Demand for Latest iPhones, BLOOMBERG 
TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
01-31/apple-forecast-misses-estimates-casts-shadow-over-holiday-sales. 
 131. See Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 16–17. Apple distinguishes 
between premium-tier LTE chipsets and other LTE chipsets. According to the 
KFTC, Qualcomm has 16% of all LTE chipset SEPs, and approximately 50% of 
all LTE chipset sales (total of premium and non-premium tiers). See KFTC 
Press Release, supra note 7, at 3–4. Apple does not assert that Qualcomm has 
monopoly power over non-premium LTE chipsets, which other firms such as 
Intel sell. See generally Apple Complaint, supra note 12; Amended Apple 
Complaint, supra note 12. 
 132. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 22–24. 
 133. Id. at 22. 
 134. See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628 (2008) 
(“The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial 
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”); 
see also Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1537 
(2017) (“the right to exclude just ensures that the patentee receives one 
reward”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 360 
(1961) (concurring opinion of Black, J.) (“One royalty to one patentee for one 
sale is enough under our patent law as written.”). 
 135. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. 1523. 
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products,136 and thus bolstering the FTC’s and Apple’s cases on 
this point. This led Apple to file an amended complaint in which 
it amplified these allegations and redoubled its protests against 
Qualcomm’s “double dipping,” asserting, “[t]his is precisely the 
kind of double-dipping, extra-reward system that the Court’s 
decision in Lexmark forbids.”137 Apple added that this practice 
“amounts to a scheme of extortion that allows Qualcomm 
unfairly to maintain and entrench its existing monopoly.”138 
B. REFUSAL TO LICENSE COMPETITORS 
The FTC and Apple, as well as the KFTC, charged that 
Qualcomm consistently refuses to grant licenses to competing 
suppliers of baseband processors (such as Intel and Samsung), 
in defiance of Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments to ETSI, TIA, 
and ATIS,139 but Qualcomm has denied this, in a somewhat 
equivocal manner.140 The seeming contradiction in the parties’ 
assertions may reflect Qualcomm’s carefully worded denial. The 
FTC and Apple appear to be saying that Qualcomm demanded 
such extravagant terms or payments that the royalty would not 
be FRAND, so that Qualcomm’s only offer was tantamount to a 
refusal to deal on FRAND terms, while Qualcomm responds that 
(in its opinion) it did not seek “to obtain agreement to unfair or 
unreasonable licensing terms.”141 According to the KFTC, 
Qualcomm’s reason for refusing to license competitors was that 
it determined that if it licensed chipset manufacturers, it would 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 1533. 
 137. Amended Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 2. 
 138. Id. at 1. 
 139. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 14; Apple Complaint, supra note 12, 
at 30. According to the KFTC, Samsung, Intel, and VIA Telecom have all 
requested SEP licenses from Qualcomm, but it refused them, while other 
companies such as MediaTek were offered only highly restrictive licenses. 
KFTC Press Release, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
 140. See Press Release, Qualcomm, Qualcomm Responds to Complaint from 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.qualcomm.com 
/news/releases/2017/01/17/qualcomm-responds-complaint-us-federal-trade-
commission (“Qualcomm has never withheld or threatened to withhold chip 
supply in order to obtain agreement to unfair or unreasonable licensing terms. 
The FTC’s allegation to the contrary -- the central thesis of the complaint -- is 
wrong.”). 
 141. Id. 
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be “difficult to maintain its model” for receiving royalties from 
cell phone sellers.142 
The FTC explains how this policy of refusing FRAND 
licenses to chipset manufacturers strengthens Qualcomm’s 
monopoly position: 
Qualcomm’s ability to tax its competitors’ sales via patent license 
terms with OEMs would be limited if it licensed cellular SEPs to its 
competitors. Qualcomm’s competitors, unlike its OEM customers, do 
not depend on Qualcomm for baseband processor supply. As a result, 
Qualcomm could not use a threatened disruption of baseband 
processor supply to skew SEP license negotiations with its 
competitors, and the royalties that would emerge from those 
negotiations would reflect the royalties that a court would deem 
reasonable.143 
Thus, “Qualcomm’s refusal to license competing 
manufacturers of baseband processors, in contravention of its 
FRAND commitments, contributes to its ability to tax its 
competitors’ sales and maintain its monopoly.” It also “reduces 
competitors’ abilities to invest and innovate in next-generation 
technologies,” which adversely impacts technological 
progress.144 The significance of this practice, for the issues 
addressed in this Article, is that the alleged conduct would tend 
to aid Qualcomm to capture the economic value of 
standardization, since making Qualcomm the sole source of 
standard-compliant chipsets permits Qualcomm to charge 
                                                          
 142. KFTC Press Release, supra note 7, at 6. Apple is quoted as asserting, 
“We’ve been trying to reach a licensing agreement with Qualcomm for more 
than five years but they have refused to negotiate fair terms.” Shaun Nichols, 
Bullyboy Apple Just Blew a $500m Hole in Our Wallet, Cries Qualcomm, 
REGISTER (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/04/28/qualcomm 
_apple_payment/. 
 143. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 24. 
 144. Another restrictive practice that the FTC complained about is that 
Qualcomm gave Apple a rebate of billions of dollars on its royalty payments in 
exchange for Apple’s agreement to buy baseband processors exclusively from 
Qualcomm. The FTC asserts that these “conditional rebates effectively 
penalized Apple’s use of any baseband processors supplied by Qualcomm’s 
competitors.” Id. at 26. This practice allegedly “significantly impeded the 
development of other baseband processor suppliers into effective competitors to 
Qualcomm.” Id. at 28. Apple also alleges that Qualcomm gave Apple economic 
concessions for it not to support WiMAX (IEEE 802.16), a wireless standard 
competing against LTE, which Qualcomm successfully supported. Apple 
Complaint, supra note 12, at 27–28. WiMAX was supported by Intel, Cisco, and 
other implementers. See Corcoran, supra note 23. 
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noncompetitive prices (including the so-called tax) for chipsets 
needed to implement the standard. 
C. LEGAL THEORIES OF FTC AND APPLE CASES AGAINST 
QUALCOMM 
1. Sherman Act Charges 
Both the FTC’s and Apple’s cases against Qualcomm are 
based primarily on charges that Qualcomm has engaged in 
abusive practices to maintain and exploit its dominant position 
in the market for baseband processor chipsets using CDMA 
technology and also the market for premium-tier LTE baseband 
processor chipsets, as well as its corresponding SEP ownership 
position, and that therefore Qualcomm has monopolized those 
markets in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.145 
                                                          
 145. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (“If Kodak adopted its parts and service policies 
as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it 
will have violated § 2. . . . Liability turns, then, on whether ‘valid business 
reasons’ can explain Kodak’s actions.”); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act 
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.”); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 
(1948) (“[T]he use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose 
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is 
unlawful.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(en banc) (holding that willful maintenance of monopoly power occurs when a 
monopolist’s conduct “through something other than competition on the merits, 
has the effect of significantly reducing usage of rivals’ products and hence 
protecting its own . . . monopoly”). Qualcomm’s alleged refusal to sell baseband 
processor chipsets also raises an essential-facility issue, see text accompanying 
supra note 96 and infra note 517, but that may not add anything to the plain 
monopolization charge as in Kodak, Grinnell, and Griffith. Clearly, the thrust 
of the FTC’s monopolization case, as pleaded in the complaint, is the willful 
maintenance of monopoly power—standard § 2 doctrine. 
More light on these legal theories is provided in the FTC’s brief in 
opposition to Qualcomm’s motion to dismiss the FTC’s complaint, and in Intel’s 
and Samsung’s amicus curiae briefs in support of the FTC in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss. See FTC’s Opposition to Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss, FTC 
v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/0085_2017_05_17_ftc_oppn_t
o_motion_to_dismiss_redacted.pdf; Brief for Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiff, No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-NMC (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2017), 
https://blogs.intel.com/policy/files/2017/05/Intel-Amicus-Brief-FILED.pdf; Brief 
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Furthermore, the abusive practices allegedly involved 
Qualcomm’s imposition of licensing and supply contracts in 
unreasonable restraint of trade, in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.146 The sections 1 and 2 charges are pleaded as 
violations of section 5 of the FTC Act, for technical reasons, but 
the antitrust allegations are conventional Sherman Act 
allegations.147 
The FTC does not assert the charge of imposing royalties in 
excess of FRAND as an antitrust violation in itself.148 Rather it 
                                                          
of Samsung as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK-
NMC (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2017), https://regmedia.co.uk/2017/05/15 
/samsungqualcommftc.pdf. 
 146. 15 U.S.C. § 1. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999) 
(stating that under § 1 the essential inquiry is “whether . . . the challenged 
restraint enhances competition” or lessens it). To justify its imposition of a 
restraint, “the defendant [must] show the restraint in fact does not harm 
consumers or has ‘procompetitive virtues’ that outweigh its burden upon 
consumers.” Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 147. Technically, the FTC pleaded a violation of § 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a), because that is the statute that the FTC is authorized to enforce. 
But the courts have held that § 5 registers all violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 
(1953) (holding that a company’s conduct “falls within the prohibitions of the 
Sherman Act and is therefore an ‘unfair method of competition’ within the 
meaning of § 5(a)”); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948) (“[A]ll 
conduct violative of the Sherman Act may likewise come within the unfair trade 
practice prohibitions of the Trade Commission Act.”); The Antitrust Laws, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
 148. Intel’s amicus curiae brief does assert that, however. Brief for Intel 
Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, supra note 145, at 19. The 
European Commission and the EU’s national competition authorities consider 
excessive pricing to be the illegal abuse of a dominant position. Article 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU specifically states that the prohibition 
against such abuse covers “directly or indirectly imposing unfair . . . selling 
prices.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 102, Oct. 10, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 89. The European Court of 
Justice held, in the United Brands case, that a business having a dominant 
market position abuses that position by “charging a price which is excessive 
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the products 
supplied.” Case C-27/76 United Brands v. Commission, 1976 E.C.R. 207. See 
also Summary of Commission Decision of 29 April 2014, 2014 O.J. (C 350) 8 
(making Samsung’s FRAND-SEP commitments legally binding); Summary of 
Commission Decision of 29 April 2014, 2014 O.J. (C 344) 6 (finding that 
Motorola had violated its FRAND-SEP commitments); Case Scandlines Sverige 
AB v. Port of Helsingborg, (COMP/36.568) 23 July 2004 (putting a gloss on 
United Brands); Napp Pharm. Holdings Ltd. v. Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading, [2002] 
Comp AR 13 (UK Competition Comm’n App, Trib.). 
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is only one of several practices (such as the “no license, no chips” 
policy,149 refusal to license competitive chip makers in violation 
of a FRAND commitment, exclusive dealing—including 
compensation for exclusive dealing, threats to cut off chipset 
supplies if customers seek judicial scrutiny of Qualcomm’s 
demands or conduct, and raising competitors’ costs) that 
allegedly cooperate together and reinforce one another, to 
maintain Qualcomm’s monopoly power. 
2. Unfairness Charge 
In addition to the conventional antitrust charges, the FTC 
makes a pure (or “standalone”) “unfairness” charge under 
section 5(a) of the FTC Act.150 The FTC asserts, “Qualcomm’s 
practices, regardless of whether they constitute monopolization 
or unreasonable restraints of trade, harm competition and the 
competitive process and therefore constitute unfair methods of 
competition in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.”151 The 
Supreme Court has held that the FTC Act prohibits not only 
actual violations of the antitrust laws (such as the violations of 
sections 1 and 2 described above) but “incipient” antitrust 
violations and conduct that violates their “spirit.”152 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court said, in the Sperry & 
Hutchinson case: 
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the 
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself 
if, in measuring a practice against the elusive but congressionally 
mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers 
public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or 
encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.153 
In so ruling, the Supreme Court quoted with approval from 
a report of the FTC on what standards should be used in 
considering whether a practice that is not in violation of the 
antitrust laws is nonetheless unfair: 
                                                          
 149. The “no license, no chips” policy allegedly raises rivals’ costs, which is 
recognized as possibly violative of § 2. See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 
832 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that “exclusive dealing arrangements” can harm 
competition “by raising . . . rivals’ costs”); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 
1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 150. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 151. FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 31. 
 152. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1972). 
 153. Id. at 244. 
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(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously 
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established 
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, 
it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or 
other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other 
businessmen).154 
Subsequently, Congress put a further, restrictive gloss on 
the unfairness doctrine. In 1994 it enacted section 5(n) of the 
FTC Act, which requires that the FTC may declare an act or 
practice unfair only if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”155 In this case, even the 
further requirements of section 5(n) would seem to be satisfied, 
because consumers cannot avoid the impact of increased cell 
phone prices allegedly resulting from the challenged practices, 
and the alleged abusive practices would not provide 
countervailing benefits, or any benefits to anyone but the 
defendant.156 
Lower courts have also held that the FTC’s use of section 5 
outside the antitrust-related area is limited to business conduct 
not “normally acceptable.” In the du Pont case, the Second 
Circuit held that when the FTC challenges a business practice 
that “does not violate the antitrust or other laws and is not 
collusive, coercive, predatory or exclusionary in character, 
standards for determining whether it is ‘unfair’ within the 
meaning of § 5 must be formulated to discriminate between 
normally acceptable business behavior and conduct that is 
unreasonable or unacceptable.”157 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 244 n.5 (quoting Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade 
Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of 
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 
(1964)). 
 155. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
 156. The FTC brief in opposition to Qualcomm’s motion to dismiss simply 
asserts that the conduct alleged here satisfies these requirements of § 5 because 
“a dominant firm forcing its customers to deal with rivals on unfavorable terms 
is coercive and exclusionary,” and because the complaint alleges “an 
economically sound theory of competitive injury.” FTC’s Opposition to 
Qualcomm’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 145, at 24. 
 157. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(setting FTC order aside because it did not satisfy that test). 
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Although the FTC’s use of section 5 as a supplement to the 
antitrust charges against Qualcomm therefore seems 
appropriate here, one Commissioner, Maureen Ohlhausen, 
dissented from the filing of the case. She pointed out—not quite 
accurately—that the “core theory of the complaint is that 
Qualcomm uses its alleged chipset monopoly to force its 
customers—smartphone manufacturers (OEMs)—to pay 
unreasonably high royalties to license FRAND-encumbered 
patents that are essential to practicing CDMA and LTE cellular 
communications standards.” She also pointed out that the theory 
of the case requires that Qualcomm charges unreasonably high 
royalties: “If Qualcomm charges reasonable royalties for its 
patents, then there is no anticompetitive tax.” Olhausen denied 
that there was any “robust economic evidence” to support the 
charge of an antitrust violation. She also rejected the section 5 
“unfairness” charge, on principle: “It is no answer to an 
unsupported Sherman Act theory to bring an amorphous 
standalone Section 5 claim based on the same conduct.”158 
Commissioner Olhausen’s argument that the core of the 
FTC’s complaint is that Qualcomm charged unreasonably high 
royalties, period, seems misplaced. If that were so, she might 
have better argued that this is a garden-variety breach of 
contract claim (breach of FRAND commitment) dressed up as an 
antitrust case. But the antitrust complaint is not directed merely 
at price gouging. Rather, the case is directed at exclusionary 
practices—such as the “no license, no chips” policy and refusals 
to license competitors—that have maintained monopoly power 
and excluded market entry by new competition that might 
threaten Qualcomm’s monopoly. Qualcomm’s conduct has, 
because it was effective in maintaining monopoly power, had the 
usual monopoly effects, however, such as price gouging. But that 
is one of the effects of the conduct, not the gravamen of the 
antitrust violation. (Although not the gravamen of a Sherman 
Act violation, price gouging in violation of a FRAND 
commitment could be the gravamen of a violation of FTC Act § 
5, if dishonest, unethical, or oppressive, with resulting injury to 
consumers that they could not avoid.) 
                                                          
 158. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen in the 
Matter of Qualcomm, Inc., Jan. 17, 2017, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files 
/documents/cases/170117qualcomm_mko_dissenting_statement_17-1-17a.pdf. 
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For some time there were two vacancies at the FTC, so that 
the Qualcomm complaint was issued in January 2017 on a 2-1 
vote. Then a third vacancy occurred, because Chairman Edith 
Ramirez resigned in February 2017. President Trump has now 
nominated a new chairman, Joseph Simons, a Republican, to 
replace resigning Democrat Ramirez, and has also announced 
two nominations for remaining Democratic and Republican 
seats.159 All three nominees await Senate confirmation. 
A coalition of conservative groups wrote President Trump a 
letter urging him “to take immediate steps to terminate the 
FTC’s midnight complaint against Qualcomm,” because it is “a 
misuse of antitrust litigation to promote a destructive policy 
agenda that aims to undercut patent property rights and 
conservative free market principles.”160 On the other hand, a 
coalition of Silicon Valley, information technology, and 
automotive industry companies wrote a letter to President 
Trump urging him to allow the FTC suit “to run its course 
without prejudice or political interference,” because the critically 
important “standard setting system is vulnerable to abuse” 
when a SEP holder “commits to license its patents on fair and 
reasonable terms, but then reneges on its commitments once its 
                                                          
 159. Brian Fung, Trump’s Pick for a Top Consumer Watchdog Once 
Represented Microsoft and MasterCard, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/19/trumps-pick-for-a-top-
consumer-watchdog-once-represented-microsoft-and-mastercard/?utm_term= 
.b8f65b6613f3. The White House has announced the nomination of Rohit 
Chopra to the remaining Democratic seat, and news sources have said that 
Noah Phillips has been or is expected to be nominated to the remaining 
Republican seat. William MacLeod et al., Trump to Nominate Competition-
Focused Simons for FTC Chair, CP-Focused Chopra for Commissioner; Reports 
of Philips for Additional Seat, AD LAW ACCESS (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www 
.adlawaccess.com/2017/10/articles/trump-to-nominate-competition-focused-
simons-for-ftc-chair-cp-focused-chopra-for-commissioner-reports-of-philips-for-
additional-seat/. Democratic Commissioner Terrell McSweeny also continues to 
serve on the Commission, although her term expired in September, so that 
Trump will be able to fill her Democratic seat at any time he wishes. The statute 
requires five commissioners and that no more than three of them can be of the 
same political party. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 160. Letter from Ed Martin et al. to Donald J. Trump, President, United 
States (Jan. 26, 2017), https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2017 
/01/Ltr-Conservatives-Pres-Trump-FTC.pdf. 
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patents have been included in standards and technological 
alternatives are excluded.”161 
3. Clayton Act Issue 
Curiously, even though the FTC invoked the so-called 
standalone aspect of section 5 (the “unfairness” doctrine), it did 
not try to apply a less controversial provision of conventional 
antitrust law that here is similar in impact. Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act makes it unlawful to sell goods, “whether patented 
or unpatented,” or set a price for them “or discount from, or 
rebate upon, [that] price, on the condition, agreement, or 
understanding that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or 
deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of 
the . . . seller, where the effect . . . may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly.”162 The Supreme Court 
has found violations of Clayton Act section 3 in cases where a 
single firm had a 40% market share163 or a few sellers using this 
practice together had an aggregate market share of 65%.164 It 
has also been held that section 3 applies when a patent license 
is granted on the condition that goods be purchased from the 
                                                          
 161. Letter from ACT | The App Association et al. to Donald J. Trump, 
President, United States (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/embeds 
/345863368/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&access_key=key-
YxhFfdkdkb095ehYT8Th&show_recommendations=true. The signatories 
assert that they “represent a broad cross-section of the United States business 
community, including automakers and suppliers, application developers, 
personal computer makers, television manufacturers, telecom product 
suppliers, chip designers and manufacturers, and other technology developers.” 
Id. at 1. This coalition of signatories includes Apple, AT&T, Dell, HP, Intel, 
Microsoft, Oracle, Samsung, and Verizon. Id. at 2. 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). 
 163. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 
(1922). 
 164. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 
295 (1949). In the Standard Stations case, there was a violation of section 3 
where the defendant tied up 16% of the gasoline stations in the relevant market 
with requirements contracts and accounted for 23% of all gasoline sales in the 
area, while its six leading competitors “employ[ed] similar exclusive dealing 
arrangements” and foreclosed another 42% of the gasoline market. The seven 
major companies sold a total of 65% of the gasoline sales and controlled 76% of 
all stations. Id. at 295, 309 n.12. They “collectively, even though not collusively,” 
foreclosed the market against competitive entry. Id. at 309. In contrast, 0.77% 
market foreclosure is insufficient. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 
U.S. 320, 333 (1961). 
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patentee.165 In FTC v. Qualcomm, Qualcomm has market shares 
of 80% or more in the relevant markets alleged; its chipset sales 
to Apple were made subject to a conditional rebate on the 
condition, agreement, and understanding that Apple would not 
deal in competitive baseband processors (such as those of Intel); 
and various anticompetitive and monopolistic effects were 
alleged. The facts alleged seem to fit the literal words of the 
Clayton Act.166 It would seem tactically more advantageous to 
rely on this statute, if not instead of the others at least in 
addition to them. 
D. RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE QUALCOMM CASES 
These suits involve a number of issues, and the remedies the 
plaintiffs seek go beyond determination of FRAND royalties for 
cell phone SEPs. But all of these suits are directed, in part, to 
requiring future cell phone SEP royalties to be determined on 
the basis of a share of the market price of the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit that the SEPs cover (chipsets)—a share 
proportioned to the relative contribution of the patented 
(infringed) technology to the chipset or of the chipset’s patented 
technology to the whole standard, rather than a royalty based on 
                                                          
 165. Lord v. Radio Corp. of Am., 24 F.2d 565, 567–68 (D. Del.), aff’d, 28 F.2d 
257 (3d Cir. 1928). In that case, RCA had patents on radio set circuits using 
vacuum tubes; it licensed the patents on the circuits and sold the vacuum tubes 
to radio manufacturers, subject to the condition that the sold tubes would be 
used only in the licensed radio sets. Id. at 566. The court said that “the practical 
effect of paragraph 9 [was] to prevent the licensees . . . from using or dealing in 
tubes other than those sold by the defendant,” and that “the provisions of 
paragraph 9 [were] quite as effective as express covenants could be, and 
practically compel[led] the use of the tubes of the defendant in all receiving sets 
made by the licensees.” Id. at 568 (citing Standard Fashion, 258 U.S. at 355). 
On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that the “contract or understanding between 
the defendant and the licensees has actually resulted in the monopoly of the 
radio tube business by the defendant to the extent of somewhere between 70 
per cent and 95 per cent.” Radio Corp. of Am. v. Lord, 28 F.2d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 
1928). The fact pattern in Lord v. RCA is generally comparable to that alleged 
in the Qualcomm cases. 
 166. In January 2017 Apple had a 44% market share of US smartphone 
sales, and presumably an even higher market share in the submarkets alleged 
in the complaint. Adam Ismail, Apple, LG Rise in U.S. Smartphone Market 
Share as Samsung Falters, Report Says, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 8, 2017, 4:23 
PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/us-smartphone-market-share-
january-2017/. The case would therefore seem comparable to Standard Fashion, 
on the basis of the rebate-exclusivity Qualcomm-Apple arrangements. 
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a share of the market price of the entire downstream product 
(cell phones) including value contributed by unpatented (non-
infringing) aspects of the upstream and downstream products or 
contributed by standardization. 
A different relief issue is suggested by the recent ruling in 
the Impression Products case.167 In that case, the Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance to patent policy of the exhaustion 
doctrine—the “well-settled line of precedent” against the 
extension of patent monopoly power beyond the patentee’s sale 
of its patented product.168 Qualcomm’s so-called double dipping 
and its business model of collecting patent royalties on 
smartphones containing patented Qualcomm baseband 
processors that Qualcomm has sold contravene the exhaustion 
doctrine. The conduct is clearly an unlawful downstream 
extension of patent rights and thus patent misuse,169 in that it 
uses an upstream patent on baseband processors to collect 
patent royalties on downstream products (smartphones), which 
are not within the scope of the upstream patents. Under the 
patent misuse doctrine, a finding of patent misuse makes the 
misused patents unenforceable against infringers until it is 
shown that the effects of the misuse have been “purged” and fully 
dissipated.170 In addition, patent misuse is an antitrust 
violation, but only if the other necessary elements of such a 
violation, such as adverse market impact, are shown to be 
present in addition to the patent misuse.171 
For types of patent misuse other than the conduct involved 
in this case, the Supreme Court has held that patent policy 
trumps state contract law and preempts its application, 
                                                          
 167. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
 168. Id. at 1527. 
 169. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
343–44 (1971) (holding that it is patent misuse to “attempt[] to broaden the 
physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly” or use “the monopoly of the 
patent to create another monopoly” or attempt “to enlarge the monopoly of the 
patent by the expedient of attaching conditions to its use.”). 
 170. B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942); see also U.S. 
Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) (“It is now, of 
course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused 
his patents to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of 
misuse or thereafter until the effect of such misuse have been dissipated, or 
‘purged,’ as the conventional saying goes.”). 
 171. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140–
41 (1969). 
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depriving the patentee of the power to have its unlawfully 
restrictive contract enforced under federal patent law or state 
contract law.172 It has not yet been decided whether the same 
policy applies to contractual restrictions contravening the 
exhaustion doctrine,173 but irrespective of whether misuse would 
deprive a company in Qualcomm’s position of entitlement to 
breach of contract remedies, it would deprive the company of 
patent infringement remedies,174 and the right to collect unpaid 
patent royalties.175 Qualcomm is now engaged in breach of 
contract litigation with licensees that are not paying patent 
royalties under their licenses, a breach of contract which 
Qualcomm says Apple has instigated.176 The licensees have 
                                                          
 172. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2413–14 
(2015) (holding contract was not enforceable, despite state contract law, due to 
patent policy that patent expiration marks a temporal boundary for exercising 
patent rights); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (holding contract was 
not enforceable, despite state contract law, due to patent policy that the public 
should be relieved of the burden of invalid patents); Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 
29, 31–32 (1964) (same as Kimble); see also Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 203 
P. 760, 762–63 (Cal. 1922) (“Anyone sued upon a contract may set up a defense 
that it is a violation of an act of Congress, and if it is found to be so, that fact 
will constitute a good defense to the action.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise or other term of an 
agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if . . . the interest in its 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms.”); id. § 178(3) (“In weighing a public 
policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of . . . the strength of that 
policy as manifested by . . . judicial decisions”). 
 173. The Supreme Court left the issue open in Impression Products, Inc. v. 
Lexmark International, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017), and Quanta Computer, Inc. 
v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). For a discussion of the issue, see 
Richard H. Stern, Impression Products v. Lexmark: The Resurgence of the US 
Exhaustion Doctrine, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 652 (2017). 
 174. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942). 
 175. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957). 
 176. Mike Freeman, Qualcomm Sues iPhone Makers in Escalating Patent 
War with Apple, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 17, 2017), http://www 
.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/technology/sd-fi-qualcomm-foxconn-
20170516-story.html (“Apple is definitely behind this . . . .”); see also United 
States Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457; Qualcomm Inc.’s Redacted Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief, Specific Performance, Declaratory Relief, and Damages, 
Qualcomm Inc. v. Compal Electronics, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01010 (S.D. Cal. May 
17, 2017), https://www.qualcomm.com/documents/qualcomm-complaint-
against-contract-manufacturers-redacted; Defendant’s Answer and Defenses; 
Counterclaims; Demand for Jury Trial, Qualcomm Inc. v. Compal Electronics, 
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01010 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2017), https://regmedia.co.uk/2017/07 
/19/qualcommcountersuitjuly18.pdf; Florian Mueller, Qualcomm’s Latest Move: 
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impleaded Apple into this suit as a third party defendant, 
because Apple had agreed to indemnify its suppliers.177 
There is authority that litigation in attempted furtherance 
of a monopolistic scheme is actionable under the antitrust laws, 
despite the First Amendment’s guarantee of the right to petition 
the government (including courts) for redress of grievances,178 
and that a defendant in such a case may be awarded treble its 
attorney fees and expenses in defending itself, as well as other 
consequential damages.179 However, the suit must be brought in 
                                                          
Breach-of-Contract Suit Against Apple’s Four Contract Manufacturers, FOSS 
PATENTS (May 17, 2017, 7:36 PM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2017/05 
/qualcomms-latest-move-breach-of.html. 
 177. Florian Mueller, Apple Accepts Invitation by Its Contract 
Manufacturers to Join Another Qualcomm Fray, FOSS PATENTS (July 18, 2017, 
8:56 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2017/07/apple-accepts-invitation-by-
its.html. 
 178. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 
1757 (2014) (citation omitted) (quoting Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993)) (“We crafted the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine—and carved out only a narrow exception for ‘sham’ 
litigation—to avoid chilling the exercise of the First Amendment right to 
petition the government for the redress of grievances (‘Those who petition 
government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability’).”). 
 179. See Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding antitrust treble damages include expense of defending 
patent infringement lawsuit based on assertion of “fraudulently-obtained 
patent in pursuit of a monopoly.”); Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 
F.2d 976, 989 (7th Cir. 1980) (“We also find that the municipalities are entitled 
to recover, as part of their antitrust damages, the expenses they incurred in 
litigating before the commission . . . . In the context of this antitrust violation, 
we do not believe that to allow litigation expenses to the municipalities . . . runs 
afoul of Noerr-Pennington as claimed by the utility. It was not the utility 
petitioning for its own lawful purposes. It was the municipalities petitioning to 
prevent the utility’s allegedly unlawful conduct.”); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. 
Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977) (“We agree that no 
barriers should be erected which prevent free access to the courts by one who 
believes in good faith that his valid patent is being infringed. However, one who 
has established or is attempting to establish an illegal monopoly by fraud on 
the Patent Office or misuse of a patent should not be permitted to further this 
goal by means of an infringement suit. When the antitrust violations are 
causally connected to the infringement action it is permissible to include the 
expenses of defending that action in the award of damages.”); Rex Chainbelt, 
Inc. v. Harco Prods., 512 F.2d 993, 1005 (9th Cir. 1975) (“In those cases which 
have awarded as part of antitrust treble damages, attorney’s fees incurred in 
defending patent infringement actions, we see the consistent thread of the 
patent infringement suit being used with ulterior motives as a predatory 
means—an aggressive weapon to attain some other anticompetitive end . . . .”); 
Dairy Foods Inc. v. Dairy Maid Prods. Coop., 297 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1961) 
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bad faith, not for the purpose of defending and vindicating the 
plaintiff’s legal rights.180 Typically, there must be a pattern of 
sham, baseless litigation.181 Some cases, however, involve a 
                                                          
(showing precedent supports holding expense of defending patent infringement 
suit brought in furtherance of antitrust violation is recoverable as treble 
damages); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424–25 (10th Cir. 
1952) (“We fully recognize that free and unrestricted access to the courts should 
not be denied or imperiled in any manner. At the same time, we must not permit 
the courts to be a vehicle for maintaining and carrying out an unlawful 
monopoly which has for its purpose the elimination and prevention of 
competition. . . . [T]he real purpose of the infringement action and [notifying 
customers of the suit] was to further the existing monopoly and to eliminate 
Dempsey as a competitor.”); ABS Global, Inc. v. Inguran, LLC, No. 14-cv-503-
wmc, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104617, at *13 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2016) (“[A] 
damages award [in an antitrust case] may include attorney fees and costs 
incurred due to anticompetitive conduct, separate and apart from any attorney 
fees incurred in pressing an antitrust claim itself.”). 
 180. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1757 (“In other words, the plaintiff must 
have brought baseless claims in an attempt to thwart competition (i.e., in bad 
faith).”); Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60–61 (1993); Ansul Co. v. 
Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 882 (2d Cir. 1971) (reasoning that only frivolous 
patent infringement suits can be held anticompetitive and part of an unlawful 
scheme, even though patentee’s suit had effect of furthering its patent misuse); 
Am. Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 997 (8th Cir. 
1966) (“There being no proof of any causal connection between the patent 
litigation and the allegedly illegal contracts, and it not being shown that the 
suit was initiated in furtherance of any monopolistic scheme or conspiracy, we 
believe that defendants have failed to prove these litigation expenses are anti-
trust damages.”). 
 181. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372, 380 (1973) 
(“Otter Tail instituted or sponsored litigation involving four towns in its service 
area which had the effect of halting or delaying efforts to establish municipal 
[power] systems. . . . ‘The delay thus occasioned and the large financial burden 
imposed on the towns’ limited treasury dampened local enthusiasm for public 
ownership.’ . . . [R]epetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial 
claims [are] within the ‘mere sham’ exception [to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity].”); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 
(1972) (holding a pattern of sham litigation to be violative of antitrust laws 
where actions were instituted “with or without probable cause, and regardless 
of the merits of the cases” in order to “impos[e] cost and delay” on competitors); 
see also Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 60–61 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)) (defining 
“sham” litigation as “objectively baseless [litigation] in the sense that a 
reasonable litigant would not realistically expect success on the merits,” which 
is brought as “an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships 
of a competitor”). But see Octane Fitness, 134 S.Ct. at 1757 (placing a gloss on 
PRE’s definition of “sham”); Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, 508 U.S. at 67, 73–74 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Posner, J., in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool 
Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (1982)) (arguing that some sham litigation has a 
basis in law but is filed only to injure a competitor—for example, one in which 
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single very egregious spurious legal claim.182 The courts have 
developed different legal tests for single and multiple ill-
conceived lawsuits.183 
In the present controversy, Qualcomm has filed a single civil 
action naming four Taiwanese defendant suppliers of Apple as 
having breached (at the instigation of Apple) four independent 
contracts that may impose unlawful restraints of trade or may 
be part of an unlawful, monopolistic scheme. It is unclear 
                                                          
“the damages it [plaintiff] could hope to get if it did win, were too small 
compared to what it would have to spend on the litigation”). 
 182. See cases cited supra note 180; Cal. Motor Transp. Co, 404 U.S. at 512–
13. The Court in California Motor Transport referred to several cases of 
egregious single-claim litigation, including Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. 
Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (enforcement of a 
fraudulently procured patent); Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. 
Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (perjury of 
witnesses in a patent infringement case); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962) (conspiracy with a licensing agency to exclude a 
competitor); and Kobe, 198 F.2d at 424 (“When the suit was filed the plaintiffs 
had no concrete information that the Dempsey pump infringed any of Kobe’s 
patents. Drawings or models of it had never been examined by or been in Kobe’s 
possession.”). 
 183. See Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 
162, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that California Motor Transport is a rule 
concerning a series of sham petitions, while Professional Real Estate Investors 
concerns a single sham petition, and that for California Motor Transport cases 
one should consider a win/loss ratio); Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 363–65 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(finding sham where one of fourteen proceedings was successful); Primetime 24 
Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the 
USS-POSCO rule to a series of sham claims); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra 
Costa Cty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 
1994) (stating that “the question is not whether any one of them has merit—
some may turn out to, just as a matter of chance—but whether they are brought 
pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits 
and for the purpose of injuring a market rival,” and finding no sham where 15 
of 29 lawsuits were successful); see also Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. 
Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no sham where 
defendant “won seven of the seventeen suits” and in each of the ten remaining 
cases “had a plausible [albeit unsuccessful] argument on which it could have 
prevailed.”); P.R. Tel. Co. v. San Juan Cable Co. LLC, 196 F. Supp. 3d 248, 
(D.P.R. 2016); Total Renal Care, Inc. v. W. Nephrology & Metabolic Bone 
Disease, P.C., 08-cv-00513-CMA-KMT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80821 (D. Colo. 
Aug. 21, 2009); ERBE Electromedizin GMBH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 529 F. 
Supp. 2d 577, (W.D. Pa. 2007); In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapple Antitrust Litig., 
04 MD 1628 (RMB) (MHD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1372 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007); 
Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 519 
(M.D. La. 2001). 
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whether this is a single claim, subject to a more difficult test for 
an antitrust claimant to satisfy,184 or four claims, subject to a 
legal test easier for an antitrust claimant to satisfy.185 In any 
case, liability is still speculative: it is not at this time adjudicated 
that Qualcomm is using the breach of contract suits for 
monopolistic purposes.186 Moreover, if this is considered a single 
sham claim, and thus subject to the Professional Real Estate 
Investors rule more favorable to patentees, is the patent misuse 
and unenforceability of imposing post-sale restrictions in 
violation of the exhaustion doctrine and using that conduct to 
further a monopolization program sufficiently egregious (and 
unambiguously unlawful enough) to satisfy the Professional 
Real Estate Investors rule? 
E. RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS FTC CASE 
Qualcomm filed a motion to dismiss the FTC’s case, which 
the court denied on June 26.187 Qualcomm argued that the FTC’s 
complaint did not state a claim for relief, but the court held that 
it stated a sufficiently plausible Sherman Act case, and thus a 
violation of section 5 of the FTC Act, making it unnecessary to 
determine whether the FTC complaint also stated a section 5 
standalone claim for relief. The court held that the “FTC has 
plausibly alleged that Qualcomm’s ‘no license-no chips’ policy is 
                                                          
 184. Hanover, 806 F.3d at 180 (“Where there is only one alleged sham 
petition, Professional Real Estate’s exacting two-step test properly places a 
heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the defendant. With only one ‘data point,’ 
it is difficult to determine with any precision whether the petition was 
anticompetitive.”); see also cases cited supra note 182. 
 185. See California Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 513; Waugh, 728 F.3d at 
365 (“[T]he fact that there may be moments of merit within a series of lawsuits 
is not inconsistent with a campaign of sham litigation.”); USS-POSCO, 31 F.3d 
at 811 (“[E]ven a broken clock is right twice a day.”); see also cases cited supra 
note 183. 
 186. It should be noted that First Amendment/Noerr-Pennington immunity, 
even if applicable to the breach of contract litigation, would not apply to any 
underlying antitrust liability for making the contracts. See Amphastar Pharm. 
Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 850 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2017) (“The mere 
existence of a lawsuit does not retroactively immunize prior anti-competitive 
conduct.”). Moreover, Noerr-Pennington is a limitation on finding an antitrust 
violation, not a ban on awarding consequential damages for an antitrust 
violation including otherwise privileged petitioning conduct. Id. 
 187. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98632 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017). 
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anticompetitive conduct in violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and thus in violation of § 5 of the FTCA.”188 
The court also held that “Qualcomm’s voluntary 
participation in the standards setting process, and Qualcomm’s 
voluntary commitment to license its SEPs on FRAND terms 
pursuant to the standards setting process, are the type of 
voluntary actions that can support an antitrust duty to deal,”189 
and that Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs on FRAND 
terms to chip manufacturer competitors such as Intel and 
Samsung showed “anticompetitive malice.”190 The refusal to 
license competitors allegedly “enables Qualcomm to enact its ‘no 
license–no chips’ policy and harm its competitors’ sales,” 
facilitating “Qualcomm’s ability to collect above-FRAND 
royalties.”191 The court therefore found that the FTC had 
sufficiently alleged that  
Qualcomm violated a duty to deal in refusing to license its FRAND-
encumbered SEPs to its modem chips [baseband processors] 
competitors [and] . . . that Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to its 
modem chips competitors is independent anticompetitive conduct that 
violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and thus violates § 5 of the FTCA.192 
Separately, the exclusive dealing “allegations are sufficient 
to plausibly allege that competitors were excluded from the 
alleged market by Qualcomm’s agreements with Apple” and that 
the arrangements “foreclosed a substantial share of the market 
for premium LTE modem chips,” in violation of the Sherman Act 
and thus in violation of section 5.193 
These rulings are only on a motion to dismiss, in which the 
plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations must be assumed to be 
true.194 Nonetheless, the court’s statements indicate its 
                                                          
 188. Id. at *68. 
 189. Id. at *77. 
 190. Id. at *79–81. 
 191. Id. at *79–80. 
 192. Id. at *83–84. 
 193. Id. at *89–90. 
 194. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986) (“We are bound for the 
purposes of this review to take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the 
complaint as true.”); Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual allegations that, if true, would “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”’ The court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as 
true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant.”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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acceptance of the FTC’s legal theories of Sherman Act 
violation.195 
V. HOW COURTS HAVE RULED FRAND ROYALTIES 
SHOULD BE DETERMINED 
In recent years, litigation has increased over FRAND 
royalty determination for SEPs. As a result, the courts have 
developed, or at least moved toward, legal principles that the 
FRAND claims in these pending lawsuits and the 2015 IEEE 
Patent Policy update embody, or with which they are at least 
consistent. But the issue remains highly controversial and many 
SEP holders strongly resist this movement. 
A. FRAND COMMITMENTS ARE LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACTS 
The first step in the movement to make FRAND 
commitments a meaningful element in standardization was the 
recognition that a FRAND commitment was a legally binding 
contract, enforceable in favor of those implementing the 
standard incorporating the patented technology. One of the 
earliest cases was Ess Technology v. PC-Tel,196 in which General 
DataComm, PC-Tel’s assignor, undertook to grant FRAND 
licenses on SEPs to implementers of an ITU modem standard. 
PC-Tel then acquired General and the patents.197 Ess 
Technology and PC-Tel were unable to agree on license terms.198 
Ess claimed that PC-Tel “started demanding increasingly 
unreasonable and discriminatory terms for licensing” the SEPs, 
and Ess brought an action to compel specific performance of the 
FRAND agreement.199 PC-Tel contended that the FRAND 
agreement was not a valid contract because a FRAND 
                                                          
 195. See Florian Mueller, Judge Koh Shows the Way: FRAND Non-
Compliance Can Be Established Without Rate-Setting Exercise, FOSS PATENTS 
(June 28, 2017), http://www.fosspatents.com/2017/06/judge-koh-shows-way-
frand-non.html (“And the federal judge whom Qualcomm needs to persuade at 
the future bench trial has taken positions on the legal issues in the case that 
don’t bode well for the San Diego patent holder and chipset maker. . . . [T]he 
way Judge Koh has expressed her disagreement with Qualcomm’s various legal 
challenges does go beyond what is strictly needed to deny the motion.”). 
 196. Ess Tech., Inc. v. PC-Tel, Inc., No. C–99–20292 RMW, 1999 WL 
33520483, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at *1–2. 
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agreement is “too vague to support a claim for specific 
performance, since it does not provide any express terms of the 
contract.”200 The court held, however, that an enforceable 
contract could exist even if “no terms of the contract are 
expressly agreed upon.”201 The court ruled that if the factual 
circumstances make it possible “to determine what is fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory, [then] under California law 
it must try to enforce the contract.”202 
In Apple v. Motorola,203 Motorola had made FRAND 
commitments to several SSOs for SEPs, but when Motorola and 
Apple were unable to agree on terms, Motorola sought an 
exclusion order and a permanent cease and desist order against 
Apple from the International Trade Commission (ITC). Apple 
sued Motorola for breach of contract, and Motorola moved to 
dismiss.204 Motorola claimed that no enforceable contract 
existed, because the concept of FRAND is too vague and 
indefinite to be the basis for a valid contract.205 Motorola also 
argued that Apple was neither a party to the Motorola-SSO 
contracts nor an intended third-party beneficiary of them.206 The 
court held that there was a valid bilateral contract between 
Motorola and the SSOs, in which Motorola received 
consideration in the form of benefits gained by “participating in 
the standard development process and influencing the choice of 
technology for the standards.”207 The court held that the contract 
was not too indefinite, and Apple was an intended third-party 
                                                          
 200. Id. at *3. 
 201. Id. at *4. 
 202. Id.; see also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 
2007). In that case, the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of Broadcom’s 
antitrust case based on allegations that Qualcomm fraudulently deceived SSOs 
into adopting the UMTS standard by committing to license its technology on 
FRAND terms and, later, after lock-in occurred, demanding non-FRAND 
royalties. The court said, “We are unpersuaded by Qualcomm’s argument that 
antitrust liability cannot turn on so vague a concept as whether licensing terms 
are ‘reasonable.’ . . . The reasonableness of royalties is an inquiry that courts 
routinely undertake” in determining damages in patent infringement cases. Id. 
at 315 n.8 (citing Ess-Technology). 
 203. Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11–cv–178–bbc, 2011 WL 
7324582, at *2–3 (W.D. Wis. June 7, 2011). 
 204. Id. at *4. 
 205. Id. at *9. 
 206. Id. at *10. 
 207. Id. at *8, *10. 
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beneficiary: “[t]he unavailability of essential patents matters 
only to those who wish to practice the standards, such as Apple. 
Thus, ‘Apple is a member of a class of beneficiaries intended by 
the parties to benefit from [the contract].’”208 The court therefore 
denied the motion to dismiss Apple’s breach of contract claims, 
and required trial to proceed.209 
Similarly, in Realtek v. LSI,210 the court granted Realtek’s 
summary judgment motion on its breach of contract claim for 
violation of a FRAND commitment. The facts were almost 
identical to those of Apple v. Motorola. The defendants were 
“contractually obligated under their Letters of Assurance to the 
IEEE to license the . . . patents on RAND terms and Realtek is 
a third-party beneficiary.”211 The “defendants breached their 
contractual obligations to IEEE and to Realtek as a third-party 
beneficiary of that contract by seeking injunctive relief against 
Realtek before offering Realtek a license” on the RAND-
encumbered SEPs.212 The court also granted a preliminary 
injunction barring defendants from enforcing any exclusion 
order or injunctive relief by the ITC, until the court determined 
what defendants’ RAND obligations were, and that defendants 
had complied with them.213 Unlike such prior cases as Apple v. 
Motorola, in which the ruling was preliminary or 
interlocutory,214 in Realtek the court made a determination on 
                                                          
 208. Id. at *10 (quoting Pappas v. Jack O. A. Nelsen Agency, Inc., 260 
N.W.2d 721, 725 (Wis. 1978)); see also Telefonix, Inc. v. Response Eng’g, Inc., 
No. 12 C 4362, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161756, at *1213 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2012) 
(holding that, contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, “fair” is not “simply too vague 
a concept to constitute an unambiguous promise.”). 
 209. Apple, 2011 WL 7324582, at *18. 
 210. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1008 
(N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 211. Id. at 1006. 
 212. Id. at 1008. 
 213. Id. at 1010. 
 214. Other courts before Realtek also made preliminary rulings denying 
motions to dismiss in FRAND commitment cases. See, e.g., Research in Motion 
Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (N.D. Tex. 2008), in which RIM 
argued that Motorola breached contracts it made with IEEE and ETSI to license 
its SEPs on FRAND terms, and had instead demanded “of RIM terms that are 
unfair, unreasonable, and, on information and belief, discriminatory.” The court 
held that RIM was entitled to litigate its breach of contract claim. Accord 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823 JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73827, at *13 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2011) (holding that Microsoft alleged facts 
sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract for Motorola’s failure to offer 
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the merits that the patentee’s FRAND commitment was a legally 
binding obligation enforceable by users of the standard involved, 
that the defendants’ failure to honor the obligation was a breach 
of contract, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a license on 
FRAND terms.215 
Other possible legal theories applicable here, although 
courts have not had to rely on them, are acceptance of an offer to 
make a unilateral contract,216 equitable estoppel,217 and 
promissory estoppel.218 Ordinarily, the patentee represents (or 
promises) to the SSO (and its members and the working group 
for the standard) that it will grant a FRAND license to 
implementers of the standard if its technology is incorporated 
into the standard. The SSO and implementers then 
substantially change their position in detrimental, foreseeable, 
and reasonable reliance on the representation, by incorporating 
the technology and designing and marketing standard-
compliant products. Courts generally hold that such conduct 
creates a binding obligation.219 These may be sounder legal 
                                                          
licenses on FRAND terms), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872, 885 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding 
existence of bilateral contract where “Motorola made promises to the ITU to 
license its standard-essential patents worldwide to all comers. In exchange, it 
received the benefit of having its patents implicated in the standards.”). 
 215. Realtek, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 1006, 1008, 1010; see also In re Innovatio IP 
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2013), in which 
the court held that failure to offer a RAND license promised in an IEEE LOA is 
a breach of contract: “Innovatio’s predecessors made a contractual promise to 
Cisco [as an IEEE member] to offer licenses on RAND terms to all users of the 
relevant IEEE standards. If Innovatio fails to perform that obligation . . . Cisco 
can sue Innovatio to recover all foreseeable damages it suffers because of that 
breach.” 
 216. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ch. 1, § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“A 
unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives a promise as 
consideration for his promise.”). 
 217. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 
F.3d 1311, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (describing the effect of equitable 
estoppel as “a license to use the invention that extends throughout the life of 
the patent”). 
 218. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 4, § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 
1979) (“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does 
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise.”).  
 219. High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 817 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (listing the elements of equitable estoppel); Law Mathematics & Tech. v. 
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theories than bilateral contract, because the SSO does not 
usually make any return promise in exchange for the patentee’s 
promise.220 The SSO simply performs (if it elects to use the 
patented technology), thereby accepting a binding offer to make 
a unilateral contract, or by not performing it does not accept the 
offer.221 
B. FRAND COMMITMENTS FOLLOW PATENT ASSIGNMENTS 
A few years ago, there was some question whether an 
assignee of a SEP on which the assignor had given a FRAND 
commitment could successfully ignore the commitment. Trolls 
saw an opportunity to “monetize” SEPs more effectively by 
“flipping” them into new ownership and then increasing 
royalties. There should not have been any question, however, 
because it has long been the law that an assignor can assign only 
what it owns, and therefore an assignee takes “the assignment 
of the patent, subject to the legal consequences of [the] previous 
acts” of the assignor.222 It follows that “because the owner of a 
patent cannot transfer an interest greater than that which it 
possesses, an assignee takes a patent subject to the legal 
encumbrances thereon.”223 Such legal encumbrances include 
covenants not to sue and licenses.224 Thus, a FRAND-
encumbered patent stays so encumbered despite any transfers. 
                                                          
United States, 779 F.2d 675, 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (listing the elements of 
promissory estoppel). 
 220. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ch. 1, § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“A 
unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives a promise as 
consideration for his promise.”).  
 221. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“If an offer 
for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration requested in the 
offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound 
by a contract . . . .”). 
 222. Worley v. Tobacco Co., 104 U.S. 340, 344 (1881) (citing McClurg v. 
Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843)). 
 223. Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 224. V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Grp., SpA, No. 02–cv–02259–PSF–CBS, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352, at *18–19 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2006) (“Moreover, 
the license having been given to Benetton by virtue of the covenant not to sue, 
V-Formation as the subsequent purchaser of the patent would take subject to 
the outstanding license.”). 
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In the FTC’s Negotiated Data Solutions case,225 a scheme 
(based on assignments) to hold up manufacturers implementing 
an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet standard led to a prosecution for unfair 
trade practices. National Semiconductor Corporation (NSC) had 
participated in standard-setting for the standard, and in 1994 it 
made a FRAND commitment to the IEEE in a so-called Letter of 
Assurance (LOA).226 The LOA provided that, if the IEEE 
adopted a standard based on NSC’s patented “NWay” 
technology, NSC would offer to license the technology for a one-
time, paid-up royalty of $1,000 per licensee to all manufacturers 
and sellers of products that use the IEEE standard.227 The IEEE 
then incorporated NWay into its 802.3 Ethernet standard, at 
NSC’s urging, in preference to several alternative 
technologies.228 The so-called autonegotiation technique of the 
patented NWay technology was included in 802.3f and in the 
subsequent versions of 802.3, so that it was an integral element 
of the “Fast Ethernet” technology of the standard.229 
In 1998, NSC went out of the digital business and sold off 
its digital patents.230 Subsequently, N-Data, a firm that did not 
manufacture any products, acquired the patents. N-Data’s 
business was licensing patents that it acquired from inventors 
and other previous holders of patents.231 It then sought to 
“monetize” the NWay patents (the FTC noted that the term 
“troll” is sometimes applied to such companies).232 By then, 
NWay, with its autonegotiation technique, had become the 
industry standard technology for fast network 
interconnection.233 By 2008, when the FTC suit occurred, the 
worldwide Ethernet device market was forecast to exceed six 
                                                          
 225. Negotiated Data Sols. LLC (N-Data), F.T.C. No. 051–0094 (Sept. 22, 
2008), 2008 WL 4407246 (decision and order); Press Release, FTC, FTC 
Challenges Patent Holders Refusal to Meet Commitment to License Patents 
Covering ‘Ethernet’ Standard Used in Virtually All Personal Computers in U.S. 
(Jan. 23, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/01/ftc-
challenges-patent-holders-refusal-meet-commitment-license. 
 226. N-Data, 2008 WL 4407246 at *2, ¶ 13. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See id. at *2, ¶ 14. 
 229. Id. at *3, ¶ 16. 
 230. Id. at *4, ¶ 23. 
 231. Id. at *5, ¶ 33. 
 232. Press Release, FTC, supra note 225. 
 233. Id. 
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million units, and it would have been “expensive and difficult for 
the industry to switch to another standard”—a state of affairs 
known as “lock-in.”234 
At that point, N-Data decided it could better monetize its 
NWay patents by demanding royalties far in excess of NSC’s 
$1,000-royalty commitment.235 According to the FTC, because of 
the industry-wide lock-in to NWay, N-Data was able to demand 
and levy higher royalties than the industry otherwise would 
have paid for the use of the technology.236 Moreover, by reneging 
on the licensing commitment to IEEE, N-Data “was able to 
increase the price of an Ethernet technology used by almost 
every American consumer who owns a computer.”237 Therefore, 
the FTC charged N-Data with engaging in an unfair method of 
competition, in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.238 N-Data 
settled the suit with the FTC by agreeing to a consent order 
prohibiting it from enforcing the NWay patents unless it had 
first offered a paid-up patent license on the terms NSC had 
offered in its 1994 LOA to the IEEE.239 
In one case, the court upheld the actionability of an 
antitrust charge that two firms conspired to evade one of the 
                                                          
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). 
 239. Since then, there appears to be little further disputed about using 
assignments of SEPs to avoid FRAND commitments. There have been several 
FTC consent orders, however, involving assignees of SEPs (by acquiring 
companies) that sought injunctions or ITC exclusion orders against companies 
willing to accept FRAND licenses, but disagreeing with the assignee’s new 
royalty rate demands. In these cases, the FTC’s consent orders prohibited 
further such conduct. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility LLC., F.T.C. No. 121–0120 
(July 23, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07 
/130724googlemotorolado.pdf (decision and order); Robert Bosch GmbH, F.T.C. 
No. 051-0094 (Apr. 24, 2013), 2013 WL 1911293 (analysis of agreement 
containing consent orders to aid public comment). 
The present IEEE by-laws’ Patent Policy specifically states that a Letter 
of Assurance (LOA) is binding upon any and all assignees and transferees of the 
patent, and IEEE requires firms submitting LOAs to agree to notify any 
assignees about the LOA and RAND commitment and to require them to agree 
to obey the LOA and pass it on to any further assignee. INST. ELEC. & ELECS. 
ENG’RS, supra note 4. 
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firms’ RAND commitment and split the proceeds. In the Vizio 
case,240 it was alleged that “Thomson and Funai shared a 
commitment to a common scheme to circumvent Thomson’s 
FRAND commitment to [an SSO] by agreeing that Funai would 
collect a second royalty for the same technology, and to share the 
proceeds of that second royalty between Thomson and Funai,” 
thus allegedly raising the price of licensing the technology “to 
supracompetitive levels.”241 The court found this claim 
actionable under section 1 of the Sherman Act.242 
C. CASE LAW ON FRAND ROYALTY DETERMINATION 
It has been the law for more than a century that patent 
infringement damages “must reflect the value attributable to the 
infringing features of the product, and no more”; the reason is 
that the infringer has taken, for purposes of assessing 
compensatory damages, “only the patented technology, and so 
the value to be measured is only the value of the infringing 
features of an accused product.”243 Implementing this 
fundamental principle of royalty determination has raised many 
problems. Controversy still surrounds many aspects of 
determining a FRAND royalty, although determination of what 
is a reasonable royalty has been a ubiquitous issue in patent 
infringement cases,244 long before the current disputes over 
                                                          
 240. Vizio, Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co., CV 09-0174 AHM (RCx), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30850 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010). 
 241. Id. at *17, *20. 
 242. Id. at *18–19. The court granted a motion to dismiss a unilateral 
monopolization claim against the assignee, however, for lack of sufficient 
market effect. Id. at *12–16.  
 243. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(citing VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 244. See Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for 
RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1474 
(2015) (“[T]he most common measure of damages in patent cases today, and the 
exclusive measure of damages for post-judgment infringement (i.e., absent an 
injunction preventing future infringement), is a ‘reasonable royalty’ 
attributable to the infringed patent.”); see also Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco 
Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted) (“Under some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for 
patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate. If the district 
court determines that a permanent injunction is not warranted, the district 
court may, and is encouraged, to allow the parties to negotiate a license. The 
district court may step in to assess a reasonable royalty should the parties fail 
to come to an agreement.”). 
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FRAND royalties for SEPs,245 particularly since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the eBay case, holding that injunctions 
against patent infringement are subject to the same, traditional 
standards as other injunctions, such as showing a likelihood of 
irreparable injury,246 thus relegating most patent infringement 
plaintiffs to reasonable royalty damages relief. 
1. The Controversy over Royalty Base 
Most products contain multiple components and have both 
patented and unpatented features. For example, hundreds of 
components, complying with hundreds of standards, using the 
technology of hundreds of SEPs, are now found in modern laptop 
                                                          
 245. See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 
648 (1915) (“[T]here was no established royalty. In that situation it was 
permissible to show the value [of what was taken] by proving what would have 
been a reasonable royalty, considering the nature of the invention, its utility 
and advantages, and the extent of the use involved.”); Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing 
Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1894) (“[I]n the absence of [other 
probative evidence], the only measure of damages was such sum as, under all 
the circumstances, would have been a reasonable royalty for the defendant to 
have paid.”); see also text supra note 13. 
 246. The Supreme Court, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006), held that injunctions are not the presumptive norm in patent cases, and 
when granted must be based on four traditional factors. Id. at 393–94. In 
addition, the Federal Circuit has held that a showing of some “causal nexus” 
between the infringement and the alleged harm to the patentee must be made 
as part of the showing of irreparable harm, because infringement does not harm 
a patentee if consumers buy that product mainly for reasons other than the 
patented feature. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 640, 641–
42 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2013); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). These principles have made it difficult for patentees to obtain 
injunctions, and therefore they tend to make judgments of reasonable-royalty 
damages the norm. 
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computers247 and smartphones.248 This makes it necessary to 
determine the value contributed to the product by each 
component or feature and then to “apportion . . . the patentee’s 
damages between the patented feature and the unpatented 
features.”249 That apportionment can, at least in theory, be 
accomplished in any of three ways: (1) by making the royalty 
base the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit, (2) by 
adjusting the royalty rate to a small enough percentage of 
downstream end-product selling price, or (3) by a sliding-scale 
combination between those two.250 
                                                          
 247. A 2010 empirical study, Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a 
Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions), ITU-T KALEIDOSCOPE CONFERENCE 
(2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1619440, 
concluded that “a modern laptop embodies or utilizes at least 251 
interoperability standards, but the actual number is certainly much higher (the 
authors would be unsurprised by a total number of 500 or more).” They also 
found that 75% of the standards were subject to RAND requirements, 22% were 
royalty-free; and 3% were in royalty-bearing patent pools. One might speculate 
that if each of 75% of 251 RAND standards were allocated a royalty of 1% of 
sales price, to be divided among the various SEPs incorporated into the 
standard, the total royalty on the laptop (excluding the royalty-free patents and 
the pools) would be 188% of its sales price. If each patent of each standard were 
entitled to, say, 1%, the total royalty would “stack” to an astronomical value. 
 248. A 2014 study, Ann Armstrong et al., The Smartphone Royalty Stack: 
Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones 
2–4, 68 (May 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.wilmerhale.com 
/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-
Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf, finds that royalties 
are $121 to $124 for smartphones using either Microsoft Windows Phone or 
Android or some other open source operating system, the cost of components for 
which is $120 to $150, and the selling price is approximately $400. The authors 
also find average cost of the baseband processor that implements cellular 
functionality is $10 to $13, and announced royalty demands for LTE cellular 
functionality approximate $60 for a $400 smartphone. The authors state that 
they “estimate potential patent royalties in excess of $120 on a hypothetical 
$400 smartphone—which is almost equal to the cost of device’s components.” 
Id. at 2. 
 249. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884). 
 250. See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1225–27 
(calculation of a reasonable royalty can in principle be accomplished “in various 
ways—by careful selection of the royalty base to reflect the value added by the 
patented feature, where that differentiation is possible; by adjustment of the 
royalty rate so as to discount the value of a product’s non-patented features; or 
by a combination thereof.”). The court allowed that “an appropriately 
apportioned royalty award could . . . be fashioned by starting with the entire 
market value of a multi-component product” and then “dramatically reducing 
the royalty rate to be applied,” but it warned that doing this might mislead a 
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The second and third approaches theorize that the product 
of royalty and royalty base will remain approximately constant 
to produce a reasonable royalty remaining the same despite the 
reciprocal change in the two factors. This is not a realistic 
theory,251 but some earlier cases seem to have endorsed it. In the 
Lucent case, the court said: 
Simply put, the base used in a running royalty calculation can always 
be the value of the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the 
magnitude of the rate is within an acceptable range (as determined 
by the evidence). Indeed, “[a]ll running royalties have at least two 
variables: the royalty base and the royalty rate” . . . . There is nothing 
inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire product, 
especially when there is no established market value for the 
infringing component or feature, so long as the multiplier accounts for 
the proportion of the base represented by the infringing component or 
feature.252 
Some lower court decisions followed or even expanded on the 
concept of a sliding-scale royalty rate/royalty base tradeoff, 
                                                          
lay jury that “may be less equipped to understand” the difficulties in reaching 
a proper result. Id. at 1227. 
 251. A skeptic might ask why spokesmen for SEP owners contest this issue 
so strongly if the end-point is the same no matter how one starts out. See Joseph 
Kattan, The Next FRAND Battle: Why the Royalty Base Matters, CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRONICLE, Mar. 2015, at 3, 12, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational 
.com/assets/Uploads/KattanMar-151.pdf (“The revealed preferences of market 
participants suggest that the royalty base does matter. SEP holders with patent 
monetization businesses consistently seek to base royalties (and justify royalty 
levels) for SEPs that read at the component level on the price of the complete 
systems that incorporate those components. By contrast, standard 
implementers consistently advocate the use of component prices as the royalty 
base. . . . The insistence of companies with large patent monetization 
businesses on basing SEP royalties on the price of complete systems confirms 
that the royalty base matters. Given the existence of transaction cost 
inefficiencies in licensing only complete systems and not standard-practicing 
components, the conclusion that the royalty base affects the royalty amount is 
unavoidable.”). See also the statement by Ericsson official Tomas Dannelind: 
“One big advantage with this strategy [downstream royalty base] is also that it 
is likely that the royalty income will be higher since we calculate the royalty on 
a more expensive product.” Florian Mueller, Ericsson Explained Publicly Why 
It Collects Patent Royalties from Device (Not Chipset) Makers, FOSS PATENTS 
(Jan. 29, 2014, 9:02 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/ericsson-
explained-publicly-why-its.html#.VRxVb6KlyxM.mailto (quoting Dannelind). 
 252. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (citing RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 
7:4 (2008)). 
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permitting the royalty base factor to be the market price for the 
finished product.253 
Several factors have been said to make the first (smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit) approach more reliable than 
those using the sliding scale. One is that a jury (or judge) in a 
patent infringement damages suit may not be able to correctly 
apportion the value of the patented invention if it considers 
testimony about the defendant’s entire sales revenue on the 
finished product.254 A second, perhaps related, reason is that, 
when the royalty base is the price of a multi-component product, 
there is an undue risk of compensating the patent holder for 
noninfringing components of the product.255 Another reason is 
that there is inherently a greater risk of error in calculating, 
when using a higher of several possible royalty bases,256 because 
of inevitable arithmetic errors in making the necessary 
                                                          
 253. In Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Civil No. 
09–290, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120558, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2012), and 
PACT XPP Technologies, AG v. Xilinx, Inc., Case No. 2:07–CV–563–RSP, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66436, at *8 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2012), the courts ruled that it 
is permissible to start by estimating a reasonable royalty with the sales price of 
the whole product as a royalty base and then correcting downwards, because 
“an apportionment analysis needs to start somewhere.” Carnegie Mellon Univ., 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120558, at *12. In Fractus, S.A. v. Samsung Electronics 
Co., 876 F. Supp. 2d 802, 834–35 (E.D. Tex. 2012), the court similarly allowed 
use of evidence of the average overall selling price of the accused cell phone as 
a starting point for an apportionment analysis. Even more recently, the court 
in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. Apple, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 865, 
870 (W.D. Wis. 2015), allowed the patentee’s expert “to rely as an initial step in 
her analysis on the $100 price premium of the accused iPhone 5s over the 
unaccused iPhone 5c,” but “only as a starting point.” 
 254. See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226–27 (“[C]are must be taken to avoid 
misleading the jury by placing undue emphasis on the value of the entire 
product. . . . reliance on the entire market value might mislead the jury, who 
may be less equipped to understand the extent to which the royalty rate would 
need to do the work in such instances.”). 
 255. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (CSIRO), 
809 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[W]here small elements of multi-
component products are accused of infringement, calculating a royalty on the 
entire product carries a considerable risk that the patentee will be improperly 
compensated for non-infringing components of that product.”) (quoting 
LaserDynamics Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 256. See Thomas F. Cotter, Stern on FRAND, COMPARATIVE PATENT 
REMEDIES (Oct. 7, 2015, 8:12 AM), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot 
.com/2015/10/stern-on-frand.html (commenting on Richard H. Stern, What Are 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Terms for Licensing a Standard-Essential 
Patent?, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 549, 554 n.26 (2015)). 
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computations.257 A possible fourth reason is that by moving the 
royalty base farther downstream toward the finished product, 
thereby commingling many technologies embodied in many 
other patents, contributing many different functionalities to the 
aggregate functionality of the end product, it becomes harder to 
separate the ex-ante value of the relevant SEP from its ex-post 
value—the value of standardization that is embodied in the final 
standard-compliant product.258 
Courts began to recognize, around the beginning of the 
current decade, that it seriously skews the royalty calculation 
and tends prejudicially to mislead a jury when an inflated 
royalty base is used. In the Uniloc case,259 the Federal Circuit 
observed that “[t]he disclosure that a company has made $19 
billion dollars [sic] in revenue from an infringing product cannot 
help but skew the damages horizon for the jury, regardless of the 
contribution of the patented component to this revenue.”260 The 
Federal Circuit agreed with the trial court’s observation that—
“[t]he $19 billion cat was never put back into the bag even by 
Microsoft’s cross-examination”—and it held that sound 
precedent did not allow use of the selling price of the end product 
as a starting point “for minor patent improvements simply by 
asserting a low enough royalty rate.”261 
                                                          
 257. For example, consider two ways to measure a multiple a of the 
difference between two quantities b and c (e.g., by amplifying analog voltage): 
(1) ab–a’c and (2) a(b–c), where a is supposed to equal a’, in an ideal world. The 
larger the multiple, the greater the probability of error in the first approach. 
Similarly, in the case of a $500 cell phone that includes a $5 chip, a 5% royalty 
on the chip is 25 cents and so too is a 0.05% royalty on the cell phone. But the 
likelihood of getting a jury (or judge) to estimate the second royalty rate at 
0.05% rather than, say, 0.06% or 0.04%, or even 0.01% or 0.1%, is poor, and the 
cash value of the error is multiplied greatly by starting out with an inflated 
royalty base (error percentage is most likely equiprobable, however one 
approaches the issue, yet, a 10% error on $500 is $50; a 10% error on $5 is 
$0.50). 
 258. Thus, the price of a cell phone clearly reflects, in substantial part, the 
value of its interoperability, which is a product of standardization and thus ex-
post rather than ex-ante. It also reflects the value of extraneous functionalities 
such as the camera, touchscreen, and amount of memory storage. 
 259. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 260. Id. at 1320. 
 261. Id. 
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Other courts have widely quoted and followed the not-
putting-the-cat-back-into-the-bag warning of the Uniloc case. In 
the LaserDynamics case, the Federal Circuit warned: 
[N]either cross-examination nor a curative jury instruction could have 
offset the resulting unfair prejudice[]. Admission of such overall 
revenues, which have no demonstrated correlation to the value of the 
patented feature alone, only serve to make a patentee’s proffered 
damages amount appear modest by comparison, and to artificially 
inflate the jury’s damages calculation beyond that which is “adequate 
to compensate for the infringement.”262 
In that case, the patentee argued that the defendant did not 
sell any smaller salable patent-practicing unit than a laptop 
computer, so that the parties would have to use the value of the 
entire laptop computer as the royalty base, for want of anything 
else.263 The court replied that the patentee could have tried to 
determine an appropriate lump-sum royalty, and in any case the 
same difficulties in identifying the value that the patented 
component contributed to the laptop computer would exist 
“when it comes time to then apportion a royalty rate that 
accounts for the . . . contribution only[.]”264 Accordingly, “the 
exceedingly difficult and error-prone task of discerning the 
[smallest saleable patent-practicing unit’s] value relative to all 
other components in the laptop remains.”265 
The Federal Circuit’s 2015 CSIRO decision sums up several 
justifications for using the smallest salable patent-practicing 
unit approach for determining SEP royalty base, at least when 
there is no strong reason for another approach (such as when the 
technology of the relevant patent is so important in driving 
consumer demand for the product that it creates the entire value 
for the product).266 First, the considerable risk of error in rate 
                                                          
 262. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1319–20). 
 263. Id. at 69. 
 264. Id. at 70. 
 265. Id. Lower courts have also followed the principle of the cat and bag. See, 
e.g., Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Apple, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 865, 870 (W.D. 
Wis. 2015) (“Given the scale of Apple’s total revenues or total profits (or even 
just those revenues and profits from the accused iPhones and iPads), Apple’s 
concern of prejudice is, if anything, magnitudes greater than Microsoft [in 
Uniloc].”). 
 266. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (CSIRO), 
809 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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determination might result in a considerable overpayment.267 
Consider a hypothetical case: a 0.1% royalty on a $5 signal-
processing chip used to control the brakes in a car may seem a 
modest, reasonable royalty; but if even a fraction of that royalty 
rate is applied to the selling price of a $40,000 car, the resulting 
royalty becomes grotesque—a considerable multiple of the price 
of the chip itself. Second, “disclosure of the end product’s total 
revenue ‘cannot help but skew the damages horizon for the jury, 
regardless of the contribution of the patented component to this 
revenue.’”268 Using a downstream SEP royalty base, as is 
challenged in the present FTC and Apple cases against 
Qualcomm, rather than a royalty base of the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit, is likely to lead to gouging manufacturers 
implementing the standard, and that overcharge is likely to be 
passed on to the public that buys the standardized product. 
The Federal Circuit concluded, therefore, that for a 
reasonable royalty to measure, as it must, only the value of the 
patented invention: 
This value—the value of the technology—is distinct from any value 
that artificially accrues to the patent due to the standard’s adoption. 
Without this rule, patentees would receive all of the benefit created 
by standardization—benefit that would otherwise flow to consumers 
and businesses practicing the standard. We therefore reaffirm that 
reasonable royalties for SEPs generally—and not only those subject 
to a RAND commitment—must not include any value flowing to the 
patent from the standard’s adoption.269 
The CSIRO opinion thus emphasizes the interrelation of 
several factors that characterize current reasonable-royalty 
                                                          
 267. Id. at 1302. 
 268. Id.; see also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 
67–68 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In the LaserDynamics case, the patentee sought a 2% 
royalty on the price of an entire notebook computer, for a single patent that 
covered a method for identifying the type of optical disc inserted into a disc drive 
of the computer. LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d, at 67–68. The Federal Circuit 
rejected the royalty demand, instructing that “in any case involving multi-
component products, patentees may not calculate damages based on sales of the 
entire product, as opposed to the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, 
without showing that the demand for the entire product is attributable to the 
patented feature.” Id. The court stated that “it is generally required that 
royalties be based not on the entire product, but instead on the ‘smallest salable 
patent-practicing unit.’” Id. at 67. 
 269. CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305. 
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jurisprudence270 in the Federal Circuit: a reasonable royalty 
should compensate only for the value of the invention; it should 
not compensate SEP holders for the value that standardization 
creates. Moreover, the policy of the patent system, that 
compensation for the use of patented technology should be based 
only on the value of the technology used, not on “any value 
flowing to the patent from the standard’s adoption,”271 is best 
                                                          
 270. Some of these cases involve the meaning of reasonable royalty as used 
in the 1952 patent statute. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). Some involve the meaning of 
that term in a contractual FRAND commitment entered into well before the 
announcement of the 2015 IEEE Patent Policy update, purporting to clarify the 
meaning of the term in light of case law. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 271. CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305. In so ruling, the Federal Circuit did not 
elaborate on what it meant by “value flowing to the patent from the standard’s 
adoption.” Id. Clearly, the court at a minimum meant the value resulting from 
the exclusionary effect of standardization, i.e., the surge in value resulting from 
having the user at the mercy of the SEP owner. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 
869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012), modified on other grounds, 757 F.3d 
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[O]nce a patent becomes essential to a standard, the 
patentee’s bargaining power surges because a prospective licensee has no 
alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the patentee’s mercy.”). It may be 
argued that the CSIRO court did not intend also to include in the “value flowing 
to the patent from the standard’s adoption” the value of network effects and 
interoperability. CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305. The court does not seem to consider 
explicitly any such distinction in standardization value relevant to the court’s 
public policy analysis. Id. Most commentary accepts that the Federal Circuit 
does not disaggregate ex-post monopoly surge and network effect surge in SEP 
value. J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable 
Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1809, 1832 (2016). 
Some commentators perceive a relevant distinction, however. See, e.g., 
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1174–90 (2017). Sidak, while referring to 
the very similar language in the Ericsson case, 773 F.3d at 1233 (“[T]he patent 
holder should only be compensated for the approximate incremental benefit 
derived from his invention. . . . [T]he royalty for SEPs should reflect the 
approximate value of that technological contribution, not the value of its 
widespread adoption due to standardization.”), fervently states a hope that in 
some way that language will not be “interpreted to mean that one should 
exclude from a FRAND royalty any and all of the standard’s value.” Sidak, 
supra, at 1869. Like Sidak, Siebrasse and Cotter also hope for a new 
interpretation of what they say the court might have meant in Ericsson and 
CSIRO: “To the extent the Ericsson court did mean that the patentee is not 
entitled to appropriate any of the value of the standard, this holding is 
inconsistent with our theory. We therefore urge the Federal Circuit to distance 
itself from this interpretation in the future.” Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, 
at 1228. 
By now, however, even those commentators who deplore Ericsson and 
CSIRO’s absolute rejection of ex-post royalty determination and those cases’ 
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accomplished by selecting a royalty base as close as possible to 
the object embodying just that patented technology, which is 
usually the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit.272 
2. Non-Discrimination 
Still another consideration relevant for RAND 
determination is raised in Apple’s complaint in its case against 
Qualcomm—the ND in RAND. The sales price at Walmart for a 
16 GB Kyocera 4G LTE smartphone is less than $100, while a 
256GB iPhone 7 Plus sells for nearly $1000.273 Even though both 
4G LTE smartphones use 4G LTE technology that Qualcomm’s 
SEPs cover, the use of a royalty based on selling price results in 
a ten-fold discrepancy in dollar royalty—which, Apple argues, is 
inconsistent with the FRAND obligation of non-discriminatory 
terms, since the difference in royalties is not related to the 
patented technology but rather to other features of the 
                                                          
insistence on excluding all values of standardization, including network value, 
from the reasonable-royalty calculation, have come to realize that such is what 
the Federal Circuit holds. It and lower courts make no distinctions and consider 
the value of standardization to include all components of the surplus in ex-post 
values. Thus, for example, Siebrasse and Cotter say that “we reject the common 
view that the patentee should be confined to the value of its technology prior to 
standardization and argue instead that the patentee should be able to capture 
some portion of the invention’s increase in value attributable to network effects, 
as revealed ex post.” Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1169 (emphasis 
added). It therefore appears proper to read the two cases as holding that a 
reasonable royalty for a SEP should not include the network value that 
standardization generated. 
 272. The CSIRO court held, however, that an absolute rule that all damages 
calculations must always begin with the smallest saleable patent-practicing 
unit is “untenable.” 809 F.3d at 1303. It is permissible, also, to rely on royalty 
rates of sufficiently comparable licenses, in appropriate cases. Id. The court said 
that “there may be more than one reliable method for estimating a reasonable 
royalty.” Id. at 1301. For example, when the parties are negotiating for a specific 
per unit rate (say, x cents per product), rather than a rate that is a percentage 
of a royalty base (say, x% of a sales price of a product), a reasonable royalty may 
be determined without reference to the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit. 
Id. at 1302–03. 
 273. Kyocera DuraForce E6560 16GB Unlocked GSM 4G LTE Military 
Grade Smartphone w/ 8MP Camera - Black, WALMART (last visited Sept. 23, 
2017), https://www.walmart.com/ip/Kyocera-DuraForce-E6560-16GB-Unlocked 
-GSM-4G-LTE-Military-Grade-Smartphone-w-8MP-Camera-Black/117746885; 
Apple iPhone 7 Plus 256GB Unlocked GSM/CDMA Quad-Core Phone w/ Dual 
Rear 12MP Camera - Jet Black, WALMART (last visited Sept. 23, 2017), https:// 
www.walmart.com/ip/Apple-iPhone-7-Plus-256GB-Unlocked-GSM-CDMA-
Quad-Core-Phone-w-Dual-Rear-12MP-Camera-Black/107542495. 
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products.274 Apple also explains that it sells different 
smartphones at prices ranging from $200 to $1000, but 
containing similar or the same Qualcomm chipsets, so that the 
different Apple “devices provide exactly the same standardized 
cellular functionality,” yet command substantially different 
royalties because of different memory chips and other features 
unrelated to the SEPs or patented chipsets. This state of affairs 
may appear to provide a strong argument in favor of the smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit principle.275 
3. Multiple Patents on Same Component 
Court rulings support determining SEP royalties, not only 
according to the principle of the smallest saleable patent 
practicing unit, but according to a further principle to be used 
when other SEPs contribute to the value of the functionality that 
the relevant smallest saleable patent-practicing unit provides. 
This principle is that a disproportionate share of the total 
reasonable royalty should not go to only one patent out of many 
covering the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit, because 
the guiding principle in determining reasonable royalty is “what 
portion of the value of that product is attributable to the 
patented technology.”276 When multiple patents cover a 
component, even if the component is a smallest saleable patent-
practicing unit, the total reasonable royalty on that smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit should be allocated among these 
patents in accordance with their respective technological 
contributions.277 
                                                          
 274. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 37. 
 275. Id. at 50. Qualcomm has a response to this, discussed at text 
accompanying infra note 398. 
 276. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
see Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (repeating the statement of the 
lower court that damages can only be calculated based on the value of a final 
product when a patent holder can show “that the entire value of the whole 
machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the 
patented feature”). 
 277. A proper apportionment in such a case takes into account all of the 
relevant patents covering a unit (component) within a device. This can be a 
difficult task when many patents, essential or non-essential, cover the unit. It 
has been estimated that 250,000 active US patents cover portions of a 
smartphone. RPX Corp., Registration Statement 59 (Form S-1), SEC.GOV (Sept. 
2, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432 
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Consider an example that an IEEE tutorial on reasonable 
royalties provides: a circuit board or sub-assembly with 
functionality for IEEE Standard 1284, RS-232, and USB port 
connections, where the SEP whose reasonable royalty is in 
question relates only to the circuit board’s IEEE 1284 port 
function.278 It would be wrong to base a reasonable royalty for 
that SEP on the total value of all three distinct connectivity 
functions of the circuit board. Instead, the reasonable royalty for 
the SEP on IEEE 1284 should be based on the value of only that 
SEP’s contribution to the circuit board’s functionality—and not 
based on the value of the RS-232, USB, or other functionalities 
of the circuit board. The reasonable royalties for the various 
relevant patents should be allocated among all of those patents 
in accordance with the respective values of the functionalities 
they contribute and the share of that functionality that the 
individual patent contributes (when several patents contribute 
to a single function). As the IEEE states, “The values of the 
various Essential Patent Claims may vary; some, for example, 
may have higher value because they cover important 
functionality, while others may have a lower value because they 
address less important functionality.”279 Finally, it should be 
recognized that a risk of over-compensation occurs unless the 
value of relevant unpatented technology is considered as well. 
4. Determining Royalty When the Smallest Saleable Patent-
Practicing Unit Is Quite Large 
Similar issues arise when the only product actually 
marketed is far downstream from the part of the system that the 
SEP concerns. When that occurs, resort to the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit principle may suggest an unduly inflated 
royalty base. That issue came up in the 2014 VirnetX case, 
involving a feature in iPhones and Macs that was not separately 
marketed, so that there existed no smaller saleable patent-
practicing unit than the whole iPhones and Macs.280 The trial 
                                                          
/000119312511240287/ds1.htm (“Based on our research, we believe there are 
more than 250,000 active [U.S.] patents relevant to today’s smartphones”). 
 278. INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, Understanding Patent Issues During 
IEEE Standards Development 14 (Jun. 13, 2017), http://standards.ieee.org/faqs 
/patents.pdf. 
 279. Id. at 15. 
 280. VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1327–28. 
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court instructed the jury that it could base damages on the value 
of an end-product (such as the iPhone) if it was a smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit, that is, “the smallest salable 
unit containing the patented feature.”281 On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit said this was wrong: 
The instruction mistakenly suggests that when the smallest salable 
unit is used as the royalty base, there is necessarily no further 
constraint on the selection of the base. That is wrong. For one thing, 
the fundamental concern about skewing the damages horizon—of 
using a base that misleadingly suggests an inappropriate range—does 
not disappear simply because the smallest salable unit is used. . . . In 
other words, the requirement that a patentee identify damages 
associated with the smallest salable patent-practicing unit is simply 
a step toward meeting the requirement of apportionment.282 
Accordingly, “[w]here the smallest salable unit is, in fact, a 
multi-component product containing several non-infringing 
features with no relation to the patented feature,” as it was in 
the case of the iPhones and Macs, a more detailed analysis is 
needed.283 The court said that this meant that “a reasonable 
royalty analysis requires a court to . . . carefully tie proof of 
damages to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market 
place.”284 The Federal Circuit recognized that the footprint 
might be hard to detect, stating that “we are cognizant of the 
difficulty that patentees may face in assigning value to a feature 
that may not have ever been individually sold.”285 For that 
reason, “[the Federal Circuit has] never required absolute 
precision in this task; on the contrary, it is well-understood that 
this process may involve some degree of approximation and 
uncertainty.”286 
                                                          
 281. Id. at 1327. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. (quoting ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010)) (omission in original). 
 285. Id. at 1328. 
 286. Id. In the same vein, the Federal Circuit instructed that a “realistic 
starting point for the royalty calculations by juries” is “often, the smallest 
salable unit and, at times, even less.” Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 
1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1327–28); see also 
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting the use of an entire laptop computer’s value as the basis for 
calculating royalties where the patent at issue related to optical disc drives). 
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5. Gaming the System by Adroit Claim Drafting 
In theory, one could game the system by adroitly 
manipulating the patent-practicing unit to expand it. The 
Federal Circuit’s analyses thus far have concerned necessary 
reliance on the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit, not on 
the smallest patent-practicing unit, i.e., that which is claimed in 
the patent. Under a quirk of current US patent law—contrary to 
some Supreme Court precedent from about 80 years ago, the 
Lincoln Engineering case287—it is currently possible to write a 
valid patent (assuming lack of obviousness) claiming the 
invention of a novel windshield wiper as “an automobile having 
a windshield, said windshield having a windshield wiper of such 
and such a kind, slidingly located thereon.”288 The theory of the 
Federal Circuit is that if one can have a patent on X, it only adds 
further narrowing limitations to the claimed invention to claim 
X+Y. The latter claim is narrower because device X+Y 
necessarily infringes a patent on device X.289 Therefore, the 
                                                          
 287. Lincoln Eng’g. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549–50 
(1938) (“[T]he improvement of one part of an old combination gives no right to 
claim that improvement in combination with other old parts which perform no 
new function in the combination”). In that case, the Court invalidated a patent 
claim to a combination of an old grease gun with a novel nozzle tip coupling 
device. 
 288. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 845 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). The Federal Circuit effectively “overruled” Lincoln Engineering in Radio 
Steel as outdated because of the 1952 codification of the patent law. However, 
the Supreme Court in 1969, 17 years after the enactment of the codification, 
cited Lincoln Engineering with approval as authority to support its ruling in 
Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969). 
Despite this, a district court will probably follow Radio Steel as overturning 
Lincoln Engineering. See Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co. v. PSC Comput. Prods. 
Inc., CV 03–0093–SVW (Mcx), CV 03–0094–SVW (Mcx), 2004 WL 5806997, at 
*9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2004) (regarding Lincoln Engineering as superseded by 
Radio Steel, and rejecting argument that claim was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 
112 as improperly claimed); accord Minebea Co. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 
212 (D.D.C. 2006) (upholding claims to combination of conventional hard disk 
drive (HDD) and novel motor as well as to novel motor alone, so that separate 
patent royalties could be levied on the motor and then the HDD assembly); see 
also Richard H. Stern, Quanta Computer Inc v LGE Electronics Inc—Comments 
on the Reaffirmance of the Exhaustion Doctrine in the United States, 12 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 527, 529–30 (2008) (discussing Minebea); Richard H. Stern, 
An Update on ‘‘Exhaustion’’—Supreme Court Decides Quanta Case, IEEE 
MICRO, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 57 nn. 4–5 (discussing Minebea). 
 289. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“Such statements 
[in Lincoln Engineering] are indeed puzzling in view of the fact that the addition 
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latter claim must be patentable, even though X interacts with Y 
in a conventional or even trivial way.290 
Therefore, the smallest patent-practicing unit for the 
suggested windshield-wiper-cum-car claim is the whole 
automobile. A $295,000 Rolls Royce Ghost (the price for the 
“entry-level” model) embodying the patented combination would 
be an infringing automobile.291 A modest-seeming 0.1% royalty 
on the invention would be $250; not a bad inventive reward for 
conceiving a novel means for wiping windshields.292 By the same 
token, one might claim a smartphone comprising such and such 
parts in combination with a novel baseband processor chipset. 
The smallest patent-practicing unit would be the claimed 
smartphone, which might sell for $1000. It probably would be 
prudent not to sell the chipset as such, because that would 
highlight the anomaly too defiantly. 
Would this work? It should work in the Federal Circuit, at 
least at the panel level, since clear Federal Circuit precedent 
(Radio Steel and Bernhart) authorizes (or even commands) it. It 
might even pass muster before the Federal Circuit en banc.293 
                                                          
of elements to a claim narrows its scope and thereby creates a lesser 
monopoly.”). 
 290. Id. Bernhart’s analysis wrongly assumes that what is true for 
infringement and anticipation analysis, see Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961) (“[I]f anything is settled in the patent 
law, it is that the combination patent covers only the totality of the elements in 
the claim, and that no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.”), is 
equally true for all patentability analysis. That is not so, for the courts adopt an 
“inventive concept” or “essential features of the invention” approach for other 
issues such as patent eligibility and exhaustion. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 
U.S. 617, 627 (2008); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942). 
 291. See 2017 Rolls-Royce Cars, AUTOGUIDE.COM, http://www.autoguide 
.com/new-cars/2017/rolls-royce/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 
 292. In point of fact, such a 0.1% royalty (rather than, for example, 0.001% 
or 0.0001%) is not modest at all, considering the minimal technological 
contribution of the windshield wiper to the whole Rolls-Royce. But many judges 
and juries, for the reasons the Federal Circuit has given in the Uniloc case, are 
unable to recognize that. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing first the default twenty-five percent rule, 
its history of use, and its potential overestimation of the value of component 
patents in rejecting use of the rule, and discussing excessive damages 
generally). 
 293. The Federal Circuit and its predecessor court have been more inclined 
to follow their own precedents than the Supreme Court’s. See Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
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Yet, this conflicts in spirit with the trend of Uniloc, 
LaserDynamics, Ericsson, VirnetX, and CSIRO. Something 
along this line came up in a recent district court decision that 
was not appealed on this point: the GPNE case.294 In that case, 
the patentee GPNE asserted a claim to a “node in a data 
network,” which GPNE argued was an iPhone or an iPad, where 
the node as claimed comprised a RAM plus an interface plus a 
baseband processor chipset, all interconnected in a particular 
way.295 Apparently (this is unclear, however), the elements were 
interconnected so that they cooperated with one another 
conventionally, that is, they functioned as such elements 
ordinarily function together, as in the Lincoln Engineering 
case.296 
The claim was clearly directed to a device larger than, and 
including, the baseband processor chipset—it was at least 
arguably directed to a cell phone. The “node” (or cell phone) was 
indisputably the smallest patent-practicing unit. It is a firm, 
indeed bedrock, principle of patent law that the patent claim—
the specific wording of the claim—defines the invention: “The 
claim is the measure of the grant.”297 Nonetheless, the court 
summarily dismissed GPNC’s argument without citation of 
cases, other than several saying (unexceptionably) that those 
                                                          
(the Federal Circuit’s statement of the law “would cover instances where this 
Court has held the contrary.”). Compare Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression 
Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1523 
(2017), with Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); 
compare Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), with In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 
967 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“To conclude on the light Flook sheds on these cases, very 
simply, for the reasons we have stated, we find none.”). 
 294. GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., 12–CV–02885–LHK, 2014 WL 1494247, at 
*13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 830 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
 295. GPNE Corp., 2014 WL 1494247 at *12 n.6. 
 296. Id.; Lincoln Eng’g. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 546–48 
(1938). 
 297. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 
(1944); Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 11 (1935) (“[T]he the claims of the patent, 
not its specifications, measure the invention.”); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 
1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“In order to know what the invention is we must, of 
course, look to the claims which point it out.”); see also Apple Inc. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and 
Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & 
COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)) (“The name of the game is the claim.”). 
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“legal outcomes should not ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s 
art.’”298 The district court explained its ruling on pure policy 
                                                          
 298. GPNE Corp., 2014 WL 1494247, at *13 (citing Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012); Flook, 437 U.S. at 593). 
These are patent-eligibility cases, however, not royalty-determination cases. 
Another court stated a similar view, in less detail, in Emerson Elec. Co. v. 
Suzhou Cleva Elec. Appliance Co., 4:13CV1043SPM, 2015 WL 8916113, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2015). Claim l of the infringed patent (U.S. Pat. No. 
5,934,165) covered a “caster foot assembly” with a particular configuration. Id. 
at *3. Other claims covered an appliance (such as a wet/dry vacuum cleaner) 
including as claim elements the foregoing caster foot assembly combined with 
other conventional elements of a vacuum cleaner such as a drum and various 
posts. Id. The patentee argued that the royalty base could therefore properly be 
the price of the defendant’s whole vacuum cleaner. Id. The magistrate judge 
rejected the argument, despite the claim language, asserting among other 
things that the caster foot assembly was patented but the other claimed 
elements in the combination claims were not (that is simply wrong as a matter 
of patent law, because what is patented is the combination of all the claim 
elements), and asserting that “adopting Plaintiff’s reasoning would effectively 
allow patentees to circumvent the rules of apportionment through artful 
drafting.” Id. at *5 (citing GPNE). While that last assertion is correct, the fault 
is that of the law, not the plaintiff’s reasoning. 
Golden Bridge Tech. v. Apple Inc., 5:12–cv–04882–PSG, 2014 WL 2194501 
(N.D. Cal. May 18, 2014), is similar. The magistrate simply misunderstood the 
patent. The patent’s independent claims claimed a system (or apparatus) 
comprising a processor and such other conventional elements as a transmitter, 
various filters, and other electronic parts. See generally Golden Bridge Tech. v. 
Apple Inc., 5:12–cv–04882–PSG, 2014 WL 7227282 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014) 
(construing the patent claims). The processor interacted with the other 
elements in an apparently novel way, but the novel functionality allegedly was 
carried out only in the processor. Id. at *5–6. Therefore, the magistrate rejected 
use of the entire claimed subject matter as the royalty base. Id. Again, perhaps 
a right result from a public policy standpoint, but arrived at in an unprincipled 
manner. The magistrate did not distinguish the smallest saleable unit (the 
baseband processor) from the smallest patent-practicing unit (what the claim 
claimed—a system). If the processor indeed cooperated in a novel, unobvious 
manner with the other elements of the claimed system, rather than in a 
conventional manner, arguably the invention was the whole system. Cf. Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (patent invalid because 
“[i]n short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform 
generic computer functions.”); Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage 
Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60–61 (1969) (“The combination of putting the burner together 
with the other elements in one machine, though perhaps a matter of great 
convenience, did not produce a ‘new or different function,’ [citing Lincoln 
Engineering] within the test of validity of combination patents. A combination 
of elements may result in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects 
taken separately. No such synergistic result is argued here.”). It is unclear what 
the magistrate meant in saying that the action was all in the processor. Golden 
Bridge Tech., 2014 WL 2194501, at *5. The filters, for example, were not 
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grounds, in a series of what purport to be logical inferences but 
are non sequiturs: 
This cursory recitation of the entire device in the asserted claims does 
not foreclose the component that directly implements the invention 
from being the smallest salable patent-practicing unit for reasonable 
royalty purposes. Neither party contests that the patent’s 
contribution to the art is a signaling technique performed by the 
baseband processor . . . . Accordingly, the Court will not disregard the 
policy behind the smallest salable patent-practicing unit doctrine 
based on GPNE’s assertion that the invention is the entire device. 
Adopting GPNE’s reasoning would allow patent drafters to effectively 
abolish the smallest salable patent-practicing unit doctrine by simply 
drafting patent claims to cover end products rather than the 
individual components that actually embody the invention.299 
The court added, “Therefore, GPNE may not claim the 
entire accused iPhones and iPads as the smallest salable patent-
practicing units for damages purposes solely because GPNE 
claimed a ‘node’ having a processor that can perform the 
invented signaling steps rather than just the processor itself.”300 
The court is saying, in effect, “never mind what the patent claim 
says, the invention is carried out by the baseband processor 
chipset.” The court then concluded, ipse dixit, “the Court holds 
as a matter of law that in this case, the baseband processor is 
the proper smallest salable patent-practicing unit.”301 In doing 
so, the court reached a sound result, from a policy standpoint, 
but it did so in a not principled, very high-handed manner, and 
in one perhaps in excess of a district court’s authority to ignore 
appellate precedent, albeit wrong-minded precedent. 
It would have been instructive to have seen how the Federal 
Circuit would have addressed an appeal of this aspect of the 
GPNE ruling. In contrast to the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit considers the “draftsman’s art” entitled to great 
deference, and the legal outcome often depends on it.302 It would 
                                                          
decorative potted plants. The proper question was whether the claim elements 
cooperated in a new and unobvious way, as Black Rock requires. 
 299. GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. 12-CV-02885-LHK, 2014 WL 1494247, 
at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014). 
 300. Id. at *13. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See, e.g., Helferich Patent Licensing, LLC v. N.Y. Times Co., 778 F.3d 
1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding the clever claim draftsman’s “painstaking 
efforts” sufficient to overcome the exhaustion doctrine). But see Alice Corp. Pty. 
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351 (2014) (“This Court has long 
‘warn[ed] . . . against’ interpreting § 101 ‘in ways that make patent eligibility 
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have been even more interesting to see how the Supreme Court 
would have addressed a Federal Circuit ruling reversing the 
district court in GPNE, since the scarcely-buried issue here is 
the Federal Circuit’s authority to overrule the Supreme Court’s 
Lincoln Engineering decision.303 Given past relations between 
                                                          
“depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”’”) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012), in turn quoting Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 
U.S. 617 (2008) (disregarding the draftsman’s efforts); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 137 (2006) (Breyer, J. 
dissenting). For a critique of the Helferich case, see Richard H. Stern, 
Heightening Tension Between the Exhaustion Doctrine and Field-of-Use 
Licensing in Information Technology Tests the Limits of Each Doctrine (Part 2), 
38 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 326 (2016). In the Federal Circuit, as Judge Rich 
famously said, “the name of the game is the claim.” See In re Hiniker Co., 150 
F.3d at 1369. Nicety in claim drafting promotes clarity, predictability, and 
stability, but it leads to considerable tension in the case law. It appears to have 
caused the Supreme Court to think it is being bamboozled by fast-talking, city-
slicker patent lawyers, and the Court doesn’t seem to like that. However, the 
clash between form and substance is inevitable because the need to give 
precision in language in order to give the public notice of the scope of patent 
monopolies makes form prevail over substance in patent law generally, and 
certainly in claim drafting. For example, see cases cited supra note 297. But 
ultimately, the proper function of claims can be satisfied within the limits of 
Lincoln Engineering and Black Rock. 
 303. See Lincoln Eng’g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 546–48 
(1938), which the Federal Circuit unconventionally “overruled” in Radio Steel, 
731 F.2d 840, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For further discussion, see supra note 288. 
On January 12, 2018, in Exmark Manufacturing Co. v. Briggs & Stratton 
Power Products Group, LLC, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 783 (Fed. Cir. 2018), a 
three-member panel of the Federal Circuit upheld (without extensive 
discussion) the use of the sales price of an entire lawn mower as a royalty base, 
where the patent (not a SEP) claimed a conventional lawn mower with an 
improved flow control baffle for directing grass clippings toward a discharge 
chute. The court said: “Using the accused lawn mower sales as the royalty base 
is particularly appropriate in this case because the asserted claim is, in fact, 
directed to the lawn mower as a whole. The preamble of claim 1 recites a 
‘multiblade lawn mower.’ It is not the baffle that infringes the claim, but rather 
the entire accused mower. Thus, claim 1 covers the infringing product as whole, 
not a single component of a multi-component product. There is no unpatented 
or non-infringing feature of the product.” Id. at *29. The court allowed, however, 
that the royalty rate must be selected to apportion the royalty based on the 
relative values of the conventional elements and unconventional elements of the 
mower. The court cited Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2009) for the propriety of this approach, while making 
no mention of misleading juries; Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 
1292, 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) putting the $19 billion cat back into the bag, 
see text preceding supra note 261; or LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, 
Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is generally required that royalties 
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the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, it is not difficult to 
imagine the Court’s response to the Federal Circuit’s arrogation 
of the power to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court that it 
deems outdated.304 If Lincoln Engineering is the law then Radio 
Steel is not, and one cannot write valid system-gaming claims of 
the type suggested above. 
GPNE may have reached the right result—for the policy 
reasons that the district court’s opinion stated—but it did not do 
so in a principled manner. The right way to reach that result 
would be to restore Lincoln Engineering—which only the 
Supreme Court could do at this point—and thus hold GPNE’s 
“node” claim invalid, just as a claim to a Rolls-Royce with a novel 
windshield wiper should be held invalid. 
VI. THE 2015 IEEE PATENT POLICY UPDATE 
By 2014 the IEEE, a major US SSO305 whose 
standardization activity involves (among other things) 
telecommunications network technology, concluded that the 
RAND commitments for standards it had adopted were not 
                                                          
be based not on the entire product, but instead on the ‘smallest salable patent-
practicing unit.’ ”).    
 304. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) 
(overturning a line of Federal Circuit decisions that had attempted to “overrule” 
a century of Supreme Court precedent, although it lacked the judicial authority 
to do so). 
 305. The IEEE is an international organization of more than 420,000 
electrical, electronic, and computer engineers, most of whom are located in the 
United States. About IEEE, IEEE, https://www.ieee.org/about/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2017). The subdivision of the IEEE primarily involved in 
standard-setting activity is the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA). About 
Us, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, http://standards.ieee.org (last visited Oct. 10, 
2017). IEEE-SA includes many Working Groups, involved in projects for the 
development of different standards, and the IEEE Patent Committee, involved 
in the preparation and dissemination of informational material about IEEE 
patent policies. IEEE-SA Standards Board: PatCom, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, 
http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2017). IEEE-SA has a Board of Governors subordinate to the IEEE Board of 
Governors. IEEE-SA Board of Governors, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, http:// 
standards.ieee.org/about/bog/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2017). In 2017, 
the IEEE had over 1100 active standards, with over 600 standards under 
development. IEEE-SA, IEEE Standards Association Announces Virtual 
Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) Standards Projects in Advance of 
Participation at Augmented World Expo (May 9, 2017), http://standards.ieee 
.org/news/2017/ieee_p2408.html. 
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operating in an efficient manner.306 The commitments were 
inherently vague, the IEEE said, because they gave no concrete 
meaning to the crucial term “reasonable royalty rate.”307 The 
consequent uncertainty could, and did, lead to expensive 
litigation whose cost and risk could impede the adoption of a 
standard.308 License negotiations occurring after a technology’s 
inclusion in a standard appeared to involve excessive 
transaction costs and, in some cases, the lack of definiteness of 
the reasonable royalty rate commitment caused undue market 
power (potentially to the point of monopoly), high royalty 
payments, and ultimately higher prices to consumers. Standard 
implementers and SEP holders continued to take widely 
divergent positions on the meaning of ill-defined “reasonable 
rates” for SEPs. In at least two patent infringement cases 
relating to the IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi standard, the patent holder 
and the implementer were several orders of magnitude apart in 
their respective valuations of the reasonable rate for SEPs on 
which the patent holders (or their predecessors) had provided 
LOAs to IEEE making RAND commitments.309 Courts had also 
pointed out the lack of clarity in IEEE’s RAND commitments.310 
In the cell phone industry, disputes over alleged 
monopolistic practices—including excessive royalty demands for 
SEPs and exclusionary practices based on control of SEPs—led 
to antitrust litigation. In the Broadcom case, for example, 
Broadcom sued Qualcomm for abusive SEP-related practices, 
based in large part on the indefinite FRAND commitments 
Qualcomm had made to SSOs, and similar to those that are 
challenged in the current FTC and Apple antitrust suits against 
                                                          
 306. See DOJ Response to IEEE, supra note 5, at 2–3; Letter from Michael 
A. Lindsay, Counsel for IEEE, to William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice 1–9, (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public 
/busreview/request-letters/311483.pdf (requesting a business review and 
clearance for the proposed IEEE Patent Policy update). 
 307. See id. at 10–11. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 10–12. 
 310. For example, the district court in the Ericsson case—which involved a 
dispute over what qualifies as a RAND royalty for SEPs for the IEEE 802.11 
standard—stated, “[t]he paradox of RAND licensing is that it requires a patent 
holder to offer licenses on reasonable terms, but it offers no guidance over what 
is reasonable.” Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 6:10–CV–473, 2013 WL 
4046225, at *25 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in 
part, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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Qualcomm.311 In addition, Antitrust Division and FTC officials 
repeatedly suggested in speeches that action was necessary to 
clarify RAND commitments because of their ambiguity in 
defining reasonable royalty rates.312 
A. THE IEEE “CLARIFIES” ITS PATENT POLICY 
After more than a year of deliberation, in 2014 the IEEE 
tentatively adopted a new Patent Policy, largely tracking the 
rulings on reasonable royalties in the line of case law that Part 
V of this Article discusses. The IEEE governing body made the 
effectiveness of the policy update contingent, however, on 
obtaining advice (so-called “clearance”) from the Antitrust 
Division that the policy changes would not constitute what some 
SEP-holder spokesmen contended was oligopsonistic price 
fixing.313 In September 2014 the IEEE submitted a request for a 
                                                          
 311. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007). One of 
the different antitrust charges was that Qualcomm had fraudulently induced 
SSOs into basing the UMTS telecommunication standard on Qualcomm’s 
technology by making later-broken promises to grant licenses on FRAND terms, 
while Qualcomm actually intended to offer them only on non-FRAND terms 
once implementers were locked into the UMTS standard. 
 312. See, e.g., Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks as 
Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable, Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 10, 
2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download (suggesting that firms 
“eliminate some of the ambiguity that requires difficult ex post deciphering of 
the scope of a F/RAND commitment.”); Edith Ramirez, Fed. Trade Comm’n 
Chair, Standard-Essential Patents and Licensing: An Antitrust Enforcement 
Perspective, 8th Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, 
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC 9, 11 (Sept. 10, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/09/standard-essential-patents-
licensing-antitrust-enforcement-perspective-0 (“[A]dditional clarity on a 
framework for determining FRAND royalties would benefit industry 
stakeholders and consumers alike. . . . Greater clarity on the terms of a FRAND 
license is likely to facilitate private negotiations and limit the need to seek a 
third-party determination of a FRAND rate.”); Christine A. Varney, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Promoting Innovation Through 
Patent and Antitrust Law and Policy, Remarks as Prepared for the Joint 
Workshop of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Federal Trade Comm’n, 
and the Dep’t of Justice on the Intersection of Patent Policy and Competition 
Policy: Implications for Promoting Innovation 8 (May 26, 2010), http://www 
.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/260101.htm. 
 313. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion 
in Standard-Setting, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123 (2009), https://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1081997; Letter from J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion 
Economics, to Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
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business review letter to the Antitrust Division,314 which in 
January 2017 responded that it did not see a likely antitrust 
violation calling for any prosecutorial action.315 The Antitrust 
Division stated: 
The Department concludes that the Update has the potential to 
benefit competition and consumers by facilitating licensing 
negotiations, mitigating hold up and royalty stacking, and promoting 
competition among technologies for inclusion in standards. The 
Department cannot conclude that the Update is likely to harm 
competition. Further, to the extent that there are any potential 
competitive harms, the Department concludes that the Update’s 
potential procompetitive benefits likely outweigh those harms.316 
In March 2015, the IEEE formally revised its Patent Policy 
concerning RAND royalties for SEPs covering the technology 
that IEEE standards embody.317 The update provided a more 
specific definition of the concept of reasonable rate. According to 
the Patent Policy update, a reasonable rate for a SEP must be 
based on the ex-ante principle—excluding the value conferred by 
including the patented technology in the standard.318 In 
addition, a reasonable royalty rate should (if at all possible) be 
based on consideration of:319 
● “The value that the functionality of the claimed invention 
or inventive feature within the Essential Patent Claim[320] 
contributes to the value of the relevant functionality[321] of the 
                                                          
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs 
/proposed_ieee_bylaw_amendments_affecting_frand_licensing_of_seps.pdf 
(“Oligopsonistic collusion within standard-setting organizations (SSOs) should 
be no different. Collusion among implementers would harm the standardization 
process, innovation, and consumers. The IEEE’s proposed amendments are an 
agreement in restraint of trade that would coordinate the actions of buyers to 
reduce the price they pay for a valuable input. Far from deserving a positive 
business review letter, collusion within SSOs regarding the licensing of SEPs 
should be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.”). 
 314. Letter from Michael A. Lindsay to William J. Baer, supra note 306. 
 315. DOJ Response to IEEE, supra note 5. 
 316. Id. at 16; see also Richard H. Stern, Justice Department Agrees IEEE’s 
New RAND Policy Isn’t Price Fixing, IEEE MICRO 78 (Mar. 2015), http://docs 
.law.gwu.edu/facweb/claw/DOJ-IEEE-RAND.pdf. 
 317. INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 4. 
 318. Id. § 6.1. This portion of the definition says “shall mean.” 
 319. Id. This portion of the definition says “should include.” 
 320. Id. § 6.2. The IEEE Patent Policy uses the term “Essential Patent 
Claim” to refer to the relevant claim of a SEP. 
 321. The reference to the “relevant functionality” emphasizes the fact that a 
component or sub-assembly may have multiple functions in a device, only one 
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smallest saleable Compliant Implementation [i.e., smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit322] that practices the Essential 
Patent Claim.”323 
● “The value that the Essential Patent Claim contributes to 
the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that practices 
that claim, in light of the value contributed by all Essential 
Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced in that 
Compliant Implementation.”324 
Using the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit as a 
royalty base implements two important policies. One is that the 
SEP royalty should be based on the value of the relevant 
functionality—not the unrelated functionality—of the standard-
compliant unit.325 For example, a notional cell phone may 
contain a baseband processor chipset (with $10 worth of 
functionality), an EPROM (with $5 worth of functionality), a 
DRAM (with $5 worth of functionality), a camera (with $20 
worth of functionality), and a touchscreen (with $10 worth of 
functionality). The EPROM, DRAM, camera, and touchscreen 
have $40 worth of functionality unrelated to the $10 worth of 
functionality of the baseband processor chipset. The SEP royalty 
for the baseband processor chipset should be based just on its 
                                                          
of which is relevant to SEP concerns (the circuitry for the other functions may 
be unpatented or may be patented under different patents). Id. § 6.1. For 
example, as the IEEE explains in an introduction to its Patent Policy, a circuit 
or sub-assembly might “implement[] IEEE Standard 1284TM, RS-232 and USB,” 
but the SEP might “relate[] only to the circuit’s IEEE 1284 parallel port 
function.” INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 278, ¶ 43. In that case, the 
“relevant functionality” on which the SEP’s reasonable royalty should be based 
is only that IEEE 1284 functionality, and no royalty for that SEP should be 
levied for the device’s RS-232 or USB functionality. Id. 
 322. The IEEE-SA bylaws define “Compliant Implementation” (as that term 
is used in the Patent Policy) to mean “any product (e.g., component, sub-
assembly, or end-product) or service that conforms to any mandatory or optional 
portion of a normative clause of an IEEE Standard.” INST. ELEC. & ELECS. 
ENG’RS, supra note 4, § 6.2. Thus, the royalty base (called for by the IEEE 
standards when determining a RAND royalty for SEPs) is the smallest saleable 
“component, sub-assembly, or end-product” whose manufacture, use, or sale 
would infringe the relevant SEP. Id. For example, a CDMA-compliant 
smartphone would not be a smallest saleable patent-practicing unit; rather, a 
CDMA chipset or chip within the smartphone would be the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit. 
 323. INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 4, § 6.1. 
 324. Id. 
 325. INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 278, ¶ 43. 
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$10 worth of functionality, not the additional $40 worth of 
functionality of the other patented or unpatented parts. 
Second, a cell phone has many patented and unpatented 
components besides a baseband processor chipset, which one 
SEP may cover. Other patented and unpatented technologies 
may make up the other components, and they also contribute to 
the value of the entire unit. A disproportionate share of the total 
reasonable royalty should not go to only one patent out of many 
technological inputs. If a cell phone has many components—
embodies 200 patents, for example—and the traffic will bear 
only a $20 reasonable royalty, then one SEP should not 
appropriate $18 of the total $20. In the Ericsson case, the court 
explained that since “the 802.11 [Wi-Fi] standard encompasses 
numerous technologies to enable devices to communicate with 
each other,” and the SEPs involved in the case covered only a 
small part of 802.11, the proper royalty award “must be 
apportioned to the value of the patented invention (or at least to 
the approximate value thereof), not the value of the standard as 
a whole.”326 
B. SEP-OWNER OPPOSITION TO PATENT POLICY UPDATE 
The Patent Policy update did not go unchallenged. 
Opposition occurred mainly from owners of SEPs for technology 
incorporated into standards for the cell phone industry, which 
accounts for a disproportionately large share of US sales of 
standard-compliant products,327 and is largely based on the 
IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi standard. Ericsson, Interdigital, Nokia, 
Qualcomm, and other cell phone SEP-owning stakeholders and 
their spokesmen vigorously argued against the IEEE Patent 
Policy’s use of the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit as the 
preferred royalty base, and against its refusal to accord SEP 
owners the right to cash in on the ex-post value of patents that 
standards have anointed as SEPs.328 Prior to the 2015 Patent 
                                                          
 326. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 327. U.S. smartphone sales in 2015 totaled an estimated $53 billion, in 2016 
totaled $55 billion, and in 2017 totaled $56 billion. STATISTA, Smartphone Sales 
Value in the United States 2005-2017, https://www.statista.com/statistics 
/191985/sales-of-smartphones-in-the-us-since-2005/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2017). 
 328. Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson and Qualcomm, with support from 
Fraunhofer, InterDigital, Nokia, Orange, Royal Philips and Siemens, filed an 
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Policy’s adoption, these SEP holders argued within the IEEE 
against its adoption. After the governing bodies in IEEE 
tentatively approved the 2015 Patent Policy—subject to 
government review and clearance—these companies urged the 
Department of Justice not to grant clearance to the policy 
because it was, they said, an antitrust violation.329 
After the government granted a clearance and the IEEE 
announced the 2015 Patent Policy update, several important 
SEP owners publicly stated their unwillingness to license their 
patents under the RAND terms of the 2015 Patent Policy.330 
They announced that they would license SEPs only on a basis 
excluding the policies to which they objected (especially, the ex-
ante royalty base and the smallest saleable patent-practicing 
                                                          
unsuccessful appeal of IEEE’s reaccreditation with ANSI because of IEEE’s 
adoption of the 2015 Patent Policy. Lewis Crofts & Matthew Newman, IEEE 
Accreditation Under Spotlight at US Standards Body, MLEX (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://mlexmarketinsight.com/editors-picks/ieee-accreditation-spotlight-us-
standards-body/. 
 329. See, e.g., Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to Renata B. Hesse, supra note 
313. Sidak said that he was an advisor of clients “that hold valuable portfolios 
of SEPs for mobile telecommunications devices” and that they had encouraged 
him to write to the government, but he insisted that he expressed strictly his 
own views. Id. at 1. His legal argument would appear to be that a collective 
agreement not to take a patent license on other than particular terms (e.g., only 
ex-ante royalties) is tantamount to a boycott. See Jones Knitting Corp. v. 
Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 459 (3d Cir. 1965). Further, he may be contending that 
the IEEE is an oligopsonistic buyer’s cartel, engaging in a royalty price fix. See 
Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co. 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (holding 
that a buyers’ price fix violates Sherman Act); Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 426–27 (7th Cir. 1965) (same). See also Addamax Corp. v. 
Open Software Found., 152 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1998), in which HP, DEC, and 
other computer manufacturers formed the Open Software Foundation to 
develop security software for UNIX; they chose to incorporate into their 
software a cheaper software security product than that of plaintiff Addamax, 
who then sued, charging a buyers’ cartel to reduce prices. The court refused to 
use a per se rule and found that under the rule of reason there was no violation, 
because of the procompetitive potential of the defendants’ group—a “venture 
[ f o r ]  producing a new product” that could make “a productive 
contribution to the economy.” Addamax, 152 F.3d at 52. The court also 
found that, even assuming an antitrust violation, the alleged violation was not 
a substantial cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 54–55. 
 330. Susan Decker & Ian King, Qualcomm Says It Won’t Follow New Wi-Fi 
Rules on Patents, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Feb. 11, 2015, 4:29 PM), https://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/qualcomm-says-new-wi-fi-standard-
rules-unfair-may-not-take-part. 
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unit principle).331 Next, they attempted (unsuccessfully) to 
persuade ANSI to de-certify IEEE as an SSO.332 
Some of the SEP holders released statements that they 
would not accept the 2015 Patent Policy update and would not 
grant licenses on the terms it prescribed. Qualcomm’s chief 
licensing lawyer stated, “Qualcomm will continue to submit 
information that could be considered for inclusion in the 
standard, but it will set its own royalty commitment similar to 
the old rules.”333 Interdigital’s CEO stated, “In a nutshell, we 
advised the IEEE that our company objects to their entirely new 
policy on patents and, going forward, on a case-by-case basis, 
will provide alternative licensing assurances to those specified 
in the 2015 policy.”334 He explained that the IEEE’s “move could 
slash revenues for standards developers.”335 Nokia stated 
bluntly that it would not grant licenses under the new IEEE 
policy: 
Nokia notified IEEE before the changes were adopted that it would 
not be prepared to make licences available under the new patent 
policy, but that it would continue to honour commitments already 
given under the previous policy. Nokia will stick to that position and 
                                                          
 331. Id. 
 332. Crofts & Newman, supra note 328; see also Matthew Newman & Lewis 
Crofts, Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, Qualcomm’s Challenge to IEEE Accreditation 
Fails, MLEX (Feb. 29, 2016), https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center 
/editors-picks/antitrust/north-america/alcatel-lucent,-ericsson,-qualcomms-
challenge-to-ieee-accreditation-fails. 
 333. Decker & King, supra note 330. 
 334. Richard Lloyd, InterDigital Reveals That, Like Qualcomm, It Is 
Reworking Relationship with IEEE After Introduction of New Patent Policy, 
IAM (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=8c9676dd-
6bbd-4d6c-b3e5-9a5ddeb36581; see also Letter from Lawrence F. Shay, Exec. 
Vice President of Intellectual Prop., InterDigital, to IEEE Patent Committee 
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://wpuploads.interdigital.com.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads 
/2015/03/Letter-to-IEEE-SA-PatCom.pdf (stating that it is InterDigital’s 
position that its “prior commitments do not reflect or incorporate any of the 
rights, obligations, or limitations of the 2015 Patent Policy[.]”). 
 335. Lloyd, supra note 334; Bill Merritt, Why We Disagree with the IEEE’s 
Patent Policy, EE TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp 
?doc_id=1326144. For a response to Merritt, see Mark Chandler & Gil Ohana, 
Why We Support IEEE’s Patent Policy, EE TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www 
.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1326225. Ericsson’s Director of 
Technology Licensing, Tomas Dannelind, earlier stated a position similar to 
that of InterDigital’s Merritt. See Mueller, supra note 251. 
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is prepared to offer licences under its future SEPs on the previous 
patent policy terms.336 
How the SEP owners’ opposition to the 2015 Patent Policy 
amendment will ultimately be resolved is unclear. As they have 
threatened, the SEP owners can totally or selectively defect from 
the IEEE standardization process. This could affect future 
standardization, for standards such as 5G (to be deployed in 
2020 and beyond),337 as well as further incremental 
improvements of 4G. The considerations are quite complex (and 
it is uncertain what IEEE’s future role will be—for example, in 
whether IEEE 802.11 will evolve into 5G technology). 
The outcome would depend on the future availability of 
technology alternatives to that of Qualcomm and its allies.338 
There are two factions in contention here: On one side are the 
SEP holders allied with Qualcomm (located at the upstream end 
of the cell phone industry distribution chain), whose business 
model is primarily the monetization of SEPs for royalty revenue 
collected from the second faction. On the other side is a group of 
hardware and software standards implementers who support 
the 2015 IEEE Patent Policy. These appear to be Apple, Cisco, 
Broadcom, Hewlett Packard, Intel, Marvell, Microsoft, 
Samsung, and Verizon339—royalty-paying companies operating 
                                                          
 336. Richard Lloyd, Ericsson and Nokia the Latest to Confirm that They Will 
Not License Under the New IEEE Patent Policy, IAM (Apr. 15, 2015),  
http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=d07d0bde-ebd6-495a-
aa724eecb9dac67d; see also Letter from Gustav Brismark, Vice 
President, Ericsson to Eileen M. Lach, Gen. Counsel and Chief Compliance 
Officer, IEEE (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.mlex.com//Attachments/2015-10-
26_5P338037F7HPVP5L/rand-terms.pdf (“[M]oving forward, Ericsson would 
not be able to submit any LOAs under the terms of the proposed new IEEE-SA 
policy.”). 
 337. See text supra notes 69–74. 
 338. Another factor is how fast CDMA becomes irrelevant, making CDMA 
backward compatibility unnecessary. See text supra note 84 (referring to 
shutdowns of legacy CDMA systems). 
 339. See Chandler & Ohana, supra note 335. Although the authors list 
Broadcom among the supporters of the IEEE Patent Policy, curiously, 
Broadcom and its subsidiaries (LSI, Agere, and Avago) are defendants in patent 
infringement litigation over SEPs for technology used in the IEEE 802.11 and 
ITU H.264 standards. See, e.g., Funai Elec. Co. v. LSI Corp., No. 16-cv-01210-
BLF, 2017 WL 1133513 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017). In this litigation, the 
defendants have allegedly violated FRAND commitments by demanding 
downstream royalties on the sales price of consumer end products (such as TV 
sets), and refusing to license the SEPs for royalties based on the price of the 
smallest saleable patent-practicing units (semiconductor chips used in the end 
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downstream, toward the ultimate consumer end of the 
distribution chain. Cisco has been the most active publicly of 
these companies in trying to promote acceptance and 
implementation of the 2015 Patent Policy update.340 
Unless Cisco and its allies find that—in order to 
manufacture their future products—they will need the 
technology that Qualcomm and its allies develop, they will be 
able to implement the 2015 Patent Policy successfully. If that is 
the case, the Qualcomm group’s threat to go on strike will be 
ineffective for new standardization projects. The group could 
still withhold their patents,341 but then they would earn no 
revenue from them. Conversely, if the Qualcomm group’s future 
inventions prove indispensable, post-2015 IEEE standardization 
could falter,342 unless those pressing implementation of the 2015 
                                                          
products). First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 66, 67, 86, 87, Funai Elec. Co. v. LSI 
Corp., No. 16-cv-01210-BLF, 2016 WL 7645013 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) 
(“Agere would only license its essential 802.11 patents if it received royalties 
based on the sales price of the end consumer product in which those components 
are contained – a price frequently hundreds of times greater than the 
component price. . . . Because of, among other reasons, Defendants’ policy of 
attempting to capture the value of the end consumer product, rather than the 
value of the component that provides WLAN connectivity, Defendants have 
offered to license their allegedly essential patents to Funai under only 
unreasonable and discriminatorily exorbitant terms. . . . [LSI] would only 
license its essential H.264 patents if it received royalties based on the sales price 
of the end consumer product in which those components are contained – a price 
frequently hundredsof times greater than the component price. . . . Because of, 
among other reasons, Defendants’ policy of attempting to capture the value of 
the end consumer product, rather than the value of the component that provides 
H.264 functionality, Defendants have offered to license their allegedly essential 
patents to Funai under only unreasonable and discriminatorily exorbitant 
terms.”). The accusations in the complaint were upheld against the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss. Funai Elec., 2017 WL 1133513, at *11. 
 340. Cisco has offered—without success—numerous proposals to clarify 
what RAND commitment applies to different standards, projects, and project 
participants in IEEE standard-setting. See infra note 355 and accompanying 
text. 
 341. Under U.S. law, a patent owner is free to refrain from licensing or 
utilizing patented technology. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 
(1945); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908); see also 
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2010) (patentee not guilty of misuse because it merely has 
“refused to license or use any rights to the patent”). On the other hand, an 
injunction against patent infringement would be very unlikely, see eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), and reasonable royalty damages 
might be small in the case of an unexploited patent. 
 342. See Rick Nelson, Qualcomm Responds to Updated IEEE Standards-
Related Patent Policy, EVALUATION ENG’G (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www 
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Patent Policy back down. Which direction events will take 
depends on facts as to which more information will be needed.343 
The considerations regarding pre-2015 technology and 
RAND commitments are different, despite the case law 
discussed previously in Part V, because an option other than 
direct confrontation is available to the SEP owner group—delay 
because of uncertainty and doubt. The IEEE administration—
particularly the IEEE’s patent committee—has sought to remain 
neutral and avoid taking any definite position on whether the 
2015 Patent Policy covers RAND commitments and works in 
progress, that began before 2015.344 This stance creates a 
                                                          
.evaluationengineering.com/qualcomm-responds-to-updated-ieee-standards-
related-patent-policy (“We believe engineers from Qualcomm have been the 
largest technology contributor to IEEE’s 802.11ac standard and 802.11ah draft 
standard for Wi-Fi.”); see also Ron D. Katznelson, Perilous Deviations from 
FRAND Harmony—Operational Pitfalls of the 2015 IEEE Patent Policy (Oct. 8, 
2015) [hereinafter Katznelson, Perilous Deviations], http://works.bepress.com 
/rkatznelson/83/ (“Many top quality and complex standards projects may grind 
to a halt unless IEEE-SA reverses course . . . .”). Katznelson claims this is 
already occurring. See Ron D. Katznelson, The IEEE Controversial Policy on 
Standard Essential Patents – The Empirical Record since Adoption, Address at 
the Symposium on Antitrust, Standard Essential Patents, and the Fallacy of 
the Anticommons Tragedy, Berkeley, CA (Oct. 29, 2016) [hereinafter 
Katznelson, IEEE Controversial Policy], https://works.bepress.com/rkatznelson 
/80/. 
 343. One recent study found no decrease in company filing of LOAs with 
IEEE-SA, and an increase to an all-time high in LOA submissions immediately 
after the 2015 Patent Policy update, accompanied by a higher level of 
standardization work. See TIM POHLMANN, EMPIRICAL STUDY ON PATENTING 
AND STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES AT IEEE 1, 11–13 (2017), http://www.fair-
standards.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IPlytics_2017_Patenting-and-
standardization-activities-at-IEEE.pdf. Pohlmann states that a recent study—
referring to Katznelson, IEEE Controversial Policy, supra note 342—containing 
suggestions “that IEEE LOAs have declined due to the IEEE’s adoption of 
updates to its patent policy appear to be both incorrect and misleading.” Id. at 
13. 
 344. An FAQ 84A, proposed by IEEE-SA, which was never formally adopted 
for inclusion in INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 278, but nonetheless 
represents IEEE administrative policy, stated in part: “In updating its patent 
policy, the IEEE-SA expresses no view as to whether any specific provision in 
the March 2015 update does, or does not, represent any substantive change 
from the pre-March 2015 IEEE-SA patent policy.” E-mail from Gil Ohana, 
Senior Dir. of Antitrust & Competition, Cisco Sys., to IEEE-SA Standards 
Board Patent Committee (Nov. 25, 2015), http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-
dialog/email/msg00340.html. This statement is consistent with the IEEE’s 
letter to the Antitrust Division requesting business review. See Letter from 
Michael A. Lindsay to William J. Baer, supra note 306, at 19 (“The proposed 
policy does not retroactively amend previously Accepted Letters of Assurance. 
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climate of uncertainty, and it plays into the hands of those who 
seek to delay implementation of the 2015 policy update. 
A considerable amount of standardization effort is directed 
to incremental modification and extension of the 802.11 Wi-Fi 
standard, the implementations of which include cellular 
technology.345 The IEEE has a type of letter of assurance called 
a “blanket LOA.” A blanket LOA makes a RAND commitment 
that applies to all SEPs that a company may currently or in the 
future have the right to license.346 For example, for a blanket 
LOA’s RAND commitment made for a given number standard 
with any suffix letter (e.g., all 802.11 Wi-Fi), it is the current 
policy of the IEEE Patent Committee that whatever patent 
policy applied at the date the LOA with that RAND commitment 
was made continues in effect indefinitely.347 That LOA and 
RAND commitment remains in effect unless superseded by a 
later new LOA (to which the 2015 Patent Policy would 
                                                          
Patent owners who do not wish to submit a Letter of Assurance under the 
proposed policy are free not to do so.”). The letter also stated: “IEEE has publicly 
stated that it does not seek to amend retroactively the terms of any previously 
submitted Letter of Assurance, and that in adopting the policy IEEE-SA 
expresses no view as to whether any specific provision in the draft policy does, 
or does not, represent a substantive change from the current policy.” Id. at 15 
n.33. 
 345. The modifications (amendments) typically receive lower-case suffixes, 
as in 802.11a. 802.11g, 802.11n, and 802.11ai-2016 (the current active version). 
See WG802.11 – Wireless LAN Working Group, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N., 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/wg/WG802.11.html; see also IEEE 802.11ai-
2016, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard 
/802.11ai-2016.html. 802.11ay is a proposed enhancement, still in draft form, to 
enable a throughput of at least 20 gigabits per second. See IEEE P802.11 – Task 
Group Ay, Status of Project IEEE 802.11ay, IEE802, http://www.ieee802.org 
/11/Reports/tgay_update.htm. There are further proposed amendments to the 
802.11 standard, in progress, designated 802.11az and 802.11ba. A partial 
tabulation of existing and proposed 802.11 standards is found at IEEE 802.11, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.11#Standards_and 
_amendments (last updated Jan. 7, 2018). 
 346. INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 4, § 6.1. This contrasts with 
an LOA limited to the patented technology used only in a single standard, such 
as 802.11a. See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. 
(CSIRO), 809 F.3d 1295, 1297–98, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (seeming to indicate 
that a LOA for one standard does not apply to subsequent iterations of the 
standard). The CSIRO court, however, imposed a reasonable royalty 
requirement applicable to all SEPs, as a matter of general patent law. See text 
preceding supra note 269 and infra note 378. 
 347. See INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 278, ¶ 14. 
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automatically apply).348 At the same time, no IEEE position is 
taken as to the legal effect of such pre-2015 RAND 
commitments, including whether the RAND royalty is 
determined ex-ante or ex-post, and whether the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit principle applies, so that IEEE leaves 
those matters undetermined. 
For example, consider a company making a pre-2015 RAND 
commitment for 802.11a. A minimum RAND commitment could 
be limited to the technology used in 802.11a and then reused in 
enhancements of 802.11a. Or the company could make a greater, 
blanket RAND commitment for all further 802.11 standards. If 
blanket, the same RAND commitment would apply even to 
proposed 802.11az, or to a notional 802.11zzzz, with the same 
allegedly undetermined legal effect.349 The IEEE’s 
administrative refusal to take any position on whether the 2015 
Patent Policy applies to pre-2015 LOAs and RAND 
commitments leaves the matter uncertain and vulnerable to 
various SEP owners’ idiosyncratic interpretations of the effect of 
the 2015 Patent Policy update. 
At this time, therefore, considerable uncertainty exists over 
how the 2015 Patent Policy update applies to different 802.11 
amendments, and different participants in standard-setting 
activities may be subject to different policies, or if not different 
policies then to different interpretations of the IEEE’s policy. 
The uncertainty has led to two disputes over how the 2015 
Patent Policy update applies to different SEPs—the 
“grandfather” controversy and the “retroactivity” controversy. 
C. THE GRANDFATHER CONTROVERSY 
CSR plc, a relatively small British company, in 2009 
provided a blanket LOA for all 802.11 standardization then in 
                                                          
 348. Id. 
 349. Old LOAs and RAND commitments become irrelevant only if the IEEE 
chooses to designate a variation on or amendment to a prior standard such as 
802.11 with an entirely new number such as IEEE 899.99. That would probably 
not occur for any additional Wi-Fi standards such as 5G technology, although 
the matter seems wholly arbitrary. The CSIRO case illustrates the problem. 
CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1297–98. 
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effect, in progress, or to occur in the future.350 This provided a 
RAND commitment for CSR’s SEPs in accordance with the pre-
2015 Patent Policy (whatever it was), which was established in 
2007. The 2007 policy had no definition or gloss on what was a 
reasonable royalty.351 In August 2015, several months after the 
March 2015 adoption of the Patent Policy update, Qualcomm 
acquired CSR.352 Qualcomm then took the position that by 
acquiring CSR it became “grandfathered” under CSR’s 2009 
LOA and RAND commitment. Qualcomm interprets that LOA 
as not obliging it to operate under the principles of the 2015 
Patent Policy, such as ex-ante royalties and the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit principle, for all Qualcomm-owned 802.11 
SEPs, past or future.353 
Because the IEEE failed to take any position on the 
grandfather issue,354 Cisco repeatedly proposed issuance of 
statements interpreting the 2015 Patent Policy update in one 
way or another to prescribe a definite rule of some kind.355 As of 
                                                          
 350. Letter from Anne McAleer, Patent Manager, CSR, plc, to PatCom 
Administrator, IEEE-SA Standards Board Patent Committee 2 (June 3, 2009), 
http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/loa-802_11-csr-06mar2009.pdf. 
 351. See Inst. Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, Draft IEEE Standards Board Bylaws: 
Draft 39 Versus Current Policy 2 (Oct. 6, 2014) (redline draft), 
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/SBBylaws_100614 
_redline_current.pdf (showing proposed addition of definition of “reasonable 
royalty”). 
 352. See Press Release, Qualcomm, Qualcomm Completes $2.4 Billion 
Acquisition of CSR (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases 
/2015/08/13/qualcomm-completes-24-billion-acquisition-csr; see also Stacy 
Higginbotham, Here’s What’s Next for Qualcomm as It Completes Its $2.4 Billion 
CSR Buy, FORTUNE (Aug. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/13/qualcomm-
buys-csr/ (discussing the non-cell phone aspects of CSR’s business). 
 353. Richard Lloyd, How a $2.4bn Acquisition by Qualcomm Might 
Undermine the IEEE’s Controversial Patent Policy, IAM (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=aaea8593-2d6c-42ee-97d6-
e86871dad081. 
 354. See INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 278. 
 355. See, e.g., E-Mail from Gil Ohana, Senior Dir. of Antitrust & 
Competition, Cisco Sys., to David L. Ringle, Director, IEEE-SA Governance 
(Nov. 11. 2016), http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00411.html; 
E-Mail from Gil Ohana, Senior Dir. of Antitrust & Competition, Cisco Sys., to 
David L. Ringle, Director, IEEE-SA Governance (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00432.html (“If an Accepted 
LOA pre-dates the current version of the patent policy text, a Working Group 
chair or Sponsor chair may must disclose that fact to the Working Group and 
also invite submission of a new LOA in addition to the Accepted LOA already 
on file.”); see also Gil Ohana, Presentation to IEEE-SA Patent Committee 
2018] WHO SHOULD OWN THE BENEFITS 199 
 
2017, all of these proposals have failed to gain acceptance within 
the IEEE Patent Committee. They foundered ostensibly on the 
rock of “retroactivity.” But it was more likely because of the 
IEEE’s culture of non-confrontation, its shock and dismay at the 
unanticipated violent opposition to, and rancor generated over, 
the announcement of the 2015 Patent Policy update, and 
perhaps a sense of loss over the deterioration of IEEE’s former 
collegiate standard-setting atmosphere. That desire to avoid 
controversy has left the matter for ultimate resolution only in 
the courts. 
The grandfather concept may be an illusion, however, and 
the grandfathers may turn out to have the same legal status as 
everyone else. As is discussed below, in the CSIRO case the 
Federal Circuit ruled that determination of a reasonable royalty 
follows much the same principles for SEPs with (and without) 
RAND commitments, particularly the requirement of ex-ante 
royalty determination. 
D. THE RETROACTIVITY CONTROVERSY 
In and preceding 2015, when the IEEE adopted the 2015 
Patent Policy, the IEEE asserted that the amended Patent 
Policy merely clarified the prior version of the Patent Policy, 
which was silent on ex-ante royalty rates and the smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit principle.356 The February 2015 
IEEE Statement Regarding Updating of its Standards-Related 
Patent Policy asserted, “[t]his update is designed to provide 
greater clarity and predictability for patent-holders and 
implementers.”357 In its letter to the Antitrust Division 
requesting a business review and clearance for the Patent Policy, 
the IEEE stated that it was acting in response to antitrust 
enforcement officials’ statements “suggesting that SDOs 
consider taking steps to ‘eliminate some of the ambiguity that 
requires difficult ex post deciphering of the scope of a F/RAND 
                                                          
Meeting: Effectiveness of Updated Patent Policy Text: More Clarity Needed 
(Mar. 21, 2017), http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/claw/EffDatePatentPol.pdf. 
 356. Press Release, Inst. Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, IEEE Statement Regarding 
Updating of its Standards-Related Patent Policy (Feb. 8, 2015), https://www 
.ieee.org/about/news/2015/8_february_2015.html. 
 357. Id. 
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commitment.’”358 The letter also denied intent to amend 
preexisting RAND commitments.359 Blog commentary seemed to 
accept the “clarification” characterization of the Patent Policy 
update.360 
Qualcomm and other SEP holders did not agree, however, 
that the 2015 Patent Policy update merely “clarified” matters, 
yet left them substantively unchanged. Qualcomm asserted: 
“The new IEEE Patent Policy cannot be called FRAND” and it 
“cannot reasonably be called a clarification; it is a total rewrite 
that requires material, binding concessions by SEP-owners.”361 
Nokia and Panasonic representatives have similarly 
emphasized to the IEEE Patent Committee that they regarded 
pre-2015 LOAs as binding contracts between IEEE and SEP 
                                                          
 358. See Letter from Michael A. Lindsay to William J. Baer, supra note 306, 
at 12. At the same time that the IEEE asserted that it was just “clarifying” its 
policy, it also denied that it was acting retroactively and stated that it took no 
position on whether the 2015 update made any substantive change. Id. at 15 
n.33. 
 359. Id. If the IEEE were going to make such statements, perhaps it would 
have been better advised to add, when referring to preexisting RAND 
commitments, “which we, of course, understand in light of Federal Circuit 
precedents such as CSIRO and Ericsson.” 
 360. See, e.g., Brian Scarpelli, Reflecting on the One Year Anniversary of the 
IEEE’s Patent Policy Changes, LINKEDIN (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.linkedin 
.com/pulse/reflecting-one-year-anniversary-ieees-patent-policy-brian-scarpelli 
(“The IEEE-SA’s updates have provided some much-needed clarifications to the 
participants of the IEEE-SA in threshold areas, such as what constitutes a 
‘reasonable’ royalty and when seeking an injunction is appropriate (among 
other areas).”). 
 361. Kurt M. Kjelland, Senior Legal Counsel, Qualcomm, Some Thoughts on 
Hold-Up, the IEEE Patent Policy, and the Imperiling of Patent Rights, Address 
Before the 16th Advanced Patent Law Institute, Berkeley Center for Law and 
Technology (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/09/17-Antitrust-Kjelland1.pdf; see also Letter from Lawrence F. Shay, 
Vice President, InterDigital, to IEEE Patent Committee (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://wpuploads.interdigital.com.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2015/03/Letter-
to-IEEE-SA-PatCom.pdf (“[T]he 2015 Patent Policy includes significant 
substantive changes to the rules and obligations associated with the submission 
of a letter of assurance (‘LOA’) to IEEE and prior versions of IEEE’s policy have 
never included such rules and obligations. Accordingly, these changes are not 
mere ‘clarifications’ to IEEE’s prior policies . . . . It [the 2015 Patent Policy 
update] would involuntarily render previously accepted LOAs as submissions 
under the 2015 Patent Policy. And, contrary to the Department of Justice’s basis 
for issuing the Business Review Letter, patent holders could not avoid the new 
commitments and obligations contained in the 2015 Patent Policy.”). 
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owners, which IEEE was now (over their objection) retroactively 
rewriting.362 
How Qualcomm’s attempt to avoid the 2015 Patent Policy 
by seeking to operate under CSR’s old “grandfather” LOA and 
how its allied SEP holders’ objections to implementation will 
ultimately fare is still unresolved. It can be anticipated that the 
“retroactivity” debate will continue for some time. On the one 
hand, Qualcomm and its allies (Nokia, Ericsson, and other SEP 
holders) will say that they never agreed to any SEP-licensing 
commitment to the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit 
principle, ex-ante royalties, or to upstream royalties only, and 
that “a deal is a deal.” Moreover, there may be some shopping 
around to buy up old LOAs in order to claim grandfather rights. 
Eventually, the matter will be litigated and the courts will 
decide it. 
E. RETROSPECTIVITY OF THE 2015 PATENT POLICY 
How will the courts will rule on the retroactivity and 
grandfather controversies, if and when they are litigated? The 
SEP holders seek to invoke a doctrine with considerable 
emotional appeal. As the Supreme Court has admonished: 
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should 
have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their 
conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly 
disrupted. For that reason, the “principle that the legal effect of 
conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when 
the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.”363 
                                                          
 362. E-mails from some members of the Standards Board Patent Committee 
insisted that the 2015 Patent Policy unlawfully sought to impose a “retroactive 
application of terms and conditions by one party to the contractual commitment 
to the other party.” Email from John Kolakowski, Nokia, to IEEE-SA Standards 
Board Patent Committee (Dec. 2, 2016), http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-
dialog/email/msg00419.html. He added: “As far as I’m aware, this would not be 
permitted under the contract laws of any jurisdiction. If IEEE wishes to change 
the terms of that deal, then it must either obtain the Submitter’s consent or find 
alternative technology.” Id. Another such comment was that the proposal to 
apply the 2015 Patent Policy to patents that pre-2015 LOAs covered was “that 
IEEE-SA breach[es] its obligations under those contracts to compel those legacy 
SEP holders to LOA terms they never agreed to – i.e., unilaterally reopen[s] the 
contract to new terms.” E-mail from Ron D. Katznelson, President, Bi-Level 
Techs., to IEEE-SA Standards Board Patent Committee (Dec. 2, 2016), http:// 
grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00419.html. 
 363. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (citation 
omitted). 
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The retroactivity doctrine is usually confined to whether it 
is unconstitutional to criminalize by statute conduct that was 
innocent when committed or to increase the penalty for past 
acts.364 But courts apply the doctrine against retroactivity to 
civil matters as well, as to which courts use similar principles 
when deciding whether a retrospective application of a rule is 
legitimate.365 As Justice Story explained, two hundred years ago, 
any measure “which takes away or impairs vested rights 
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to 
transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed 
retrospective.”366 Whether the measure is improperly 
retrospective, however, and should therefore be condemned, is 
more complicated. A court must ask what is “the nature and 
extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection 
between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event,” 
and such cases may well “leave room for disagreement in hard 
cases.”367 Nonetheless, “familiar considerations of fair notice, 
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound 
guidance.”368 
Under that approach a court would probably hold the 2015 
Patent Policy update a restatement of existing law on what is a 
reasonable royalty, that long predated the update and the 
original RAND commitments from the late 1990s inception of 
802.11 standardization, and therefore that the Patent Policy 
update is not retroactive at all, or at worst is permissibly 
retrospective.369 It did not take away or impair vested rights, or 
                                                          
 364. See Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912) (“Finally it 
is insisted that, if retrospective in form, the section is void, as an ex post facto 
law within the prohibition of Art. I, § 9 of the Constitution. It is, however, settled 
that this prohibition is confined to laws respecting criminal punishments, and 
has no relation to retrospective legislation of any other description.”). 
 365. Courts do not usually explain the legal basis for challenging the legality 
of retrospective laws, but it appears to be due process. See, e.g., Costello v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 283–84 (1961) (“Depriving him of his fraudulently 
acquired privilege, even after the lapse of many years, is not so unreasonable 
as to constitute a denial of due process.”). 
 366. Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (No. 
13,156) (C.C.D.N.H. 1814). 
 367. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. 
 368. Id. These appear to be due process considerations. 
 369. This statement assumes that courts would treat legislative 
retrospectivity doctrine applicable in principle to an allegedly retrospective 
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create new obligations, impose new duties, or attach new 
disabilities. A series of decisions of the Federal Circuit 
interpreting RAND commitments under LOAs for 802.11 and 
other standards, and also the proper test for reasonable royalty 
in the absence of any contractual RAND commitment,370 came to 
the same conclusion. For any royalty to be reasonable, the 
Federal Circuit ruled, it had to follow well-established principles 
going back at least as far as the Garretson case in 1884.371 
These principles are essentially the same as those of the 
2015 Patent Policy. “[T]he governing rule is that the ultimate 
combination of royalty base and royalty rate must reflect the 
value attributable to the infringing features of the product, and 
                                                          
contract interpretation. Indeed, however, there is no such thing as contract 
interpretation retroactivity. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Pauma Band of 
Luiseno Mission Indians v. California: 
[T]he term “retroactive” is a misnomer in the realm of contract 
interpretation. Once a court has interpreted an ambiguous contract 
provision that is and has always been the correct interpretation from 
its formation. Although the cases discussing the retroactivity of 
judicial decisions interpreting statutes may be instructive, a contract 
is fundamentally different from a statute or a body of law. . . . Thus, a 
contract provision has only one true meaning—what it meant when 
written—even though the parties may later dispute the correct 
interpretation. . . . When dealing with interpretation of a contract 
there is no such thing as a “change in the law”—once a final judicial 
decision determines what the contested language supports, that is it. 
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th 
Cir. 2015). It may be a legal fiction that the term “reasonable royalty” in the 
pre-2015 802.11 LOAs “is and has always been” what the Federal Circuit in 
CSIRO says it means, but it is one that overwhelms the SEP holders’ 
contentions about retroactivity. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“When the parties to a bargain 
sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which 
is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is 
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.”); U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. 
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (stating where there is a contract for the 
sale of goods, but nothing is said as to price, the price is a reasonable price at 
the time). That means the courts determine the price if the parties reach 
impasse. 
 370. The Patent Code provides: “Upon finding for the claimant the court 
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of 
the invention by the infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). Generally, absent special 
circumstances, the damages in a patent infringement case are limited to a 
reasonable royalty for the use of the invention. But cf. cases and text supra note 
179 (identifying cases involving special circumstances allowing for other 
measures of damages). 
 371. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884). 
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no more.”372 That value is the measure of what was taken from 
the patentee, and thus the proper measure of a reasonable 
royalty.373 The infringing features of the product are, ordinarily, 
what the SEP claims, and that typically corresponds to no more 
than the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit. Moreover, ex-
ante determination of the proper royalty for a SEP is obligatory 
because the extra monopoly price that attaches when a patent is 
made essential through its selection in a standard is not 
attributable to the merits of the patented technology, yet a 
reward for those merits is all that the patentee is entitled to. As 
the Federal Circuit stated in the CSIRO case: 
[T]he patentee’s royalty must be premised on the value of the patented 
feature, not any value added by the standard’s adoption of the 
patented technology. These steps are necessary to ensure that the 
royalty award is based on the incremental value that the patented 
invention adds to the product, not any value added by the 
standardization of that technology.374 
Accordingly, the 2015 Patent Policy update is not 
retroactive or retrospective at all,375 and even if it were 
retrospective, it would not be unfairly or unjustly 
retrospective.376 A court would probably reject the challenge that 
IEEE’s Patent Policy “rewrites” the contract made with SEP 
owners. Moreover, even if grandfather rights can in some way be 
acquired by buying a company with a pre-2015 LOA and RAND 
                                                          
 372. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (2014) 
(explaining the Garretson, 111 U.S. 120 and VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 
F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) decisions). 
 373. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226. (citing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline 
Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915)). 
 374. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (CSIRO), 
809 F.3d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 
773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (2014)). 
 375. The SEP owners are thus in the position of Moliere’s M. Jourdain who 
had been speaking in prose for 40 years without knowing it. JEAN BAPTISTE 
POQUELIN MOLIÈRE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, act 2, sc. 4 (trans. Philip 
Dwight Jones) (1670), http://www.online-literature.com/moliere/middle-class-
gentleman/7/. 
 376. See Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242–43 (1912) (“[T]he 
act provides [only] that he shall be deprived of a privilege that was never 
rightfully his. Such a statute is not to be deemed an ex post facto law.”). 
According to the Federal Circuit, the value of standardization was never 
rightfully the patent owner’s. See text and cases supra notes 266–72. 
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commitment,377 the result would not be to change the 
purchaser’s legal obligations regarding such issues as ex-ante 
royalty rates and use of the smallest saleable patent-practicing 
unit principle. Thus, SEP owners had fair notice of what to 
expect from courts and should not have expected or relied on a 
contrary result. On the other hand, the IEEE’s continuing 
refusal to take a position on whether the 2015 update made any 
substantive change in RAND commitments could hamper its 
ability to make this argument to a court, perhaps because of 
laches or estoppel, if the IEEE somehow became involved in a 
court proceeding. An 802.11 implementer engaged in patent 
infringement litigation with a SEP owner, however, would not 
be deprived of the precedential effect of previous Federal Circuit 
decisions interpreting pre-2015 RAND commitments and 
general law on the meaning of “reasonable royalty,” even in the 
absence of explicit RAND commitments.378 
VII. WHO IS ENTITLED? 
Below the surface of all the controversy over “a deal is a 
deal” and whether the rules of the Federal Circuit and the IEEE 
Patent Policy update deprive SEP holders of their property 
rights379 and legitimate expectations is the question: who should 
                                                          
 377. It is questionable that one can buy grandfather rights under an LOA 
and then use those rights to limit the buyer’s obligations that it would otherwise 
have. An LOA is an encumbrance; it creates an obligation. When one acquires 
a debt, by succeeding to a debtor’s asset, for example, by acquiring a house 
subject to a mortgage, one does not erase one’s own prior obligations. The SEP 
grandfather argument confuses an encumbrance with a privilege—a detriment 
with a benefit. 
 378. In CSIRO and Ericsson, the Federal Circuit held that a royalty award 
must be based solely on the ex-ante value of the patented technology and “not 
any value added by the standardization of that technology,” and that this rule 
applies to all SEPs irrespective of whether they are RAND-encumbered. 
CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232. Even 
if the 2015 Patent Policy had made a substantive change in the IEEE’s standard 
RAND commitment, therefore, that would not affect the applicability of the ex-
ante principle. Similarly, the reasons for using the smallest saleable patent-
practicing unit principle for royalty bases do not depend on a RAND 
commitment or even SEP status. See CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1302. 
 379. In United States v. Willow River Power, Justice Jackson asked whether 
the courts will provide a remedy because a property right has been invaded, or 
whether a property right exists because the courts will enforce it. United States 
v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 503 (1945) (holding that the company 
seeking compensation should have no remedy, because Congress had failed to 
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rightly own the benefits of standardization (the surplus that 
standardization creates) or, more generally, how should the 
monetary benefits be allocated among stakeholders and 
claimants? As discussed at the outset of this Article, 
standardization causes interoperability, which causes network 
effects, and the network then generates value that increases 
greatly with the number of users joining the interoperable 
network.380 That value is vastly greater than the sum of the 
values that would exist if the individual elements in the network 
were isolated from one another in their original form instead of 
being interconnected or interconnectable so that they can 
interoperate. That value is reflected in the surplus between the 
ex-ante value and ex-post value of a SEP. 
SEP holders claim that, as creators of technologies that are 
the basis for the benefits of standardization,381 they have a 
strong claim—they are entitled—to the extra value (the surplus) 
that standardization generates.382 They warn also that, if they 
are denied adequate rewards to “incentivize” their technological 
contributions, the benefits of standardization and technological 
progress will dry up because the standard-setting process will 
die—the goose will no longer lay its golden eggs.383 Those two 
points, made in a variety of ways, are the main arguments of 
                                                          
order that any enforceable right existed in the subject matter); see also Plato, 
EUTHYPHRO (photo reprint) (1895) (in which Plato asks Euthyphro: “Is the pious 
loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is that which the 
gods love?”). What the SEP owners’ property rights are (or are not) is the end 
point of the legal analysis, not its starting point. 
 380. In a smartphone market of 200 million users, the aggregate value of the 
network is roughly 200 million times the sum of the individual user network 
values. See Appendix A infra. 
 381. Or at least as the assignees of the patents awarded to the inventors of 
that technology, and usually the employers paying the salaries of such 
inventors. 
 382. The ingredients of the surplus are described in Part I. The principal 
and most heatedly contested ingredient, but not the only one, is the value of 
network effect resulting from the interoperability of standardized products. 
Another ingredient is the exclusionary value of a SEP that standardization 
creates. 
 383. See Letter from J. Gregory Sidak to Renata B. Hesse, supra note 313, 
at 2 (“Whatever static benefits from lower prices might flow to consumers from 
downstream manufacturers in the short run surely would be more than offset 
by forgone consumer surplus in future periods because of reduced innovation 
and diminished dynamic efficiency.”). 
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SEP owners and their spokesmen for their claim of entitlement 
to the surplus. 
Some downstream implementers of standards, such as 
iPhone seller Apple, claim they are the innovators that lay the 
golden eggs, and by implication deserve to claim the value of 
smartphone standardization.384 The Federal Circuit and other 
courts say that SEP owners deserve only the intrinsic, ex-ante 
value of their technology, and not the value that standardization 
confers on SEPs—that surplus should flow to consumers and 
implementers, rather than to patentees: 
[A] reasonable royalty calculation under [35 U.S.C.] § 284 attempts to 
measure the value of the patented invention. This value—the value of 
the technology—is distinct from any value that artificially accrues to 
the patent due to the standard’s adoption. Without this rule, 
patentees would receive all of the benefit created by standardization—
benefit that would otherwise flow to consumers and businesses 
practicing the standard. We therefore reaffirm that reasonable 
royalties for SEPs generally—and not only those subject to a RAND 
commitment—must not include any value flowing to the patent from 
the standard’s adoption.385 
Professorial commentators say that the public needs to be 
protected from forced wealth transfers such as from smartphone-
purchasing consumers to smartphone-SEP owners that seek to 
evade their FRAND commitments. 386 
                                                          
 384. See Apple Complaint, supra note 12 (accusing defendant Qualcomm of 
establishing a business model for collecting patent royalties on the technological 
contributions of others and their innovations unrelated to Qualcomm’s 
technology). Apple states that “Apple engineers create[d] a revolutionary . . . 
breakthrough technolog[y]” and “Qualcomm insists on royalties” on it; “Apple 
spends billions redefining the concept of a smartphone camera” and Qualcomm 
decides to collect “tribute” on it. Id. at 1–2. Apple does not explicitly articulate 
the next step of the syllogism—that it is entitled to claim the surplus that 
standardization creates, by making the benefits of these technological advances 
available to the millions of intercommunicating US iPhone owners. Its 
statement can be understood, however, to imply that. 
 385. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (CSIRO), 
809 F.3d 1295, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 
 386. Steven C. Salop & Carl Shapiro, Whither Antitrust Enforcement in the 
Trump Administration?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2017, at 1, 16, https://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/feb17_salop_2_
16f.authcheckdam.pdf (“If . . . a narrow view [is taken] of the role of antitrust 
and patent law in preventing SEP owners from evading their FRAND 
commitments, potentially very large amounts of money would flow from 
ordinary consumers purchasing smartphones (as one leading example) to a 
small number of entities that hold SEPs relating to smartphones and have 
promised to license those patents on FRAND terms.”). 
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Spokesmen for SEP owners may deplore the tide of 
controversy that has displaced the former acquiescence of 
implementers and the IEEE in letting SEP owners define what 
royalties are RAND, on their own terms—described as “a long 
history of developing policies in consensus fashion” where “one 
would be best advised to let individuals [sic] companies agree on 
terms.”387 But cynical observers may respond that the 2015 
Patent Policy update involves: 
the sort of policy change that could never achieve consensus, because 
the economic interests of the parties are inherently at odds. . . . That 
SEP holders, themselves, complain about these kind [sic] of things is 
easily understood. You have a (minority) faction that has historically 
been conferred with a tremendous business advantage by a policy that 
converted what should naturally be competitive-source negotiations 
into single-source negotiations. Nice work if you can get it. They have 
come to view that advantage as an entitlement, and they’re not about 
to give it up quietly. They’ll raise any objection they can . . . .388 
Making a rational assessment of this debate calls for a 
sensitive balance of interests. It also demands an evaluation of 
relative values, like those of promoting innovation and those of 
protecting the public from forced wealth transfers,389 among 
others, which implicates one’s “hierarchy of values.”390 The 
remainder of this Article explores that subject further, to 
consider in more detail the policy arguments that spokesmen for 
                                                          
 387. Alden Abbott, Comment to IEEE Patent Policy Change Would 
Undermine Property Rights and Innovation, TRUTH ON MKT. (Feb. 10, 2015, 
8:40 AM), https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/02/04/ieee-patent-policy-change-
would-undermine-property-rights-and-inn; see also Katznelson, Perilous 
Deviations, supra note 342 (describing the “salutary aspects of FRAND 
Harmony [that] have been exploited by companies and industries for decades,” 
but are now imperiled); Salop & Shapiro, supra note 386. Judge Posner would 
doubtless consider the “salutary harmony” of “let[ting] individuals [sic] 
companies agree on terms” to be like letting a highwayman and stagecoach 
passenger individually agree on terms when the highwayman says, “Stand and 
deliver!” See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 
2012), modified on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (declining to 
enjoin Apple’s sale of an infringing product where such an injunction would 
result in patent royalties reflecting the hold-up value of the patent instead of 
its ex-ante market value). 
 388. J.S. Greenfield, Comment to IEEE Patent Policy Change Would 
Undermine Property Rights and Innovation, TRUTH ON MKT. (Feb. 10, 2015, 
1:52 PM), https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/02/04/ieee-patent-policy-change-
would-undermine-property-rights-and-innovation/. 
 389. Salop & Shapiro, supra note 386. 
 390. 2 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR 
A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 1045 (1992). 
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SEP-owning stakeholders make to justify their claims about the 
values standardization creates. 
As already indicated, major SEP holders have spoken out 
against at least two aspects of the judicial, governmental, and 
device-manufacturers’ positions discussed earlier, as well as 
against the IEEE 2015 Patent Policy (at least as it applies to 
802.11 Wi-Fi SEPs). They strongly oppose: 
● the ex-ante royalty rate determination principle, which 
expressly denies that SEP owners have any right to share in the 
value that standardization creates;391 and 
● the policy to base royalties on the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit, and refuse to base them on the price of 
downstream products that combine a smallest saleable patent-
practicing unit with other components to form a composite 
finished product.392 
The two principles are intertwined in the arguments that 
SEP stakeholders make because the reason for the second 
principle is to provide a way to implement the first. This part of 
the Article now addresses and evaluates various formulations of 
those arguments. 
A. WE ARE ENTITLED TO SHARE 
On the first point, SEP spokesmen have argued that SEP 
owners are entitled to profit from the adoption of standards and 
their resulting benefits, because it is unfair not to let them 
share: 
The [IEEE Patent Policy] provision that “reasonable rates” should 
“exclude” any value associated with incorporating the patented 
technology into the standard is the most objectionable aspect of the 
proposed changes, implying as it does that patent holders should not 
share in the gains from standardization (other than via the volume 
effect).393 
                                                          
 391. See, e.g., Decker & King, supra note 330. 
 392. See, e.g., id.; Crofts & Newman, supra note 328. 
 393. David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, The IEEE’s New IPR Policy: Did 
the IEEE Shoot Itself in the Foot and Harm Innovation? 13 (Tusher Ctr., 
Working Paper Series No. 13, 2016), http://businessinnovation.berkeley 
.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Tusher-Center-Working-Paper-No.-13.pdf. 
By “volume effect” the authors refer to the fact that royalty and chipset 
revenues increase when licensees or chipset customers increase their sales 
volume subject to patent royalties, as a result of the patented technology being 
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This is more a statement of hurt feelings than a substantive 
argument. It is asked, “Why shouldn’t SEP holders share?” But 
why should they share, if the value is created by an arbitrary 
SSO anointment rather than specific technological superiority? 
Why, for example, is LTE any more entitled to be anointed, and 
therefore its SEP owners enriched, than the alternative 
technology WiMAX, unless LTE is in fact superior enough to 
WiMAX to justify a price premium over WiMAX and other 
technologies? Many have observed that the choice of one or 
another technology for anointment as the standard is more often 
arbitrary than based on technological merit.394 
Even when an anointed technology is superior, its market 
value (i.e., ability to command payment) is always increased 
above its pre-standardization value because standardization 
excludes any competitive alternatives.395 The surplus is an 
artifact of the standardization process. As Judge Posner put it, 
any manufacturer seeking to make a standard-compliant 
product “has no alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the 
patentee’s mercy.”396 The claimed “right to share in the gains 
from standardization,” meaning here ex-post rather than ex-ante 
                                                          
incorporated into a standard, and clearing the market of products that are not 
standard-compliant. 
 394. See generally Rudi Bekkers et al., An Empirical Study on the 
Determinants of Essential Patent Claims in Compatibility Standards, 40 RES. 
POL’Y 1001 (2011); Anne Layne-Farrar, Innovative or Indefensible? An 
Empirical Assessment of Patenting Within Standard Setting, 9 INT’L J. IT 
STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 18 (2008); Marc Rysman & Timothy 
Simcoe, Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1920 (2008). 
 395. See TIM POHLMANN & KNUT BLIND, LANDSCAPING STUDY ON STANDARD 
ESSENTIAL PATENTS (SEPS) 55 (2016) (“[I]t is uncertain whether declared SEPs 
are more valuable and therefore declared essential for a standard, or whether 
these patents become more valuable only after being declared standard 
essential.”). But see DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION 
COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
STANDARD SETTING 14 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments 
/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2014)27&doclanguage=en 
(“Rysman and Simcoe (2008) find that SEPs have a much higher number of 
forward citations than the average patent and observe that the inclusion in a 
standard can have a positive effect on the value of a patent. Lerner et al. (2007) 
study data from patent pools and conclude that the pool patents are more 
important, i.e. receive more citations, and that this holds both before and after 
the pool formed.”). 
 396. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012), 
modified on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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determination of royalties, is therefore in substantial part a 
euphemism for enjoying the fruits of having standards users at 
the SEP holders’ mercy.397 
B. DOWNSTREAM PRICES BETTER REFLECT THE VALUE OF THE 
TECHNOLOGY TO END-USERS 
The advocates for SEP owners do have more substantive 
arguments, which should not be ignored and go beyond merely 
expressing hurt feelings or a wish to exploit the monopoly power 
that standardization can generate. These arguments ought to be 
aired, evaluated, and engaged with. Thus, an attorney for 
Qualcomm argues that it is proper to base royalty on the sales 
price of a smartphone because a user of a more expensive 
smartphone derives greater benefit from the SEPs whose 
technology it embodies than a user of a cheap smartphone or cell 
phone does. 
A more expensive, high-end smartphone, with features such as a 
large, high-resolution screen, a high-quality camera, and photo and 
video editing capabilities, makes greater use of and benefits more 
from improved communications than a basic device does. A user of the 
more capable device will undoubtedly download, upload, stream, and 
post to social media more photos and videos, with bigger file sizes, as 
a result of higher resolutions. As an example, the vastly improved 
data transmission rates supported by the 4G LTE standard contribute 
far more value to such a high-end device than to a less capable phone. 
It is only fair that the maker of the device should pay more (in terms 
of a higher royalty) for the use of the technology in the phone that 
derives more value from the technology.398 
This argument may have some force. Arguably, the fair and 
reasonable royalty for a patent should depend on the extent of 
the benefit the patented technology confers on the user. But 
there are two patent law problems with the argument and one 
fundamental pragmatic problem, and each of the three will be 
addressed in turn. 
                                                          
 397. Id.; see also United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
This is not to imply that the surplus is entirely due to monopoly power, for it is 
not. The surplus results also from network effect and attendant scale economies. 
Although FRAND requirements may lessen or eliminate monopoly-power 
effects, they do not lessen network-related effects. 
 398. Richard J. Stark, Debunking the Smallest Salable Unit Theory, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 10 (July 2015), https://www.cravath.com/files/uploads 
/Documents/Publications/3550382_1.pdf. 
212 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:1 
 
First, US patent law has a curious and seemingly 
anomalous position on this issue of exacting further rewards for 
the use of patented technology physically embodied in an article 
of commerce sold downstream in the marketplace. Under the 
General Talking Pictures doctrine, patent law permits so-called 
“field-of-use” licensing, which allows different licensing 
arrangements to be made for manufacturing different products 
with different uses at different royalty prices: a patentee may 
license a first firm to manufacture a patented circuit for 
incorporation into a home radio receiver (but only for that use) 
at one royalty, while the same circuit can be licensed to a second 
firm for manufacturing TV transmitters at a higher royalty.399 
Presumably, under present law, Qualcomm could license A to 
make and sell baseband processors for incorporation into 
smartphones having less than 256 GB of memory, and license B 
to make and sell baseband processors for incorporation into 
smartphones having more than 256 GB of memory. Or it could 
license C to make and sell baseband processors for incorporation 
into smartphones selling for less than $500, and license D to 
make and sell baseband processors for incorporation into 
smartphones selling for more than $500.400 
On the other hand, US patent law does not allow patentees 
to manufacture and then sell patented products (say, vacuum 
tubes or ICs) to other persons, subject to a restriction that they 
be used or resold only for a particular use, such as only in the 
home radio field and not sold to TV set manufacturers.401 The 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle of the 
exhaustion doctrine: 
                                                          
 399. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 182 
(1938), aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938) (affirming the legitimacy of license 
restricting amplifiers for use in home radios and not for use in theaters); 
Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764, 774 (7th Cir. 1967) (enforcing license 
permitting use of patent in FM radios and not in FM broadcast transmitters—
for which a greater royalty was charged). According to the dissent in the General 
Talking Pictures case, however, the so-called amplifiers were shelf-item vacuum 
tubes sold on the open market. Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 186 (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
 400. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1534–
35 (2017). Whether that would be commercially feasible as a business matter is 
another question. 
 401. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1926) 
(emphasizing the distinction between sales and licensed manufacturing). 
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When a patentee sells one of its products, [then] the patentee can no 
longer control that item through the patent laws—its patent rights 
are said to “exhaust.” The purchaser and all subsequent owners are 
free to use or resell the product just like any other item of personal 
property, without fear of an infringement lawsuit.402 
Once a patentee chooses to sell its patented product, “that 
product ‘is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly’ 
and instead becomes the ‘private, individual property’ of the 
purchaser, with the rights and benefits that come along with 
ownership.”403 A patentee may permissibly limit the extent to 
which it parts with its monopoly power when licensing another 
to manufacture the patented product, as in the General Talking 
Pictures case, but post-sale restriction is not part of a patentee’s 
bundle of rights (i.e., its statutory monopoly power). Therefore, 
“when an item passes into commerce, it should not be shaded by 
a legal cloud on title as it moves through the marketplace.”404 
Any purported post-sale restriction is legally ineffective under 
patent law.405 In the Impression Products case, the Supreme 
Court rejected the contrary ruling below of the Federal Circuit 
that conflated the rule on post-sale restrictions with the rule of 
the General Talking Pictures case on manufacturing licenses.406 
                                                          
 402. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1529. 
 403. Id. at 1531 (quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549–50 
(1852)). 
 404. Id. at 1534. 
 405. The Court stated that the patentee’s sale of an item “exhausts all of its 
patent rights in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports 
to impose.” Id. at 1529. Because patent policy appears to object to such 
restrictions, insisting on such a restriction as a condition of sale may well be 
misuse. See, e.g., id. at 1530. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 
395 U.S. 100, 140–41 (1969) (insisting upon total-sales royalty is misuse but 
consensual use of such a royalty for mutual convenience is not misuse). In any 
case, the conduct when insisted upon would appear to contravene patent policy. 
See Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1532. Whether contract law may provide a 
remedy for a breach of contract was left undecided in the case. The Court stated, 
“The single-use/no-resale restrictions in Lexmark’s contracts with customers 
may have been clear and enforceable under contract law, but they do not entitle 
Lexmark to retain patent rights in an item that it has elected to sell.” Id. at 
15231 (emphasis added). But allowing a contract remedy is inconsistent with 
patent policy. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015); Lear, 
Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Both Kimble and Lear hold that contracts 
contrary to patent policy are unenforceable because patent policy trumps and 
preempts state contract law. For a more elaborate discussion of the issues 
concerning contractual enforcement of post-sale restrictions after Impression 
Products, see Stern, supra note 173, at 654–55. 
 406. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1533–35. 
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The Court insisted on maintaining the distinction between, and 
opposite rules for, sales and licenses to manufacture.407 
As the law now stands, therefore, it allows patentees to 
structure manufacturing licenses to capture values associated 
with different fields of use, even though not described in the 
patent claims, thus permitting different prices for different 
downstream uses. At least it does so unless some other law 
forbids the conduct because of its results.408 But the law does not 
authorize such downstream control for sales of the same 
patented product. Courts have made a trade-off between 
competing policies regarding reward incentives and the need for 
competition and liquidity in marketplaces.409 This policy trade-
off prohibits pursuing downstream customers in order to extract 
additional payments from them by wielding the power of the 
patent law.410 This result would seem to apply particularly for 
                                                          
 407. Id. 
 408. Field-of-use licensing is not totally immunized from the antitrust laws. 
See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 400–02 (1945) (holding 
a glass bottle cartel based on field-of-use licensing unlawful because of its 
anticompetitive effects); see also United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 
64 (1973) (involving both post-sale restrictions and a manufacturing license 
limitation against sales of a drug in a form useful to generic drug companies, 
but the Court did not even mention the distinction between the manufacturing 
patent license limitation and the post-sale restrictions as being relevant to the 
outcome); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457–58 (1940) 
(holding that a cartel regimenting the gasoline industry on the basis of a 
combination of post-sale restrictions on a patented product and field-of-use 
restrictions based on manufacturing licenses violated the Sherman Act). 
 409. Moreover, the potential harm to the public from post-sale restrictions 
on patented articles is excessive. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917); see also Keeler v. Standard Folding-
Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 667 (1895) (“The inconvenience and annoyance to the 
public that [allowing post-sale restrictions] would occasion are too obvious to 
require illustration.”). Another factor in the trade-off is a concern lest upstream 
actors appropriate technology values created by downstream actors, thereby 
skewing the reward and incentive mechanism, and discouraging downstream 
innovation. See Application-Dependent SEP Licensing, FAIR STANDARDS 
ALLIANCE (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.fair-standards.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2016/09/FSA-Application-Dependent-Licensing-Paper.pdf. 
 410. See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628 (2008) 
(“The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial 
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”); 
see also Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1537 (“[T]he right to exclude just 
ensures that the patentee receives one reward”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible 
Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 360 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (“One 
royalty to one patentee for one sale is enough under our patent law as written.”). 
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the use of SEPs, because the value of the product sold 
downstream derives in substantial part from the legally 
tolerated agreement of standard setters to anoint the product for 
standard-compliance and thus exclude non-compliant 
products.411 That is not a patent law problem, however, but 
rather a competition law problem, and one to be addressed 
separately. 
There is a second patent law problem with the argument 
made about the greater uploading and downloading (and so 
forth) benefits that the 4G LTE patented technology confers on 
standard-compliant smartphones using it. The SEP itself is not 
a patent on downloading, uploading, streaming, and social 
media posting of more photos and videos, with bigger file sizes 
and higher resolutions. A smartphone SEP ordinarily claims 
only a semiconductor chip circuit for encoding or decoding a 
signal for cellular telephony in a telecommunication device that 
someone else (such as Apple or Samsung) designs and makes—
and the patent claims only the circuit’s structure without 
reference to the number of downloads and postings to social 
media in which the patented chips participate. If the patentee 
invented a way to increase the number or speed of downloads 
and postings, and was entitled to collect payment for that, he 
should have claimed it as such in his patent application (such as 
“a method for increasing the downloading and uploading 
capability of a smartphone to such and such an extent, 
comprising doing such and such . . .”) and let the patent agency 
(the PTO) determine whether the claimed invention was 
meritorious enough to deserve a patent.412  
                                                          
Sometimes, there is the further issue that those downstream customers are not 
in privity with the patentee, or even aware of his business model, much less 
agreeing to it, so that the use of contract to try to evade the exhaustion doctrine 
is not a possibility. In such a case, those downstream might also have an 
equitable estoppel argument against the patentee. See Stern, supra note 302. 
 411. See cases cited supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
 412. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1966) 
(quoting Lincoln Eng’g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 58 (1938)) 
(refusing to consider an unclaimed feature of the patented plow in determining 
patent validity, saying, “[n]o such function . . . is hinted at in the specifications 
of the patent. If this were so vital an element in the functioning of the apparatus 
it is strange that all mention of it was omitted”). The PTO would ask and 
determine: Is it patentable subject matter? Is the alleged benefit obvious? Is 
there any connection between that capability and why a patent should be 
allowed? 
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Still, it is troublesome to dismiss entirely the argument that 
a moral claim arises from conferring a benefit. That raises the 
issue, however, of who is conferring what benefit on whom. For 
example, if I invent scissors, is it appropriate that I be able to 
enforce different payments from those of my customers who use 
the benefit of my invention to clip bond coupons and those who 
use it to cut out paper dolls? In a Lockean property analysis, 
property values derive from mingling one’s labor with something 
out there in the world to make a new composite, which thereby 
becomes one’s property.413 I do not mingle my labor with the 
coupon clipper’s coupon to create his dividends. He is the one 
mingling his labor to earn the monetary rights that follow from 
wisely investing, clipping his bond coupons, and cashing them 
in. Furthermore, absent a patent on what is sought to be cashed 
in on, the argument that “it is only fair” that the patentee be 
paid extra for the expensive but unpatented downstream 
features loses its force. Whatever could be, but is not, patented 
falls into the public domain, and others have a right freely to 
copy it.414 And that is even more the case for what cannot be 
patented at all.415 
This leads into the third difficulty with the “it is only fair” 
argument: who creates the value of standardization—even 
assuming, arguendo, that it is relevant to ask that question 
(rather than look merely to the precedents of patent law and 
competition law) to determine what royalty is FRAND. The SEP 
owners say that they are the creators of the value of 
standardization, by employing the inventive engineers who 
devise patented technology used in standards.416 But that is not 
so. The main value of standardization, apart from impermissible 
values such as monopoly power or holdup, is that it creates 
                                                          
 413. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (“Whatsoever then he removes out of 
the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour 
with, and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property.”). 
 414. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 
(1989). 
 415. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 
(1964) (“Here Day-Brite’s fixture has been held not to be entitled to a design or 
mechanical patent. Under the federal patent laws it is, therefore, in the public 
domain and can be copied in every detail by whoever pleases.”). 
 416. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 342. 
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interoperability (along with resulting manufacturing economies 
of scale and the other benefits described in Part I).417 It does that 
by the concerted fiat of the standard setters,418 who agree on 
what shall be the technological rules (protocols) in the 
standard.419 The standard setters do not own the patent nor are 
they the manufacturers that implement the standard.420 They 
are, or say they are, independent and disinterested technicians 
who volunteer to devote their time and effort only to further the 
good of society.421 It is not the technology, as such, or its creators 
                                                          
 417. See text and citations, supra notes 15–19. 
 418. The concerted agreement by standard-setters that excludes the 
unanointed technologies from the standard could be an antitrust violation were 
it not for the procompetitive effects of standardization. See Standard Sanitary 
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 48–49 (1912) (holding that an agreement 
among enamelware manufacturers not to deal in substandard goods was an 
antitrust violation); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 309 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (“[Standard setting] enhances consumer welfare 
and competition in the marketplace and is, therefore, consistent with the 
procompetitive aspirations of antitrust law. Thus, private standard setting—
which might otherwise be viewed as a naked agreement among competitors not 
to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products—need not, in 
fact, violate antitrust law.”). 
 419. For example, in the IEEE, a supermajority consensus in the working 
group for developing the details of a standard must agree to the technology 
choices. Letter from Michael A. Lindsay to William J. Baer, supra note 306, at 
5–9. Then that standard must be ratified by the IEEE-SA Standards Board, 
before it can be released. Id.; see also INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 
4, § 5. To some extent this process may appear like the “extra-governmental 
agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate 
commerce” condemned in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC, 312 
U.S. 457, 465 (1941), but the law considers it benign because of the 
procompetitive benefits of standardization. See Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 309. 
 420. When a standard setter owns the patents and manufactures the 
standard-compliant product, an antitrust violation could result if a rule-of-
reason analysis established that the consequent anticompetitive conduct 
outweighs the procompetitive benefits. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
616 F.3d 1318, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding, under rule of reason, that the 
MPEG standard’s pooling of patents by competitive manufacturers Sony and 
Philips did not unreasonably restrain trade, because of lack of adverse market 
effect). 
 421. The IEEE asserts, “IEEE is . . . dedicated to advancing technology for 
the benefit of humanity.” IEEE Ethics and Member Conduct, INST. ELEC. & 
ELECS. ENG’RS, https://www.ieee.org/about/ethics.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2017); see also IEEE Mission and Vision, INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, 
https://www.ieee.org/about/vision_mission.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017) 
(“IEEE’s core purpose is to foster technological innovation and excellence for the 
benefit of humanity.”). IEEE-SA’s counsel summarized the ethical, conflict-of-
interest responsibilities of IEEE standardization participants in a slide show 
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that proximately cause the benefits of standardization. It is, 
instead, the determination to standardize according to the 
particular technological criteria collectively agreed upon by the 
standard-setters—the SSO and its working groups—that causes 
the benefits of standardization. The SEP owners’ argument, 
therefore, that they have a moral claim to the benefits of 
standardization, because they created them and then provided 
them to the end user public, is based on an erroneous premise. 
SEP owners neither create nor provide the benefits of 
standardization to the public—standard setters do, purportedly 
doing so in order to benefit humanity. In effect, they designate 
the public as third-party beneficiaries of their unpaid efforts. In 
short, creation of technology is not creation of standardization, 
nor creation of the standard using the technology, nor creation 
of the benefits of standardization.422 The benefits are a gift to the 
public from the selfless, public-spirited technicians who develop 
the standard “for the benefit of humanity.”423 
C. THE SYNERGISTIC VALUE CHAIN SHOULD TRUMP THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF COMPETITION 
Other SEP-holder spokesmen phrase the argument that 
SEP owners create the public benefits resulting from 
standardization, in slightly different terms, speaking of value 
flowing downstream synergistically from the patented LTE chip: 
                                                          
instructing that participants have a fiduciary duty not to exercise powers in 
“the interest of your employer or any entity with whom you are otherwise 
affiliated,” and not to participate in actions “in which a participant’s decisions 
or votes could substantially and directly affect the participant’s professional, 
personal, financial or business interests.” Claire H. Topp, Overview of Certain 
Legal Issues and Responsibilities, A Presentation to the IEEE Standards 
Association Standards Board and Committees, New Member Orientation (Mar. 
2017), https://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/nmo_ct.pdf. These words may, at 
times, be more aspirational than actualized. See Bob Liu, IEEE Unable to Agree 
on 802.11g Standards, WI-FI PLANET (May 18, 2001), http://www.wi-fiplanet 
.com/news/article.php/782961/IEEE-Unable-to-Agree-on-80211g-Standards 
.htm (describing how a TI official, as chair of 802.11g group, attempted to block 
consideration of rival Intersil’s technology for incorporation into standard, but 
his ruling was overturned on appeal within IEEE). 
 422. The issue of attribution to an agent or actor is a difficult policy question 
invoking the shades of Mrs. Palsgraf and the owners of the ship Polemis. To 
avoid unduly interrupting the flow of this Article, further discussion of this 
issue is relegated to Appendix B, infra. 
 423. See, e.g., IEEE Mission and Vision, supra note 421. 
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But the value to consumers of the camera phone, and thus the value 
to them of the cellular capability, is enhanced by the ability to share 
pictures taken with the camera in the phone over the cellular network 
with others. And conversely the value of the camera capability is 
enhanced by the ability to send photos via the cellular network. That 
is, there is a value synergy between the camera feature and the 
cellular capability. Focusing only on the “smallest saleable unit” 
ignores this source of synergistic value. . . . [The IEEE policy] denies 
the patent holder any share of that synergistic value, which can be 
considerable. In our view, that is not “reasonable” in the sense of 
“commercially reasonable,” and fails to “adequately compensate” the 
patent holder for that aspect of the infringement.424 
They thus argue that there is a “value chain” that flows 
synergistically downstream from the chipset level. They contend 
that the 2015 IEEE Patent Policy—and any Federal Circuit case 
law—to the effect that a RAND royalty should be based on the 
smallest saleable patent-practicing unit—and thus should be 
measured at the chipset level—“ignores the fact that both 
handset manufacturers and cellular service providers are also 
using the patented technology to sell products/services, and that 
the value that they receive from using the patented technology 
is unlikely to be reflected in actual chipset prices/profit 
margins.”425 Why? The reason, they explain, is competition: 
It would be one thing if one were to show that chipset manufacturers 
were able to set the prices of chipsets so as to extract all of the value 
that those “downstream” from them in the “value chain” received from 
using the patented technology, but that is unlikely given competition 
at the chipset level. . . . Simply put, there is no reason to believe that 
a royalty assessed at the chipset (“component”) level, especially one 
assessed with reference to chipset prices and chipset profits, 
adequately captures the value to those at other levels in the value 
chain – such as handset manufacturers and cellular service providers 
– of using patented cellular technology. Such royalties are not likely 
to be “adequate.”426 
At this point, any “fairness” argument has gone astray. The 
protest made here is that free competition in semiconductor 
chips is unfair and its benefits to the public should not be 
allowed. It is also a complaint that the legal doctrine that, once 
a patented product is sold, the product is no longer under the 
                                                          
 424. Teece & Sherry, supra note 393, at 8. The alleged synergism, however, 
is the ordinary and expectable co-action of known elements of this type. See 
Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60–61 
(1969). 
 425. Teece & Sherry, supra note 393, at 8–9. 
 426. Id. at 9. 
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protection of the patent law (the “exhaustion doctrine”), is wrong 
and that in a well-ordered world the doctrine would be abolished. 
This is not the place to address that argument in detail, but 
there are strong reasons why the US courts have followed that 
doctrine for well over a century.427 In any case, the translation 
into plain English of the SEP spokesmen’s argument made here 
is that cell phone buyers should be forced to fork over more cash 
to SEP holders so that the latter could adequately capture (or 
fully extract) the monetary value that would exist, but for 
competition in the chip market. That is not an appealing 
argument.428 
Moreover, the argument is, essentially, a plea to scrap 
patent law’s long-settled entire market value royalty principle—
that in order to recover as damages a percentage of total 
revenues or profits attributable to an entire multi-component 
product, such as a cell phone, the patentee must establish that 
the patented component or feature drives the market demand 
for the entire product.429 But when the value of one component 
out of many components that make up the value of the entire 
                                                          
 427. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502, 516 (1917); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873). In the Motion Picture 
Patents case, the Court held that “[t]he patent law furnishes no warrant for 
such a practice [controlling customers’ post-sale use of patented products in 
order to increase patentee’s revenue], and the cost, inconvenience, and 
annoyance to the public which the opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it.” 
243 U.S. at 516. See also Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. 
Ct. 1523, 1532 (2017) (quoting Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 
659, 667 (1895)) (“The inconvenience and annoyance to the public that an 
opposite conclusion would occasion are too obvious to require illustration.”). 
 428. The Supreme Court has instructed that the policy of the antitrust laws 
“precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.” Nat’l 
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); see also 
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national 
economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.”); United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940) (the antitrust laws do 
not “permit[] the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be 
a defense” nor “genuine or fancied competitive abuses as a legal justification”). 
 429. For this rule see, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. 
Cisco Sys., Inc. (CSIRO), 809 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015); VirnetX, Inc. v. 
Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (“The 
entire market value rule allows a patentee to assess damages based on the 
entire market value of the accused product only where the patented feature 
creates the ‘basis for customer demand’ or ‘substantially create[s] the value of 
the component parts.’”); see also Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884). 
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product is proposed to be made the base for a royalty 
determination, it is no more entitled to such treatment than each 
of the other components. Therefore, if all SEP-embodying 
components are rewarded that way (in terms of the value of 
downstream products), and each SEP is by definition essential, 
the stacked sum of the values comprising the royalty base will 
likely exceed 100 percent of the market value of the product. The 
royalty sum will not be a reasonable royalty, the individual 
royalties so computed will not be reasonable royalties, and the 
traffic could not bear them. Reasonable royalties are those 
attributable to the patented invention (that which is claimed), 
meaning attributable to the features of the product that 
constitute or directly result from the patented invention, not the 
other features of the product.430 
D. INCENTIVIZE ME OR I’LL DEFECT 
A highly theoretical argument is often made by SEP owner 
spokesmen—that lessened compensation to SEP owners will 
“disincentivize” them from creating technology and contributing 
it to standardization, stagnating further standardization. For 
example: 
If the SEP holder cannot capture any of the value from 
standardization that its technology creates for the standard, it will 
have a dampened incentive to continue contributing its best 
technologies to SSOs. In the long run, the quality of technologies 
contributed to a future standard—and the expected value of that new 
standard—would decrease. The SEP holder’s decision to contribute its 
technologies to a standard depends on the compensation that an SEP 
holder expects to obtain from such a contribution, compared with the 
SEP holder’s alternative option to monetize its invention outside the 
standard. . . . If the SEP holder expects not to be compensated fully 
for its contributions, it will not commit its most valuable technologies 
to the standard.431 
                                                          
 430. Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
This rule goes back to the 19th century. See Garretson, 111 U.S. at 121 (1884); 
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 490–91 (1854) (holding that the owner of 
patent on seat for machine for reaping grain was not entitled to damages based 
on value of entire machine). 
 431. Sidak, supra note 271, at 1869; see also supra text and sources 
accompanying notes 342–43. This is also the thrust of Teece and Sherry, supra 
note 393, who ask whether the IEEE shot itself in the foot by adopting the 2015 
Patent Policy update. 
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But the amount of dampening of incentive (assuming that 
we do not already have enough or more than enough incentive 
for smartphones) may well be outweighed in impact by the 
prospect of nonetheless gaining first-user and head-start 
advantage from incorporation of one’s technology into a 
standard, and the opportunity to increase one’s equipment sales 
(anointed with the imprimatur of the standard),432 even if one 
cannot also obtain monopoly profits as well, from SEP royalties. 
In a sense, those advantages are a form of “the compensation 
that an SEP holder expects to obtain” from such a SEP 
contribution, but the commentator fails to take those significant 
incentives into consideration.433 Moreover, the supposed “SEP 
holder’s alternative option to monetize its invention outside the 
standard” may be a figment of the SEP holder spokesman’s 
imagination.434 If an alternative technology becomes standard, 
the only opportunity to monetize the withheld invention may be 
to incorporate the technology into unsaleable non-standard 
products. Defection may be a poor business strategy. 
Furthermore, a considerable amount of standardization 
activity has been coming from groups that prohibit the 
participating companies or individuals from collecting SEP 
royalties—so-called “RF-RAND” (royalty-free RAND)435 and 
“RAND-Zero” (RAND with zero royalties) groups or groups that 
                                                          
 432. As in the case of the TI-Intersil 802.11g contest that resulted in zero-
royalty offers. See supra note 22. 
 433. Sidak, supra note 271, at 1869. 
 434. Id. 
 435. The Bluetooth wireless (RF) device communication standard is royalty-
free. See Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License Agreement Version 1.1, 
BLUETOOTH §5 (July 8, 2016), https://www.bluetooth.com/membership-working 
-groups/membership-types-levels?_ga=2.132813006.1551079928.1494627696-
903502848.1494626654 (follow “Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License 
Agreement” hyperlink). The World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”), which 
sponsors HTML, also has a royalty-free patent licensing policy. See W3C Patent 
Policy, W3C § 3 (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-
20040205/. The Universal Serial Bus Implementers’ Forum (USB-IF), which is 
responsible for the USB standard used in personal computers and mobile 
phones, provides that adopters of the standard will have royalty-free reciprocal 
licensing rights for standard-compliant products. See USB 3.0 Adopters 
Agreement, UNIVERSAL SERIAL BUS, http://www.usb.org/developers /docs (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2017). See generally Eli Greenbaum, Puzzles of the Zero-Rate 
Royalty, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2016), http://ir 
.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1637&context=iplj. 
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rely on promises not to assert essential-patent claims436—as well 
as from SSOs that permit RAND licensing but whose members 
in practice collect royalties on few, if any, standards.437 The 
availability of these important, royalty-free technology sources 
is a factor in evaluating the threatened “disincentivization” and 
massive resistance against the policies reflected in the IEEE 
2015 Patent Policy update. 
Finally, the disincentivization argument is pure ipse dixit, 
for no analysis of comparative rates of return on alternative 
investment opportunities is offered. Nor is any empirical support 
provided.438 The rhetoric of “Incentivize me or I’ll defect” is 
completely unsupported and therefore not credible. 
E. LEGAL SYMMETRY 
One final, more subtle—perhaps the most elaborately and 
thoroughly conceived—argument for awarding SEP owners the 
value of network effects should be considered. Professors 
Siebrasse and Cotter make a complex, theoretical argument to 
justify the entitlement of SEP owners to a share of the surplus 
that standardization creates, up to the entirety of network value, 
as a matter of justice (equal treatment and legal symmetry) and 
on grounds of furthering economic efficiency.439 
                                                          
 436. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is such a group. IETF 
strongly prefers to use unpatented or royalty-free technologies, but allows its 
working groups to adopt technology with a commitment of RAND terms, or even 
with no licensing commitment, when that technology is superior enough (and 
sufficiently cost-justified) to unpatented and royalty-free alternatives. See 
generally Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization, 
and the Internet, 93 DENVER L. REV. 855, 867–74 (2016), http://www.iilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Contreras-A-Tale-of-Two-Layers-Patents-
Standardization-and-the-Internet.pdf. 
 437. See Biddle et al., supra note 247, at 2. This study found that 22% of 
standards used for laptops were developed under royalty-free policies. See id. 
fig.2. 
 438. See POHLMANN, supra note 343, at 12–13 (finding no decline in 
participation in IEEE standardization). 
 439. Their arguments are developed both in Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 
20, and in Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35. See also Norman V. Siebrasse & 
Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in 
Patent Litigation, 68 FLA. L. REV. 929 (2016), http://www.floridalawreview.com 
/wp-content/uploads/1-Siebrasse-Cotter.pdf, in which the authors describe their 
methodology more generally when it is applied to patent infringement without 
particular emphasis on SEPs and standardization. The New Framework article, 
however, is more concerned with how best to calculate a reasonable royalty than 
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They begin by disaggregating the surplus into components. 
The first is network effects, mainly the increase in end-user 
interconnectivity because of interoperability, but also such other 
effects as reduction of manufacturing costs resulting from 
economies of scale.440 The other major component is a group of 
“evil” values of one sort or another, mainly sunk cost holdup, as 
well as disproportionate capture of value by opportunistic SEP 
owners that have made only minor contributions to the 
technology of the standard.441 They say that the evil values are 
cancelled out by their SEP owner reward methodology.442 They 
                                                          
with (as the present Article is) the justifications advanced for awarding the 
values of standardization (particularly network effect value) to one or another 
stakeholder. 
 440. This component may also include reduced transaction costs associated 
with repeated, less diverse transactions, and intangible social benefits such as 
increased innovation and increased competition. It is unclear from their 
analysis whether they assign to this category the sales-enhancement prestige 
effects of anointment of equipment that result from attaching to it the label or 
imprimatur of the standard—as in the case of the 802.11g TI-Intersil contest. 
See supra discussion and sources cited at note 22. This value should be 
considered, because it can be significantly rewarding to a seller. Id. A related 
value that probably is or should be included here is facilitating sales of 
complementary products as in the case of the Windows operating system 
software. Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 20. To be sure, these values go to 
relevant SEP owners automatically, and no one appears to object to that or to 
propose to prevent it—beyond the case law requirement that royalties awarded 
in patent infringement suits will conform to the body of law described in such 
cases as CSIRO. See supra text accompanying notes 266–72. 
 441. It is unclear to which category they assign non-sunk cost holdup, i.e., 
the “surge” value due to exploitation of the monopoly power standardization 
confers on a SEP, unless that power is cabined by FRAND or some other 
mechanism, and is not due to the exploitation of sunk costs. See supra text 
accompanying notes 27–34. They may consider this value a legitimate part of 
the value of standardization, to which SEP owners have a claim. For example, 
they state:  
The broader definition of holdup that is more commonly used by the 
courts encompasses anything that allows a SEP owner to charge more 
after adoption of the standard (ex-post) than it could have charged 
before (ex-ante). This includes increased value due to network effects 
if the standard is widely adopted . . . .  
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 20, at 368. 
 442. Although the authors insist that, according to economic theory, their 
methodology will eliminate sunk cost holdup, it is not clear that their 
methodology will in fact succeed in doing that. However, that may not be a 
concern, for they emphasize that their approach “probably cannot be directly 
implemented in practice,” and their goal is only to “provide[] a principled way 
of interpreting the valuation principles articulated” in the IEEE Patent Policy 
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disclaim providing any holdup values to SEP owners, not 
because they believe holdup is unfair or dishonest, but because 
it is inefficient: risk of becoming subjected to holdup would 
discourage implementers from making socially valuable 
investments that might make them vulnerable to holdup, and 
the prospect of the rewards of sunk cost holdup would induce 
patentees to overinvest in developing patents to capture (in troll-
like manner) implementers’ sunk costs.443 
They find it intuitively unfair that users of the technology 
employed in a standard should capture all of the network value 
of standardization when the users, in contrast to the SEP 
owners, have “contributed nothing at all to the development of 
that technology.”444 Therefore, they say, the SEP owner is 
entitled to capture the “properly defined” part of the value of 
standardization (such as the network value).445 
They contend that the Federal Circuit and the IEEE Patent 
Policy mistakenly assume, when insisting that a reasonable 
royalty must be limited to the “value of the technology,” that 
what constitutes the “value of the technology” is self-evident. 
The authors insist that the value of any given technology is the 
value of its functionality to its users.446 For example, they say, 
the value of Wi-Fi to users of that technology, whether 
consumers or manufacturers, would be the same irrespective of 
whether that bundle of technology emerged from the IEEE 
802.11 multi-actor process or from a single inventive 
entrepreneur, such as the inventors Charles Steinmetz or Nikola 
Tesla, or for that matter a single inventive corporate entity such 
as Bell Labs.447 They insist that it is impossible conceptually to 
separate the respective contributions to the value of 
standardization of the value of network due to interoperability 
                                                          
and such recent Federal Circuit cases as Ericsson and CSIRO. Siebrasse & 
Cotter, supra note 35, at 1169. 
 443. Id. at 1190. 
 444. Id. at 1179. But creation of technology is not creation of standardization 
or creation of the standard. See supra text following note 421. 
 445. Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1201. 
 446. Id. at 1202 (“In our view, ‘the value of the technology’ is simply the 
value of the technology to users; or more precisely, the value of the functionality 
provided by the patented technology.”). 
 447. Id. 
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and the value of the technology itself.448 To the user of 
technology they are all one and the same; they are all one 
undifferentiated aggregate. 
Thus, the authors deny that the pre-standardization and 
post-standardization (i.e., ex-ante and ex-post) values or market 
prices of a patent or patented product can be meaningfully 
compared. They assert that strategic conduct and the 
anticipation of the possibility of gain from standardization 
anointment make it impossible; this so distorts the ex-ante price 
that it cannot be determined properly, leaving the only accurate 
price the ex-post price.449 At the very least, they say, the ex-post 
value of an invention to its users provides a sounder and more 
accurate basis for determining the value of patented 
technology.450 Therefore, one should give up on trying to 
determine reasonable royalty solely on the basis of ex-ante value 
or the so-called value of the technology itself, because there is a 
mystery factor operating that keeps us from ever grasping 
(shades of the Heisenberg principle and Schrödinger’s cat) the 
real ex-ante value.451 
This seems to be an overstatement. Clearly, LTE patents 
were worth more in the licensing marketplace after LTE’s 
                                                          
 448. Id. at 1202–03 (“But it is conceptually impossible to separate the 
contribution of the technology and the contribution of the network effects, 
unless we say that the value of the technology is the value when there are no 
network effects at all.”). 
 449. They suggest also that there is some hypocrisy in the courts’ purporting 
to reject all reference to ex-post values, since courts accept the commonly used 
running royalty, which in its total must be based on the product of price and 
sales volume. Sales volume necessarily increases if the standard is successful, 
so that total royalty increases ex-post. Id. at 1220 (“[A]ny running royalty in 
which the amount owing to the patentee increases with total sales will reflect 
in large part the increased value of the technology due to standardization”). 
Therefore, they say, even those who assert “that the SEP owner is not entitled 
to capture the value arising on standardization . . . cannot mean that the 
patentee is not entitled to any part of the value arising from network effects.” 
Id. This argument shows, however, only that SEP owners are generally 
conceded the right to enjoy the volume effect on their revenues. Cf. Teece & 
Sherry, supra note 393 (asserting that excluding SEP owners’ right to volume 
effect on revenues is a problem with new IEEE policies). But the fact that SEP 
owners are conceded to have the right to profit from volume effects does not 
logically entail their right to profit from network effects. 
 450. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1202. 
 451. Id. at 1176–78; 1201–02 (asserting that an intuitive valuation of a 
technology’s value is impossible even in a simple example). 
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proponent (Qualcomm) defeated the proponents of IEEE 802.16 
(WiMAX) for 4G standardization, and WiMAX patents were 
probably less valuable ex-post. Moreover, its CDMA patents 
became vastly more valuable to Qualcomm after it persuaded 
TIA to adopt it as standard over rival technologies. The same 
would apply to contests over de facto standards. A Betamax 
license for manufacturing videotape players, and the Betamax 
videotape players themselves, must have commanded a lower 
market price after VHS triumphed over Betamax—and vice 
versa for VHS prices. It ought to be possible to determine such 
matters approximately, if it is indeed relevant to do so. 
But is it really necessary to know exactly or accurately what 
the surge is from ex-ante to ex-post?452 We generally have an 
approximate idea of what a total reasonable royalty is for a 
standard-compliant product, on the basis of “what the traffic will 
bear,” which is usually considerably less than the sum of 
individually and separately calculated reasonable royalties. 
When one is obliged to apportion royalties among many SEPs, 
as is usually the case for high-tech products,453 it would seem 
reasonable to assume that the mystery factor operates more or 
less equally on all of the SEPs. Hence, if one allocates the total 
reasonable royalty for a standard-compliant product among all 
the relevant SEPs, according to their respective technical merits, 
as the district courts seem to have been doing,454 when they were 
                                                          
 452. The Federal Circuit instructs that great precision in determining 
reasonable royalties is unnecessary. See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, 
767 F.3d 1308, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted) (“[W]e have 
long acknowledged that any reasonable royalty analysis necessarily involves an 
element of approximation and uncertainty.”). 
 453. See supra text accompanying notes 247–48, 277. 
 454. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *73 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). In that case the district court 
considered the fact that there are “at least 92 entities that own 802.11 SEPs,” 
so that if each of them sought a royalty equal to Motorola’s “request of 1.15 % 
to 1.73 % of the end-product price” the aggregate sum would add up to far more 
that what the court considered was the upper limit of a possible reasonable 
royalty—because it was a sum that “would exceed the total product price,” 
which could not be a RAND royalty, since it would “make the end-product price 
untenable commercially.” Id. For those reasons, the court considered Motorola’s 
royalty proposal more than the traffic could bear and thus not a reasonable 
royalty. Accordingly, it lowered the royalty to counteract a stacking effect. Id. 
at *86 (“Thus, the fee that results from a hypothetical RAND negotiation is 
necessarily informed by the court considering the entire world of known SEPs 
relevant to a given standard. That ultimate sum must be the aggregate 
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not basing royalties on comparable licenses, and as patent pools 
routinely do in accordance with an agreed-upon formula or with 
the aid of technical experts,455 it does not matter what the exact 
ex-ante prices should have been if the mystery factor had not 
been operating. Because the traffic cannot bear a stacked 
royalty,456 by lowering royalties to a non-stacked level the 
necessary shrinkage and allocation cancels out the effect of the 
mystery factor.457 If that is valid, then the authors’ concern that 
we cannot have a conceptual theory based on ex-ante pricing 
(because, they say, we cannot know the “real” ex-ante value, or 
at least the perceived ex-ante value much more poorly reflects 
the real value of technology to users than the ex-post value does) 
is misplaced, and the conclusions they draw from that concern 
do not follow.458 
There is, therefore, an approximate “shrunk” ex-ante price 
that factors into the reasonable royalty calculation. The ex-ante 
principle of Ericsson and CSIRO then becomes more of a 
philosophical or aspirational principle generally guiding the 
courts, however, rather than an actual procedure for calculating 
a reasonable royalty for a specific patent infringement (a royalty 
which is lowered to some extent because a stacked royalty is 
                                                          
licensing fee of all essential patents calibrated against the principle that license 
fees should not be stacked in such a way that makes implementation of the 
standard prohibitively expensive.”). 
 455. Various patent pools that received business review clearance letters 
from the Department of Justice have used different such royalty-revenue 
allocation arrangements. For example, a DVD6C pool managed by Toshiba used 
an agreed allocation formula based on several factors, including frequency of 
infringement of the patent. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Carey R. Ramos, Counsel for DVD Licensors 7 (June 10, 
1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf. Another common 
procedure, used for example in the MPEG-2 pool, is simply to allocate royalty-
revenue on the basis of the patentee’s percentage of all patents in the pool. See, 
e.g., Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Gerrard R. Beeney, Counsel for MPEG-2 Licensors 3 (June 26, 1997), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/10/17/215742.pdf. 
 456. See Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *72–73. 
 457. The courts’ reluctance to allow stacking tends to limit the permissible 
sum of royalties on a standard-compliant product to less than the arithmetic 
sum of the individual royalties would otherwise be. Thus, a falling tide lowers 
all boats. The fallen-tide, “what the traffic will bear” royalty sum, however, does 
overstate the numbers and to that extent overcompensate SEP owners, because 
it does not add in the value of unpatented technology that provides part of the 
value. In effect, that value gets allocated to the SEP owners’ shares. 
 458. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1201–02. 
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unreasonable).459 And, in any case, the issue over which 
figurative blood is running in the streets is not how in detail to 
calculate a reasonable royalty based on ex-ante value (or 
whether one can do so accurately). Rather, the controversy is 
over whether to base reasonable royalties on an upstream or 
downstream royalty base, and whether to award SEP owners all, 
some, or none of the network value (and related values) that 
standardization generates. 
At this point, it is possible to address the authors’ main 
argument, to which the foregoing analysis leads up. The 
attempted deconstruction of ex-ante pricing is just a foundation 
for advancing the commentators’ proposals to replace it with a 
system (“contingent ex ante pricing”)460 awarding network 
values to SEP owners. The authors address why the network 
effect on a SEP’s value should go in whole or in part to the SEP 
owners.461 They say, correctly, that current US patent law holds 
that a patentee acting alone can charge as high a royalty as he 
wants, or that the market will bear.462 Thus, if Charles 
Steinmetz were unilaterally licensing his patents, he could 
                                                          
 459. This borrows from Siebrasse and Cotter, who say: 
[O]ur proposed approach, like most idealized models, probably cannot 
be directly implemented in practice. It is nonetheless useful as a 
conceptual benchmark for assessing the merits of more practical 
methodologies and comparators, which should serve as proxies for the 
theoretical ideal. Our approach also provides a principled way of 
interpreting the valuation principles articulated in the emerging case 
law, as well as the recently adopted [IEEE Patent Policy] (which, like 
some of the cases cited above [CSIRO, Ericsson] states that a FRAND 
royalty should not include the value resulting from a patent’s inclusion 
in a standard. 
Id. at 1169–70. 
 460. See id. at 1164 n.15 (“[U]nder the contingent ex ante approach the 
patentee is entitled to the value of the patented technology ex ante (that is, prior 
to incurring sunk costs) given that the patent is chosen for inclusion in the 
standard, over the value of the next-best unpatented technology ex ante had 
that technology been chosen for inclusion in the standard.”). 
 461. See id. at 1168. 
 462. Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1178 (“[A] classic example of the 
patent system working the way it should: the patentee invents a valuable 
product, charges what the market will bear and is rewarded accordingly.”); see 
Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) (“A patent empowers the owner to exact 
royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.”); W.L. 
Gore & Assocs. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 623 (3d Cir. 1976) (“The general 
rule is that, absent any overriding unlawful conduct, ‘A patent empowers the 
owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that 
monopoly.’”). 
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charge a royalty that included network value. Yet, so many 
patents are needed to comply with a standard for such a complex 
product as a cell phone that no licensor can provide all the 
necessary technology and patents.463 It is necessary to provide 
would-be implementers with a portfolio of SEPs owned by many 
different SEP holders. Considerations of legal symmetry (i.e., 
giving equal treatment and equal justice to all similarly situated 
SEP owners), they say, dictate that the SEPs of many SEP 
owners combined in such a portfolio may be licensed just as 
Steinmetz’s (or those of a single proprietor of a de facto standard) 
could—that is, at a price that includes the network value.464 It is 
thus unreasonable not to treat all patentees alike.465 They add 
that paying patent owners enough to incentivize them is 
necessary. Otherwise they will defect to other endeavors, 
hampering standardization.466 
For these reasons, the authors suggest a hypothetical model 
of how best to allocate the values of standardization (such as 
network effect value) between users of a standard (i.e., 
implementers) and an SSO having as its members a consortium 
of SEP owners.467 The model contemplates a several-step process 
in which the SEP-owner-SSO would negotiate with user-
implementers ex-ante, for a royalty rate to be used on condition 
that the standard under consideration is adopted.468 This model, 
in allowing a consortium of patentees to license a portfolio of 
SEPs, suggests an arrangement something like the MPEG 
patent pool for digital video and audio technology.469 The authors 
                                                          
 463. RPX estimates that 250,000 patents are relevant to cell phones, but not 
all of them are SEPs. See RPX Corp., supra note 277, at 59. Nonetheless, 
thousands are SEPs. See Mobile Communications, supra note 77. 
 464. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1235–36. 
 465. Id. at 1203–04 (“In our view, the patent system should not discriminate 
between inventions depending on the source of their value to users, but if there 
is an argument to be made for discrimination on that basis, surely network 
effects are not a source of value that should be particularly disfavored.”). 
 466. Id. at 1203 (arguing that, for example, if the owner of an invention that 
greatly increases Wi-Fi speeds “is not entitled to capture any value of 
standardization, there will be a substantially greater incentive to invent 
technologies like [fashion fads] rather than enhanced WLAN, even though the 
social value is the same in either case.”). 
 467. Id. at 1197. 
 468. See id. at 1198. 
 469. See generally MPEG-2 FAQ, supra note 80 (explaining the basics of a 
MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License). 
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believe that this negotiation would result in the SEP owners, 
through a collective bargaining process akin to that established 
under the NLRA,470 capturing a portion of the network value 
that standardization generates, with an upper limit of the entire 
value.471 They believe that the SEP- owner-SSO, acting as whole 
would want and therefore act non-opportunistically in a manner 
to ensure both adequate compensation for themselves and, by 
not setting an excessive royalty level, widespread adoption of the 
standard.472 
This is an ambitious and ingeniously constructed program. 
There are some problems in the details, however. The legal 
symmetry and equal justice argument is based on the premise 
that different patentees (say, Steinmetz compared to Ericsson + 
Nokia + Qualcomm + . . . ) are similarly situated in regard to 
royalty pricing.473 The proposal calls for concerted price 
determination among competitors, in part with the laudable aim 
of avoiding stacking and allocating SEP royalties in a way that 
avoids disproportion.474 It also has the avowed aim of increasing 
SEP royalties to SEP owners, so that all or part of network effect 
value goes to the members of the consortium of SEP owners.475 
A consortium of Ericsson, Nokia, Qualcomm, and so on, 
however, is not the factual or legal equivalent of Charles 
Steinmetz. First, what might be only fair for Steinmetz, the 
individual inventor, confronted by such implementers as Apple, 
Cisco, HP, Microsoft, and Samsung, individually or collectively, 
is not fair for Ericsson + Nokia + Qualcomm + . . .476 The 
symmetry and equal justice argument presupposes similarly 
situated actors. That premise does not apply to the facts. 
Therefore, symmetry and equal justice do not require awarding 
network values in whole or in part to SEP holders. 
                                                          
 470. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (providing employees with the right to engage in 
“concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection”). 
 471. Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 35, at 1198–99, 1205–06. 
 472. Id. at 1207–09. 
 473. Id. at 1239–40. 
 474. Id. at 1238. 
 475. Id. at 1218 (“[I]t is unobjectionable for the patentee to appropriate some 
part of the increased value derived from network effects on standardization.”). 
 476. See pie chart supra note 94 (showing the market share, and thus 
suggesting the bargaining power, of such a hypothetical consortium). 
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Further, under settled principles of US law, concerted price 
determination among SEP holders that are competitors is not 
the same as unilateral price determination.477 The legal 
standard to which a group of actors—whether labeled a 
consortium, joint venture, cartel, or walking conspiracy—is 
subject is less permissive than that for a single actor’s unilateral 
conduct.478 The MPEG pool was cleared in a Department of 
Justice business review letter, because of its procompetitive 
benefits, but the clearance was based on the assurance that 
“contemplated royalty rates are likely to constitute a tiny 
fraction of MPEG-2 products’ prices, at least in the near term.”479 
It was thus anticipated that the effect of the horizontally 
concerted pricing would be to lower total royalties, not raise 
them by awarding network value to SEP owners.480 It is 
extremely unlikely that a proposal with the avowed purpose to 
raise royalties through concerted action among competitors 
                                                          
 477. See, e,g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400–01 (1948) 
(Sherman Act was violated when in cross-licenses “the defendants, constituting 
all former competitors in an entire industry, had acted in concert to restrain 
commerce in an entire industry under patent licenses in order to organize the 
industry and stabilize prices.”); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 
287, 312 (1948) (patent law does not confer on a patentee “authority to combine 
with other patent owners to fix prices on articles covered by the[ir] respective 
patents,” and the Sherman Act prohibits it); United States v. Masonite Corp., 
316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (holding combination of patentees illegal when they 
pooled patents and designated one pool member to determine prices; because 
“there was price-fixing, the fact that there were business reasons which made 
the arrangements desirable to the [defendants] . . . or the fact that from other 
points of view the arrangements might be deemed to have desirable 
consequences would be no more a legal justification for price-fixing than were 
the ‘competitive evils’ in the Socony-Vacuum case.”). 
 478. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (“The supreme evil of antitrust [is] collusion.”); 
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) 
(“[P]rivate standard-setting associations have traditionally been objects of 
antitrust scrutiny.”); Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–
69 (1984) (citations omitted) (“Section 1 of the Sherman Act [prohibits 
anticompetitive agreements] between separate entities. It does not reach 
conduct that is ‘wholly unilateral.’ Concerted activity subject to § 1 is judged 
more sternly than unilateral activity . . . . The reason Congress treated 
concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior is readily 
appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. 
It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision making that 
competition assumes and demands.”). 
 479. Letter from Joel I. Klein to Carey R. Ramos, supra note 455, at 11. 
 480. Id. at 11–15. 
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would similarly receive clearance, or survive a litigation 
challenge,481 nor should it.482 Therefore, to the extent, if any, 
that concerted price-setting is necessary in order to avoid run-
away stacking and disproportion, in the course of awarding 
network values to SEP owners, the project cannot pass legal 
muster. 
The incentivization argument is also subject to question. It 
does not consider the many non-royalty benefits to a SEP owner 
of anointment in a standard that Part I discusses,483 or the 
possible availability to implementers of alternative sources of 
technology.484 These factors may well provide a sufficient basis 
to deter SEP holder defection. And even if the risk of defection 
threatened to harm the standardization process gravely, that 
would not save a horizontal agreement to raise royalty rates to 
a non-ruinous level.485 Agreements among patentees to prevent 
allegedly harmful competition have fared badly in the courts for 
at least a century.486 
For these reasons, whatever are the merits of contingent ex-
ante pricing in general, this carefully constructed argument that 
allocating at least some network value to SEP owners is 
necessary to be fair to them and to provide adequate incentives 
                                                          
 481. See cases cited supra note 477. 
 482. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 
(2007) (“A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers . . . to increase 
price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful.”). 
 483. See text and citations, supra notes 15–19. 
 484. Supra text accompanying notes 435–37. 
 485. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 346 (1982) (quoting 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940)) (“Congress 
has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing 
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the 
age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-
fixing conspiracies.”); United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir. 
2015) (citations omitted) (“[T]he Sherman Act does not authorize horizontal 
price conspiracies as a form of marketplace vigilantism to eliminate perceived 
‘ruinous competition’ or other ‘competitive evils.’ Indeed, the attempt to justify 
a conspiracy to raise prices ‘on the basis of the potential threat that competition 
poses . . . is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the 
Sherman Act.’”); Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1152 
n.24 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If there is any argument the Sherman Act indisputably 
forecloses, it is that price fixing is necessary to save companies from losses they 
would suffer in a competitive market.”). 
 486. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 41, 48 
(1912). 
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to keep them from defecting from standardization does not make 
a persuasive case. 
———  
 
The arguments for awarding SEP holders some or all of the 
surplus that standardization generates should be evaluated in 
terms of the likelihood that the factual assumptions that 
underlie them are well supported. The assertion that failure 
adequately to incentivize SEP owners by paying them ex-post, 
downstream royalties will result in defection simply is 
inconsistent with such empirical data as the existence of 
Bluetooth, USB, and HTML, as well as the collateral benefits of 
anointment that visibly cause patent owners to vie for the 
chrism of standardization for their products, even to the point of 
dedicating their patent rights to implementers in order to gain 
it. At the very least, the reality of the threatened defection and 
consequent loss of future technology for standardization is not 
proved. The moral argument also fails because creating 
technology is not equivalent to creating standardization and its 
benefits. 
F. THE END IS NOT IN SIGHT 
Thus far, the group of major SEP holders—such SEP 
holders as Qualcomm, Ericsson, InterDigital, and Nokia—have 
not receded from their position that they will not yield to the 
2015 Patent Policy. It has been observed, “It remains to be seen 
how the IEEE will respond to these statements,” so that if the 
IEEE also sticks to its position, “[t]here clearly is a possibility 
for ‘brinkmanship’ and/or inefficiency (avoiding the use of 
societally-beneficial patented technology).”487 However, the 
strength of the threat of withdrawal from the standard-setting 
process depends on how essential, as a practical matter, the 
future technology of present SEP owners will be. If alternative 
technologies will continue to be available, as some have 
                                                          
 487. Teece & Sherry, supra note 393, at 11; see also Richard Lloyd, One Year 
on and the IEEE’s Controversial Patent Policy Changes Continue to Divide 
Technology Companies, IAM (May 16, 2016), http://www.iam-media.com 
/Magazine/Issue/78/Insights/One-year-on-and-the-IEEEs-controversial-patent-
policy-changes-continue-to (“Effectively, the situation is at an impasse.”). 
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claimed,488 the threat to withdraw from the standardization 
process will be empty. Then the technology of future 6G, 7G, and 
802.11zzzz will embody the competing alternative technologies, 
and the 2015 Patent Policy will fully apply. SEP holder 
spokesmen, however, predict the death or maiming of 
standardization.489 Whether that happens involves the 
prediction of future events.490 The answer will come from the 
facts yet to emerge, not the present rhetoric of those who oppose 
or support the 2015 Patent Policy update. 
One commentator, Darryl Lim, sees this controversy as a 
“convergence of technologies and a divergence of interests,”491 
and this applies particularly to smartphones. Traditional 
industry boundaries have been shattered between such hitherto 
disparate industries as software and wireless 
telecommunications, drawing such once unlikely rivals as Apple, 
Cisco, Huawei, Microsoft, Nokia, Qualcomm, and Samsung into 
a collision course. These companies “exist at different points on 
the value chain, and have different incentives. For instance, a 
handset maker views patent royalties as a cost,” but a SEP-
owner firm may view them “as a source of revenue.”492 Therefore, 
                                                          
 488. In Ericsson the court observed, “When a technology is incorporated into 
a standard, it is typically chosen from among different options. Once 
incorporated and widely adopted, that technology is not always used because it 
is the best or the only option; it is used because its use is necessary to comply 
with the standard.” Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014). See also J.S. Greenfield, supra note 21 (“There are two classes of 
standard essential patents: those that would be essential to any possible 
standard, regardless of design choices, and those that are essential to a 
particular standard, on the basis of design choices made in creating the 
standard. Most SEPs fall into the latter category.”). 
 489. See, e.g., Teece & Sherry, supra note 393, at 13; Katznelson, IEEE 
Controversial Policy, supra note 342; Sidak, supra note 271, at 1865–67. 
 490. See Gregory K. Leonard, Reflections on the Debates Surrounding 
Standard-Essential Patents, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2015, at 2, http://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug15_leonard
_7_21f.pdf (“In light of the ambiguity of the theoretical models, empirical 
analysis is needed to sort out whether changing the balance between innovators 
and implementers would increase or decrease innovation. . . . Importantly, 
scant empirical evidence exists regarding whether innovation is, or has been, at 
the optimal level.”). 
 491. Daryl Lim, Patent Holdups, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
ANTITRUST, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND HIGH TECH 245 (Roger D. Blair and 
Daniel D. Sokol eds., 2017). 
 492. Id. Moreover, different patent-owning actors may have competing 
business models that threaten one another’s operation. For example, after 
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Lim argues, one’s perception of the antagonists in the 
controversy depends on one’s “ideological point of view, much 
like how one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”493 
Thus, in the 802.11 standoff Qualcomm and its allies threaten 
the IEEE with secessionist brinkmanship, and they contend the 
IEEE Patent Policy will “deter innovators who would otherwise 
invest more heavily in new technologies,” leading to the death of 
802.11 standardization progress.494 Lim concludes, “As with 
many things in life, the truth can be complicated and each choice 
comes with its own set of tradeoffs.”495 That is an 
understatement: the truth is not only complicated; it is elusive—
a scarcely visible, inconstant, distant star. 
The question of who should own the value that 
standardization creates—for example, for smartphones—is 
answerable (if at all) only after a series of difficult factual 
determinations and in the wake of a series of value judgments 
that the different stakeholders will dispute. The fact issues 
largely have already been suggested. The value judgments, 
although unarticulated, may already be implicit. Is there a 
deficit of smartphone innovation that we need or desire to see 
remedied? Would the wealth transfer to SEP owners be effective 
                                                          
Google acquired the Motorola portfolio of telecommunications patents, it 
adopted a policy of distributing the Android operating system for cell phones 
freely, in order to encourage widespread adoption of the software to facilitate 
the sale of cheap cell phones and the development of collateral markets for 
Google’s Android-related application software. This posed a threat, however, to 
Microsoft’s business model, which was based on generating revenue from selling 
its Windows operating system to OEMs, and to Apple’s business model, which 
was based on selling expensive iPhones and keeping its software proprietary. 
The different business goals of these companies led them into smartphone war 
against one another, now largely subsided due to regulatory action (and 
superseded by the current smartphone controversy in which former adversaries 
Apple and Microsoft are allied against Qualcomm). See John D. Harkrider, 
Seeing the Forest Through the SEPs, 27 ANTITRUST 22, 25–28 (2013); see also 
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 20. 
 493. Lim, supra note 491, at 22. 
 494. Id. The controversy seems to be confined to 802.11 Wi-Fi, and does not 
extend even to the many other IEEE standardization activities affected by the 
2015 Patent Policy update. See Lloyd, supra note 487 (“One point that the policy 
proponents emphasise is that IEEE standards cover a far broader range of 
technology than simply Wi-Fi. ‘Nobody at IEEE feels under pressure to review 
the policy because it’s non-controversial in 99% of what they do,’ insists Gil 
Ohana senior director for anti-trust and competition at Cisco.”); cf. Lim, supra 
note 491, at 22. 
 495. Lim, supra note 491, at 22. 
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to increase smartphone innovation to a higher and more 
desirable level? Are the other commercial incentives that 
motivate technology creators to gain standardization 
anointment for their technology already sufficient to create as 
much inventive incentive as is socially desirable? That is, are 
other economic incentives (such as value of head start) operating 
at a level sufficiently high that the proposed wealth transfer 
would not significantly increase incentivization at all,496 much 
less by an amount producing a socially desired result? Even 
assuming that the wealth transfer from smartphone buyers to 
SEP owners would bring about greater technological progress in 
smartphones that prospective smartphone buyers would desire 
(faster video downloads, shorter connection delays, speedier 
transmittals of selfies to one’s friends, the Internet of Things),497 
is spending that amount an investment that smartphone buyers 
(or society) would prefer to make, in order to gain such 
smartphone advances, rather than spending that in acquiring 
other possible goods and services (such as housing, food, 
clothing, vacations, and so on)? The debate has not so far 
addressed these issues directly, nor is it likely to. Instead, 
unarticulated assumptions prevail. 
It is not only the SEP holders who rely on unarticulated 
assumptions. When the Federal Circuit in the CSIRO case 
asserts that reasonable royalties “must not include any value 
flowing to the patent from the standard’s adoption” because 
“[w]ithout this rule, patentees would receive all of the benefit 
created by standardization—benefit that would otherwise flow 
to consumers and businesses practicing the standard,” the court 
assumes without explanation that consumers and businesses 
                                                          
 496. See supra note 22 (discussing the 802.11g contest between Intersil and 
TI that was driven to such an extent by the desire to sell equipment using the 
patent owners’ technology that the patent owners agreed to royalty-free licenses 
for implementers in order to sell the equipment). 
 497. See generally 5G – Advantages & Disadvantages, TUTORIALS POINT, 
https://www.tutorialspoint.com/5g/5g_advantages_disadvantages.htm (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2017) (cataloging the possible advantages of 5G and IoT—such as 
multitasking while talking on the telephone with another person (e.g., 
simultaneously chatting and checking weather and location); attending classes 
and lectures at remote locations; doctors’ treating patients at remote locations; 
governmental organizations’ more easily monitoring and investigating, 
anywhere). 
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implementing the standard should be the ones to whom the 
benefits of standardization flow.498 
Yet, as SEP-owner spokesmen say, why should the gains 
from standardization all flow to implementers, and none to 
patent holders?499 Sidak makes this argument in more detail 
and with more fervor, in a lengthy criticism of the Federal 
Circuit’s Ericsson decision: 
Those who believe that a FRAND royalty should not include any of 
the standard’s value assume that SEP holders that have contributed 
to the creation of the standard’s value should not capture any of that 
value. Implicit in that assumption is the idea that the implementers 
are entitled to capture the entirety of the surplus that is not passed 
on to consumers. What normative principle makes implementers 
worthier claimants to the producer surplus (or, more properly, seller 
surplus) from the standard than SEP holders, without whose 
inventions no standard would exist? No economic or normative 
justification supports the assumption that all of the seller surplus 
from the standard should accrue to the implementers. Without the 
SEP holder’s contribution to the value of the standard, the 
implementer’s profit from the sale of the end product that practices 
the standard would not exist. There is no economically sound reason 
to deny an SEP holder any portion of the value of the standard that it 
helped to create.500 
One implementer provides an answer of sorts: “the 
standards process exists not to enrich a few patent holders, but 
rather to simplify product introduction and interoperability for 
consumers around the world.”501 But then one must ask whether 
this proposition is self-evident. To paraphrase Sidak, what 
                                                          
 498. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (CSIRO), 
809 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 499. See. e.g., Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Innovators, Implementers, and 
Two-sided Hold-up, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2015, at 4–5, 10, http://www 
.mikeshor.com/research/antitrust /antitrustsource.pdf (criticizing DOJ and 
IEEE Patent Policy for their focus on the smallest saleable patent-practicing 
unit principle, because, in his view, “if a patent provides even a dollar of 
incremental value to the implementer beyond what is reflected in the smallest 
component, then that is a dollar that economic efficiency would require the 
innovator to appropriate in part” and, further, for “assuming that economic 
rents above those in the smallest component should flow primarily to the 
implementer of the end product” rather than to SEP owners. Froeb and Shor 
conclude that “basing royalties on the smallest salable component [poses] the 
risk of under-rewarding innovators for their investments” and “is likely to 
retard innovation, reduce incentives to participate in standards, and [thus] 
reduce economic welfare.”); Teece & Sherry, supra note 393, at 6–7. 
 500. Sidak, supra note 271, at 1867. 
 501. Chandler & Ohana, supra note 335 (emphasis added). 
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normative principle makes consumers worthier claimants?502 
Perhaps, the dispositive normative principle is that the right 
rule is that which should bring about the greatest amount of 
good for the greatest number, attributed to Mill.503 We can 
explore, then, the ramifications of accepting utilitarianism as 
the Prime Directive. 
G. APPLICATION OF UTILITARIAN THEORY 
When SEP-holder spokesmen argue there is no principled 
reason the surplus that standardization creates should go to 
implementers rather than to SEP owners,504 they are quite right, 
in a very limited sense. Under true utilitarian principles, the 
surplus should go to neither SEP owners nor implementers, but 
instead should go farther down the distribution chain to the far 
more numerous consumers.505 The unfairness charge in FTC v. 
Qualcomm may also rest in part on the claimed unfairness to 
consumers of exacting SEP royalties far in excess of FRAND 
rates, which causes higher smartphone prices when passed down 
                                                          
 502. See Sidak, supra note 271, at 1867. 
 503. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (George Sher ed., 2002) (1861) 
(“Actions are right to the degree that they tend to promote the greatest good for 
the greatest number.”); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, Preface to A COMMENT ON 
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. 
Hart eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1776) (“[T]his fundamental axiom, it 
is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right 
and wrong.”); FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR 
IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND VIRTUE IN TWO TREATISES, Treatise 2, Section III (VIII) 
at 180 (2d ed. 1729) (“[T]hat Action is best, which procures the greatest 
Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, 
occasions Misery.”). 
 504. See Sidak, supra note 271, at 1867. 
 505. According to comScore, 198.9 million Americans owned smartphones at 
the beginning of 2016. ComScore Reports February 2016 U.S. Smartphone 
Subscriber Market Share, COMSCORE.COM (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.comscore 
.com/Insights/Rankings/comScore-Reports-February-2016-US-Smartphone-
Subscriber-Market-Share. As of January 2017, 77% of American adults owned 
smartphones, and 95% of American adults had cell phones of some kind. Mobile 
Fact Sheet, supra note 47. For persons aged 18 to 44, smartphone ownership 
runs from 96% to 98%. Millennials Are Top Smartphone Users, supra note 47. 
Statista makes an estimate of 224 million US smartphone users in 2017. 
Number of Smartphone Users in the United States from 2010 to 2022, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/201182/forecast-of-smartphone-users-in-
the-us/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
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the distribution chain.506 In the Sperry & Hutchinson case, the 
Supreme Court endorsed the concept of a pure unfairness 
case.507 The principal unfairness alleged was a practice that 
oppressed consumers and burdened them with higher grocery 
prices by forcing trading stamps on them, when they could have 
preferred to spend the cost of stamps on necessities, such as 
clothing for their children, rather than “redeem” stamps for 
S&H’s luxury goods.508 Implicit in such a theory of unfairness, 
when it is applied to the allegations of FTC v. Qualcomm, is that 
the royalties Qualcomm exacts are not fair and reasonable 
because they unfairly hijack the value of standardization away 
from consumers to whom they rightfully should flow. 
Similarly, the Apple complaint in Apple v. Qualcomm 
argues that Qualcomm should not commandeer the value of 
standardization by charging royalties for its SEPs far in excess 
of FRAND rates, and Apple implies that if Qualcomm is required 
to charge Apple only FRAND royalties, that decrease in Apple’s 
costs will trickle down to the public in the form of lower 
smartphone prices.509 That may be implicit, also, in the Federal 
                                                          
 506. See FTC Complaint, supra note 11, at 1 (“Qualcomm has engaged in 
exclusionary conduct that . . . raises prices paid by consumers for cell phones 
and tablets.”); id. at 63 (“These higher all-in prices . . . raise handset prices paid 
by consumers.”); id. at 87 (“The tax thereby maintains Qualcomm’s monopoly 
power and raises handset prices paid by consumers.”); id. at 136 (“Qualcomm’s 
anticompetitive practices have . . . increased consumer prices . . . .”). 
 507. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 248 (1972) (endorsing 
the unfairness doctrine in principle, but finding the FTC’s decision defective, 
because the alleged unfairness was not properly supported by linkage in the 
Commission’s opinion between findings and conclusions). 
 508. The practice was said to work “to the detriment of consumers on whom 
ultimately falls the burden of paying for trading stamps.” Sperry & Hutchinson 
Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146, 152 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., dissenting). “A 
substantial number of retailers admit that they cannot offset the costs of stamps 
at all except by passing the cost on to the consumer in the form of higher prices.” 
Id. at 152 n.3. “The housewife cannot decline to save stamps; she is virtually 
forced to do so. . . . [T]he housewife must submit to the collecting of trading 
stamps.” Id. “[F]airness to consumers requires that they should have the right 
to dispose of stamps that came to them with their purchases of goods and 
services.” Id. at 155. “S&H’s suppressive activities have a detrimental effect on 
consumers . . . .” Id. at 156. 
 509. Apple Complaint, supra note 12, at 1–3 (describing how Qualcomm’s 
alleged practices increase Apple’s costs whenever it improves its devices in ways 
that are popular with consumers). Unlike SEP holders, implementers such as 
Apple do not come out blatantly and say they are entitled to the surplus that 
standardization creates. They appear to be content to rest by suggestion and 
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Circuit’s oblique statement in the CSIRO case that the benefits 
of standardization should flow to implementers and consumers 
rather than to SEP owners.510 The court may assume without 
articulation that benefits that flow to implementers will 
continue to flow down the distribution chain to consumers.511 
Whether a decrease in implementers’ costs will indeed flow down 
to consumers (here, smartphone buyers) depends on a number of 
unmentioned factors—in particular, whether the market is 
sufficiently competitive to compel that to happen,512 instead of 
letting implementers simply pocket the money.513 
There are serious practical and political problems, however, 
in validating a consumer claim to the monetary benefits of 
standardization that is more forceful than merely hopeful. The 
general consumer public does not have a seat at the table when 
                                                          
implication on the trickle-down theory, or just prefer discreet silence. Cf. supra 
citations and text accompanying note 384. 
 510. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (CSIRO), 
809 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Without this rule [that patentees are 
entitled to the value of the invention, and not value accruing because of 
standardization], patentees would receive all of the benefit created by 
standardization—benefit that would otherwise flow to consumers and 
businesses practicing the standard.”). 
 511. Sidak speaks of implementers capturing the surplus resulting from 
standardization, and then not passing “the entirety of the surplus . . . on to 
consumers.” Sidak, supra note 271, at 1867. 
 512. The smartphone market presently tends to be an oligopoly, indeed a 
duopoly or near duopoly between Apple and Samsung. According to comScore, 
in January 2017 Apple had a 44% market share and Samsung had 28%. The 
next seller had approximately 10%. See Adam Ismail, Apple, LG Rise in U.S. 
Smartphone Market Share as Samsung Falters, Report Says, DIGITAL TRENDS 
(Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/us-smartphone-market-
share-january-2017/. Legal precedent supports the conclusion that such a 
market structure is an oligopoly. See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 
229, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding it proper to presume “that Visa U.S.A. and 
MasterCard, jointly and separately, have power within the market for network 
services” where “Visa U.S.A. members accounted for approximately 47% of the 
dollar volume of credit and charge card transactions, while MasterCard 
members accounted for approximately 26%.”). Those market share percentages 
are close to those for Apple and Samsung. This is not to suggest that Apple and 
Samsung are engaged in wrongdoing; the market share data simply suggest a 
market structure such that competitive forces may not at this time compel a 
trickle-down effect. But see Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Joshua D. Wright, 
Intellectual Property and Standard Setting, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 52, 57 
n.48 (2016) (contending that the smartphone market is unconcentrated). 
 513. In that event, the consumer is left to complain and curse like Mercutio, 
in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 3, sc. 1. 
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SSOs operate,514 nor does it have much real representation in 
the organs of government. It therefore remains problematic that 
the general consumer public could succeed in capturing the 
monetary value of network effect or other related values, other 
than fortuitously. 
CONCLUSION 
The question posed by the title of this Article cannot be 
answered persuasively without answering an expanding, fractal 
universe of other questions—what is the good, which goods are 
greater than others, are the values of the different goods 
incommensurate, will the Internet of Things bring about less or 
more examined lives—in saecula saeculorum. If one makes the 
assumptions that have been suggested tentatively in the 
preceding discussion, one can conclude, as the Federal Circuit 
decisions imply and the FTC seems also to believe, that the 
monetary benefits of standardization belong to the public and 
not to SEP owners. Nor do they properly belong to implementers, 
who are, however, a necessary conduit for the benefits to flow 
down (if they will) to the public. There does not appear to be any 
legal mechanism by which the public could pry the monetary 
benefits of standardization out of the hands of implementers, if 
those implementers gain them under CSIRO and then decide to 
hold on to them. The public can hope, however, that competitive 
or rivalrous market forces will cause a reasonable share of those 
benefits to trickle down to consumers such as buyers of 
smartphones. 
Even without that to-be-hoped-for trickle-down effect, the 
antitrust suits of the FTC and KFTC (and perhaps other foreign 
regulatory agencies) against Qualcomm might embolden Intel, 
Samsung, and perhaps others515 to infringe Qualcomm’s CDMA 
                                                          
 514. This is so despite the lofty, aspirational sentiments described supra in 
text accompanying note 421. SSOs may at times succumb to a type of regulatory 
capture. See Liu, supra note 421. In two reported cases, companies controlled 
and manipulated SSOs to exclude competitive technology. See Am. Soc’y of 
Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. 
Peoples Gas Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). 
 515. Intel and Samsung have already publicly accused Qualcomm of the 
monopolistic patent abuse charged in FTC v. Qualcomm, asserting that they 
have been victims of Qualcomm’s exclusionary practices. See Florian Mueller, 
Intel Supports FTC Against Qualcomm, Says Antitrust Investigations Enabled 
Its New Deal with Apple, FOSS PATENTS (May 16, 2017), http://www 
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SEPs in order to manufacture and sell backward-compatible 4G 
smartphones.516 Or some other firms might even be emboldened 
to bring essential-facility cases517 to compel Qualcomm to sell to 
them, on a RAND basis, its premium-tier LTE/CDMA baseband 
processor chipsets, and thus pry open and fragment the now-
                                                          
.fosspatents.com/2017/05/intel-supports-ftc-against-qualcomm.html 
(“[R]egulatory action apparently paved the way for private-sector action.”); 
Florian Mueller, Samsung Joins the Fray, Supports FTC Against Qualcomm: 
“Directly Harmed” in Two Capacities, FOSS PATENTS (May 13, 2017), http:// 
www.fosspatents.com/2017/05/samsung-joins-fray-supports-ftc-against.html 
(“Apple is still the only private-sector plaintiff against Qualcomm on antitrust 
grounds (not the first one, but the only one at the moment). But Apple is not 
alone among device makers. . . . Samsung stresses [that it] ‘is both Qualcomm’s 
customer (as a handset supplier) and Qualcomm’s potential competitor (as a 
manufacturer and potential seller of chipsets). In both capacities, Samsung has 
directly experienced, and been directly harmed by, the exclusionary conduct 
alleged in the FTC’s Complaint’”). Intel and Samsung have filed amicus curiae 
briefs in favor of Apple in opposition to a Qualcomm motion to dismiss in Apple 
v. Qualcomm, accusing Qualcomm of wrongdoing, and arguing that the FTC’s 
case is meritorious. Chance Miller, FTC Again Says Qualcomm is a Monopoly 
as Samsung Files Amicus Brief in Support, 9TO5MAC (May 13, 2017), 
https://9to5mac.com/2017/05/13/ftc-samsung-apple-monopoly-suit/; see also 
Florian Mueller, Intel Supports FTC Against Qualcomm, Says Antitrust 
Investigations Enabled Its New Deal with Apple, FOSS PATENTS (May 16, 2017), 
http://www.fosspatents.com/2017/05/intel-supports-ftc-against-qualcomm.html 
(predicting that in litigation, “regulatory action apparently paved the way for 
private-sector action.”). Intel and Samsung may have already begun 
manufacturing such infringing 4G chips. 
 516. Such potential litigants would rely on CSIRO, Ericsson, and similar 
cases, supra section V.C, to obtain a ruling for FRAND-priced royalties on 
Qualcomm’s SEPs. 
 517. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Under 
the essential facility doctrine, a firm controlling a facility essential to market 
participation may be required to sell to would-be competitors. See generally 
James R. Ratner, Should There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 327 (1988). The district court in the FTC case against Qualcomm 
has suggested this possibility, in denying Qualcomm’s motion to dismiss the 
case for failure to state a claim. The court ruled that the FTC pleaded a viable 
case under the antitrust laws that Qualcomm is not entitled to refuse to license 
its chip manufacturer competitors. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-
LHK, 2017 WL 2774406, at *83–84 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (“[T]he Court finds 
that FTC has adequately alleged that, under the circumstances presented here, 
Qualcomm violated a duty to deal in refusing to license its FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs to its modem chips competitors. Thus, FTC has adequately alleged that 
Qualcomm’s refusal to license its SEPs to its modem chips competitors is 
independent anticompetitive conduct that violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and 
thus violates § 5 of the FTCA.”). 
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concentrated high-end smartphone market.518 If that occurred, 
competitive forces might then cause the benefits of 
standardization of smartphone technology to flow down to 
smartphone consumers even without their needing always to 
depend on the kindness of implementers or SEP owners. 
  
                                                          
 518. See United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973) (holding that, 
in an antitrust case in which the antitrust violation was furthered by the 
defendant’s use of patent control, compulsory product sales and patent 
licensing, on a RAND basis, are ordinary and customary forms of relief); id. at 
64 (“Mandatory selling on specified terms and compulsory patent licensing at 
reasonable charges are recognized antitrust remedies.”); see also id. at 59 
(“[M]andatory sales and reasonable-royalty licensing [of relevant patents are] 
well-established forms of relief when necessary to an effective remedy, 
particularly where patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed 
to the antitrust violation adjudicated.”); Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1225–26 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring non-
discriminatory, but not reasonably priced, sales of patented and unpatented 
repair parts, for ten years, as relief in monopolization case). Moreover, the 
growth of VoLTE, and the gradual replacement of legacy CDMA networks, see 
supra note 84, may erode the market power that CDMA SEPs confer, rendering 
Qualcomm’s present monopoly obsolete. See supra note 84. 
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APPENDIX A 
Network effects  
A network effect (also called a network externality or 
demand-side economy of scale) is the effect that additional users 
of a good or service have on the value of that product to other 
users. When a network effect is present, the value of a product 
or service is dependent on the 
number of others using it. The 
classic example is the 
telephone, in that the more 
people who own telephones 
that can interoperate, the more 
valuable the telephones are to 
each other owner.519 
Accordingly, one possible 
measure of the value of a 
network to a user is the 
number of possible 
interconnections the user can 
make, and the total value of the 
network is the number of 
interconnections that the 
network can make among 
users. As shown in the 
accompanying diagram, the 
number of possible one-to-one 
telephone conversations when 
there are two subscribers is 1. 
When there are three 
subscribers there are 3 
possible. For four subscribers, 
6. For five, 10, and so on. In 
other words, the first of n 
telephone subscribers can 
engage in n-1 possible 
conversations. The second one can engage in n-2 possible 
conversations (not including the already counted first 
subscriber). The sum S or total number of possible conversations 
                                                          
 519. See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A 
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY (1999). 
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is (n-1) + (n-2) + (n-3) ... + 2 + 1 + 0. (The last, nth one has nobody 
not already counted.) It can be shown that S = n(n-1)/2. 
Very roughly, the total value of an n-node telephone 
network is proportional to n2—more precisely, k2n(n-1)/2—the 
number of possible two-member combinations among the n 
nodes, where k2 is a constant representing units of benefit to a 
network subscriber. (If one considered three-party conference 
calls, which occur less frequently than two-person calls, their 
additional value would be approximately proportional to n3—
more precisely, S3 = k3n(n-1)(n-2)/6, where k2 >> k3. This 
additional increment is small enough to be ignored.) 
APPENDIX B 
Who Proximately Causes the Benefits of 
Standardization? 
The issue of who is responsible for creating the benefits of 
standardization, or who or what is the proximate cause of those 
benefits, is complex and difficult, riddled with public policy 
judgments. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the issue is 
relevant to a legal determination of reasonable royalty levels for 
SEPs, and the issues within that of whether to use as a royalty 
base the price of the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit or 
that of a downstream product. 
In many ways, this matter of the responsibility for creation 
of standardization’s benefits, particularly interoperability and 
network effects, is like the issue of remote or proximate cause in 
tort law. That issue, too, has been difficult to settle, and riddled 
with policy judgments. Moreover, distinguished jurists—
Cardozo, Pound, and Andrews, for example, in the Palsgraf 
case520—have disagreed over what is remote or proximate, direct 
or indirect, and foreseeable or unforeseeable, as well as those 
factors’ proper roles in deciding cases. 
Perhaps, a concrete example may help to describe the issue. 
Consider wheat flour and bread. Wheat flour is almost, but not 
quite, a but-for element for bread (like a technology covered by a 
SEP). (There are other grains, used to a slight extent for some 
                                                          
 520. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). Compare In re 
Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. [1921] 3 K.B. 560, with Overseas Tankship 
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. Ltd. (Wagon Mound (No. 1)), [1961] AC 
388 (P.C.) (describing Polemis as “out of the current of contemporary thought”). 
2018] WHO SHOULD OWN THE BENEFITS 247 
 
kinds of bread—for example, rye, barley, rice. They may be 
regarded as “alternative technologies.”) There are, however, 
other necessary inputs for bread—for example, yeast, sugar, 
salt, water, oil or shortening, not to mention other inputs that 
must be used, such as labor, ovens, fuel, pots and pans. 
Moreover, there are other inputs for standardization besides 
technology. Finally, wheat flour is an input for other things 
besides bread—spaghetti, pizza crust, brioches, croissants, 
cookies, wedding cakes. 
Imagine, now, that I am Mr. Miller, an individual wheat 
flour manufacturer and seller or the representative of a 
consortium of millers. I go to Mr. Baker to negotiate the future 
price of flour. “You realize,” I say to him, “that my flour is an 
essential ingredient for your bread and other products. Indeed, I 
feel I am responsible for creating the value of your bread, 
croissants, cakes, and so forth. Without my flour, you could not 
make and sell them. I have noticed that you use my flour in 
varying proportions (by weight) to make bread, brioches, cakes, 
etc., and the products have varying utilities to your customers, 
and they pay you varying prices based on the value to them of 
the different products.” 
I continue: “I propose to institute a new pricing regime. I feel 
that I am entitled to share in the value to the customer of what 
is made with my flour. It is only fair that I do so. I will no longer 
sell you flour at such and such a number of dollars per pound of 
flour. Rather, I will charge you in proportion to the value of the 
end products that you sell to the customer. For example, $1 per 
pound for flour used in making bread; $2 per pound for flour used 
for brioches; $3 per pound for flour used for wedding cakes.” 
What is the proper outcome for the discussion between Mr. 
Miller and Mr. Baker? 
SEP owners have no more claim to the value of downstream 
products than Mr. Miller has (or for that matter, than the wheat 
farmer has) to the value of Mr. Baker’s wedding cakes. One may 
multiply examples, such as the weaver of cloth or maker of 
thread having a claim on the value of the couturier’s dresses; or 
the seller of pots to the value of the chef’s menu items; or that 
Westlaw has to the revenue from users’ billable hours. We do not 
have, or wish to have, a society in which the sellers of inputs 
have a claim on the value of their customers’ downstream 
products. 
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In that case, one might say, why not just let the Invisible 
Hand of the free and open market determine the price of a SEP, 
with or without network value, as the process determines? But 
there is no free and open market for SEP-encumbered 
technology. The market has been irrevocably regimented, first 
by the patent system, then by standardization, which created 
the network effect of interoperability and simultaneously 
created monopoly power by prescribing standard technology, in 
place of free and open markets. For better or worse, the 
mechanism for SEP royalty determination we have, instead of 
the Invisible Hand of the market, is patent infringement 
litigation in the federal courts and an accumulation of many 
years of patent and antitrust precedents. Both bodies of 
precedent require that downstream use and price restrictions on 
sold goods must be reasonable, and to some extent outlaw them 
entirely.521 
Our SEP royalty system now operates substantially as a 
regulatory scheme in which the one-time role of the ICC for 
railroad rate regulation is played by the courts, usually the 
Federal Circuit, but sometimes another court of appeals such as 
the Ninth Circuit when only antitrust claims or breach of 
contract claims (rather than patent infringement or patent 
declaratory judgment claims) are at issue, with occasional 
further appellate review in the Supreme Court. The courts do 
not consider it proper for a seller of technology (or chipsets) 
essential to manufacturing standard-compliant products to price 
the technology (or chipsets) to implementers on the basis of the 
implementers’ standard-compliant products made by using the 
technology (or chipsets). Is that wise? That may be the wrong 
question (although the Federal Circuit has given good reasons 
for an affirmative answer). The right question, when one 
considers SEP-holder claims to be entitled to a share of the value 
of standardization, may be: is that legal rule permissible? 
SEP owners enjoy their monopoly power (to the extent they 
have it) only because the state (the government) tolerates their 
antitrust law-violating potential of designating some 
technologies as standard and excluding other technologies, 
                                                          
 521. See generally Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
1523 (2017); Continental T.V., Inc v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); 
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
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because of sufficient counterbalancing procompetitive effects of 
standardization. But the concerted restrictive action in 
standardization—a naked agreement among competitors not to 
manufacture, distribute, or otherwise deal in non-standard 
products, and thereby to exclude those products from the 
market, that leads to the conversion of patents into SEPs—is not 
free-market conduct, and therefore its SEP holder participants 
do not enjoy all the privileges of participants in a free market. 
They have obligations that are the quid pro quo for the 
governmental toleration of their concerted action and monopoly 
power. The obligations include not pricing their monopolized 
product (SEP technology or SEP licenses) at all that the traffic 
can bear, namely the ex-post value of the technology, including 
network value. 
That argument does not require the conclusion that none of 
the price increment (the surplus) resulting from state-
sanctioned creation of monopoly power should go to SEP owners. 
Rather, it could just as well follow, as some spokesmen for SEP 
owners suggest, that an undefined “proper” share of the entire 
surplus should go to SEP owners. But there are objections to that 
proposal. One is that no sound criterion has been proposed to 
determine the “proper” share, and if it is not well-defined, SEP 
owners (or some of them, who adhere to the precepts of Gordon 
Gekko) will try to seize all of it. A second objection, and to me 
the more important one, is that the state (acting through its 
agents that the law designates) decided to tolerate 
standardization’s otherwise unlawful concerted action—a 
naked, exclusionary agreement. Since the surplus exists only 
because the state decided to permit the monopolistic conduct, the 
state may (on Hobbesian principles) decide how to allocate the 
surplus (except for unconstitutional allocation decisions). That 
is, the state may decide to tolerate the monopolistic conduct of 
standardization on only such conditions as it chooses, so long as 
the conditions are not unconstitutional. The relevant 
conditions—ex-ante, upstream royalties based on the smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit principle—are not 
unconstitutional.522 
                                                          
 522. The condition that the surplus that standardization creates must not 
go to SEP owners and must instead go to implementers and consumers (per 
CSIRO) is hardly an unconstitutional condition. A due process or equal 
protection argument would surely fail because patent infringement litigation is 
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If the state decides to allocate the surplus value, over and 
above ex-ante value, to consumers, that is within its powers and 
is consistent with Benthamite and Millsian principles of how to 
operate a government. The state is not obliged to allocate a share 
of the surplus to SEP owners, as it presently declines to do (per 
CSIRO and its ilk). There is no reason for it to do so, absent a 
persuasive argument that doing so will more greatly benefit 
society than not doing so. That argument has not yet been 
satisfactorily made, as is discussed in Part VII. 
So, who or what is responsible for creating the benefits of 
standardization? At one level of analysis, it has been the 
members of the SSOs, as described in Part VII.523 But at a more 
fundamental level, it is the state, by its toleration of the 
monopolistic acts of standard-setting, in order to further the 
public good because of the perceived procompetitive benefits of 
standardization. Only the state, as the organ of positive law 
according to the will of the general public, has the sovereign 
power either to tolerate standard-setting, or leave it unexcused 
and condemned by the otherwise applicable principles of law 
(the Sherman Act). And thus the state creates (and proximately 
causes) the benefits of standardization. Other claims to be the 
Promethean fire bringer of standardization’s benefits are 
spurious. 
 
                                                          
due process, and SEP owners are not members of a protected class. Moreover, 
it is not a regulatory taking of property, for there never was any right to engage 
in the concerted restrictive activity involved in standardization. See Allied Tube 
& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988); Standard 
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). 
 523. See supra text accompanying notes 418–23. 
